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Author:  	Mr. Neal A. Davis (ndavis@mail.utexas.edu)
School:		University of Texas School of Law
Course:		Contracts
Year:		Fall 1995 and Spring 1996
Professor:	Robert Hamilton
Book:		Contracts, 2nd Edition, by Hamilton, Rau, & Weintraub

Message from the Author:

Thank you for downloading this outline.  I hope it is as helpful to you as it was to me.  If you use this outline, please send $1 cash to help cover my time and effort in making this and future outlines available.  My address is:

Neal A. Davis
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If you have any questions, feel free to e-mail me at:  ndavis@mail.utexas.edu

Your support will be greatly appreciated.  Good luck!

Sincerely,
Neal A. Davis

Contracts Outline

Spring, 1996

Prof.  Robert Hamilton

Book used in Hamilton’s class:  Hamilton, Rau, and Weintraub on Contracts (2nd Ed.)

Recommended Study Aids:  The Remedies Nutshell and the Emmanuel’s on Contracts are both outstanding for Hamilton’s class, and I cannot recommend them enough.  Even though the Emmanuel’s does a great job of covering the UCC, you may want to occasionally consult White and Summer’s superb hornbook on the UCC if you are having difficulties with particular UCC sections (such as 2-207!).  Because Hamilton, Rau, and Weintraub focus so much on remedies and have such an “unorthodox” approach to contracts, I do not think that, say, the famous Farnsworth hornbook on contracts or the Gilbert’s outline are very helpful at all.  

Other tips:  Prof. Hamilton (“Ham”) has his own views of practically every case in his casebook, and often times his views differ from the courts’.  It is very important on the exam to know what Ham’s view is of a certain case and how that case should have been decided, not what the judge actually decided.  For example, Ham will teach a number of cases where judges were quite liberal in deciding what constituted a contract or what remedy to award.  In most of these cases, Ham thought the judge displayed “sloppy sentimentality” and was not “hard-nosed” enough in his decision.  

Exam Tips from Ham himself

1. Questions are like an onion (many levels).

2. Most questions will not have a clear-cut answer (although some might -- just to keep us honest).

3. Assume that the reader doesn’t know very much law.

4. Do not assume that something you write in question 1 shouldn’t be written again in question 2.

5. Brevity is key.  Hamilton is suspicious of lots of writing.

6. Never, ever, ever paraphrase a statute! 

7. 	On questions dealing with a host of issues—such as mutuality, promissory estoppel, 
etc.—it is better to “cover all of the bases” than to go with one single theory and run.

					  Contracts

Consideration
						
I.  Consideration

	A. Must have consideration (“blinkum”) to enforce K:  In order to have a 	legally 	enforceable promise, there must be adequate consideration.  

		1. Definition:  Consideration is a legal term defined as a benefit received 			by the promisor or a detriment incurred by the promisee.  More 			practically speaking, the promisee’s detriment must have been bargained 			for by the promisor.

			NOTE:  Benefit to the promisor does not require economic benefit.  			Peace of mind or personal satisfaction is sufficient.  

				Example:  C promises to give $100 to R if he stops 						drinking for one week.  If R does so, can he enforce C’s 					promise?  The answer is yes, because the consideration 					which makes the contract valid (and thus enforceable) is 					R’s refraining from drinking, at C’s request (so it’s 						“bargained for”).

		2. Rationale:  We require consideration for enforceability because we 			don’t want to enforce gratuitous promises.

			Example:  Professor Foreskin tells Uribe that, if he does a 					cartwheel on the front lawn of the law school, he will pay Uribe 				$500.  Uribe agrees, and does cartwheel.  Is this a legally 					enforceable promise?  

			Analysis:  The answer is yes, because here we have both a benefit 				to the promisor (pleasure of seeing Uribe make a fool of himself) 				and a detriment to the promisee (Uribe making a fool of himself, 				giving up a legal right) -- each of which was bargained for.  

			NOTE:  The secret of consideration, according to O.W. Holmes, is 				“the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the 			other, between consideration and promise.”

3. 	Excepted classes where law generally refuses to recognize consideration (but where promissory estoppel might apply):

a. Promises close family members (although, promissory estoppel could apply here if there is detrimental reliance that the promisor could reasonably foresee).

				Example:  Dad promises to give son allowance for the next 					year if he cleans his room.  The son is grounded, and dad 					takes away allowance.  Can son sue for breach of K?  The 					answer is no, because there is no consideration in promises					between immediate family.  

NOTE:  If, however, the same scenario took place between two roommates or two distant relatives, then there would
be consideration and K would be enforceable.  (If dad were 60 and husband were 42, then this is more uncertain.)

				NOTE:  Hamilton says that you must objectify these 					situations (which frequently arise between husband and 					wife), rather than looking at them from a social standpoint.

			b. Social engagements

				Example:  Couple calls to cancel coming to dinner party.  					Can you sue for breach of K?  No, because social 						invitations are viewed as promises our legal system should 					not enforce.

			c. Jokes

			d. Gifts (although, promissory estoppel could apply here if there is
			detrimental reliance that the promisor could reasonably foresee)

Example:  Percy promises to give you $1000 to go to law school.  There is no consideration, because gifts like these do not increase society’s wealth (Hamilton says that gifts are a sterile transaction -- i.e., a zero-sum game, and that the legal system excludes them from enforcement for policy 	reasons.)  

					NOTE:  Even if Percy put in writing that he 							intended to be legally bound to give the gift, it 						would not be considered enforceable.

				Example:  A rich guy tells tramp, “If you’ll step around the 					corner, I’ll pay my tailor to make you a silk suit.”  There is 					no consideration because the tramp’s stepping around the 					corner is not a detriment to her -- it is merely an action 					meant to facilitate the gift.  The promise is considered a 					gift -- rather than something bargained for.  (Case of 					Willistons Tramp).

					NOTE:  This case is analogous to my stopping by 						Percy’s office to pick up $1000 for law school.

				NOTE:  If the promisor has already made the gift to the 					promisee, the rights of the promisor to reclaim it are 					governed by the law of property, not of contract.  Hamilton 					says, “You can’t be an Indian-giver.” 

  		4. Seals

			a. Common law:  Under common law, seals -- which served 				evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling purposes (just like a 				signature under SoF) -- were sufficient to make a promise 					enforceable.

			b. Today:  Attaching a seal to a contract today, however, does not 				make it any more or less enforceable than if it did not have the 				seal in most states.

		5. Contractual relationships

			a. Bilateral:  This is a promise made in exchange for a promise. 

				NOTE:  In a bilateral contract, the detriment must induce 					the promise, and that the promise induced the detriment -- 					thus, each party’s promise is the consideration for the other 					party’s promise.

			b. Unilateral: This is a promise made in exchange for an action (it’s 			contingent upon an action)

	B. Determining consideration:  In determining consideration, courts must 		determine motive of promisor as best they can under the circumstances (this is 	tough, however, because people often hide their motives).

		1. Acts incidental to a true gift promise are insufficient consideration:  The 		promisee will often take some sort of action in order to obtain the benefits 			of a gift promise.  If such action is deemed only incidental to the true 			gratuitous nature of the promise, the taking of such action is 				insufficient to act as consideration.

			Example:  Brother-in-law wrote to recently widowed sister-in-law, 				“If you come down and see me, I will let you have a place to raise 				your family.”  Sister-in-law moved to Alabama with her family, 				but brother-in-law would not provide her with a place to live.  Can 				court hold that this promise is enforceable?

			Analysis:  No.  Court found that the brother-in-law’s offer was a
			gift, and that sister-in-law’s move was merely an action to facilitate 			the making of a gift, rather than a detriment that was bargained for.  			[Hamilton says this ruling is questionable.]  Kirksey v. Kirksey.

				NOTE:  Had the brother-in-law written “I am lonely, please 				come down here,” then this will likely constitute 						consideration (reciprocal conventional inducement).

		2. Unsolicited action is insufficient consideration:  Actions taken without 			regard to the promise are not sufficient to serve as consideration. This 			issue most often arises when a party fortuitously accomplishes the acts 		called for by an offer, but is unaware of the offer while he is doing 			them.

			Example:  Harry places an ad in the local newspaper promising a 				$100 reward for the return of his lost wallet.  Tara, who is unaware 			of the ad, finds the wallet and independently returns it to Harry.  				Even though Tara did the acts called for by Harry in the offer, her 				actions were not made as part of a bargain with Harry.  That is, 			she did not return the wallet in exchange for Harry’s promise to 				pay the reward.  Thus, her acts cannot serve as consideration under 				the bargain theory.

	C. Invalidating promises with consideration --  Reasons for the court not to 	enforce contracts with consideration include (UCC 3-305(a)(1)):

		1. Fraud

		2. Duress

		3. Insolvency

		4. Infancy

		NOTE:  UCC also has an unconscionability clause, which is pretty 				general, that may apply to unfair contracts involving sale of goods 				(2-302).
		
	D. Adequacy of consideration:  Where there was a bargain, the court does not 		inquire into the adequacy (or fairness) of consideration, assuming the parties 	voluntarily entered the agreement both with about the same knowledge and 	expertise.  As mentioned above, courts may invalidate K if they involve fraud, 	duress, insolvency, or infancy.

		Example:  In Greece, a man loans a woman 500,000 Drachmae (about $25 		after the war) for the signing of a note for $2,000 at 8% interest to be paid 			to the man as soon as she returned to the US after the war.  The woman 			bought 5 gallons of oil and a couple of days of food to feed her family and 			keep them warm.  The court ruled that, in general, the parties know best 			what the value of things are, and the court should be careful to step in 			and set such value.  In this case, the contract was valid because there was 			barter, agreement and valid consideration.  Furthermore, the parties 			voluntarily entered the agreement with about the same knowledge and 			expertise.  Batsakis v. Demotsis.

			NOTE:  When evaluating fairness, courts must look at the contract 				ex-ante.

		Example:  Man is dying from a blockage of the intestine for which there is 		only one surgeon in the entire world who could perform the surgery.  The 			surgeon demands $1,000,000. Fair or unfair?  The surgeon has developed 			a unique skill for which he should be awarded, not penalized.  He has the 			right to do what he wants to with his services. 

		Example:  Man is in the back country of Arizona and is in danger of 			dying.  A car comes along and says that he will only take him to town if he 		signs over half his wealth. Hamilton says this is over the edge, as it is 			opportunistic since it is not based upon any developed skill by the person 			in the car.

		Example:  During a winter in Idaho, a village is cut off from outside 			communication and travel.  There is a virulent disease that may kill 			everyone, and the pharmacist has only four doses of the vaccine.  He 			auctions them off, and ends up owning the four biggest ranches in town. 			This is not duress, since the pharmacist and the people were in the same 			circumstances.

			NOTE:  If pharmacist gives himself one dose, and auctions off the 				others, then this would be closer to the edge, because he has cut off 			the market for this product.

	E. Enforcing invalid claims -- Case law vs. Restatement 

		1. Case law -- Generally speaking, case law has two requirements 				that must be met for a promissory note to be enforceable (as 				enumerated in Duncan v. Black):

			a. The claim must be made in good faith (you can’t use 					courts affirmatively to enforce bad faith claims); AND

			b. The claim must have some foundation (“molehill of 					possibility”) 

		2. Restatement -- Claim may be settled if it may “be fairly 					determined to be valid.”

			Example:  You are involved in a fender-bender, and you bargain 				with the driver of the other car to pay him $50 not to report the 				accident (you don’t want your insurance to go up, even though you 				do not believe the wreck was your fault).  This agreement would be 			enforced without regard to who’s at fault.   

			Example:  A neighborhood trouble-maker forges a promissory note 			in the name of the wealthiest man in the city, and threatens to 				smear his name if he doesn’t pay the price of the note.  This would 				not be enforceable, because it was not made in good faith 					(Hamilton says this is extortion).

Reliance on a Promise

I. Reliance on a Promise as a Basis for Enforcement

A. 	Promissory estoppel: The essence of promissory estoppel is the idea that the maker of a promisor may be bound by that promise, even though it is not supported by consideration, if the promisee relies on the promise to his detriment, and the promisor should have reasonably foreseen this reliance.  This is totally different from the consideration doctrine, which is designed to enforce promises which are “bargained for.”  It is a mistake to argue for promissory estoppel when there is consideration present.

1.  If someone gratuitously undertakes to perform something, they are subject to liability to promisee if personal injury results or if harm is suffered by promissee's reliance on the undertaking.

EX:  P had three houses, and relied on D’s letter saying that D had renewed P’s fire insurance policy.  Three years later, one of P’s houses burned down, and P learned that the policy did not cover that particular house.  The court held that P may hold D liable, if he proves he reasonably relied on the promise.  Colonial Savings Association v. Taylor

2. Promissory estoppel is often applied to enforce promises to make gifts
that induce detrimental reliance, even between family members.

EX:  P’s grandfather, promised her $2000 so she would “not got to work any more.”  Immediately, P quit her job.  He died one year later, and P brought suit against D’s estate for the money.  D’s estate argued that the $2000 offer was a “gift for nothing in return.” The court held that P
justifiably and foreseeably relied on her granfather’s promise of
payment, by giving up her job.  This reliance made the note enforceable, and operated to “estop” the executor from denying that the note was given for valid consideration.  Rickets v. Scothorn

3. 	Promissory estoppel has also been applied to situations where there 
have been promises by employers to pay pensions and other fringe benefits.  

EX:  D promises P a pension when she retires.  She retires shortly after this promise is made, apparently at least in part in reliance upon it. She 
does not seek other employment, and is eventually stricken with cancer,
making further employment impossible (if she were too old, she could also argue she could not gain further employment).  The court held that the
promise to pay the pension is binding under promissory estoppel since the
employee has reasonably and detrimentally relied upon it.  Her reliance
came in choosing to retire, since she was already at such an age (57) that
finding another job would have been impossible even had she not gotten sick. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer

		NOTE:  P immediately retired upon P’s promise.  If she had worked some
additional period after the promise was made, as in the example below, this additional work will be considered consideration (a “bargained-for exchange”).  

		EX:  D promised P money for her past work, so long as she stayed with the
company until her death.  In this written promise, D stated that the promise was “purely voluntary and gratuitous” and that D had no legal obligation to carry it out.  P’s estate sued for the money, after she had died.  Held: 
D had to still work as an employee of the company in order to receive the money, and this is sufficient enough to constitute consideration.  Ham
characterized this case as being “sloppily sentimental” and though the court stretched to find consideration.

B. 	The Restatement 90 has been instrumental in shaping the doctrine of promissory estoppel:

      “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
      action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
      and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
      can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The remedy…may
      be limited as justice so requires.”  R 90, Second Restatement
	
NOTE:  R90 in the Second Restatement, unlike in the First Restatement, does not require that the action or forbearance on the part of the promisee be of definite and substantial character.  Rather, there must be a reasonable amount of detrimental reliance.

R90 also applies to third parties:

EX:  A has a mortgage on B’s property.  B wants to re-finance with C.  A agrees to subordinate his mortgage to C.  C loans the money to B, but A refuses to give the money to C for the loan.  C has detrimentally relied on A, and is entitled to a remedy.	

C. 	Because promissory estoppel is based on the idea of reliance, the most
common measure of damages in promissory estoppel is reliance damages—putting P in the position he would have been before the promise had been made.
But restitution and expectation damages can also be appropriate in certain situations (i.e., P could argue for expectation dams--profits or other financial gain he would have earned since he relied on D’s promise).

D. 	Charitable organizations do not have to show detrimental reliance in order to
collect on a promise.  A charity can collect without consideration or reliance.

II. 	Promises as Consideration:  the Problems of Mutuality

A.  Unilateral v. bilateral promises

1.  Unilateral: One party promises to do something, and the other party is
free to act or not as he wishes.  The offeree’s act is the consideration for
this kind of contract.

EX:  A says to B, “Don’t smoke and I’ll pay you $500.”  The bargain which A has proposed is not an exchange of promises, since A does not
seek to have B promise to do anything.  Instead, A has proposed to 
exchange his promise (to pay $500) in return for B’s act of not smoking.
Thus A has made an offer for a unilateral contract, since B is not bound
to do anything, and the offer is accepted, if at all, by B’s act rather than his
promise.	

2.  Bilateral:  A contract which consists of an exchange of promises.  
Both parties promise to do something.  PromisorPromisee and 	 PromiseePromisor.  There must be “mutuality of obligation”—
the consideration of the second promise is the first promise and vice-versa.

EX:  A says to B, “I promise to pay you $500 on April 15 if you promise to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge on April 1.”  B’s walking across the
		bridge is consideration for A’s promise to pay for it, even though B is
		never bound to walk across the bridge unless he chooses to do so. 

		NOTE:  As Ham points out, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish
		between these two types of contracts.

3. 	General rules about promises:

a. 	Manifold promises do not need separately supported promises. 
			It is sufficient if a bundle of promises is supplied by a return 
			promise.

b. 	Promises also need not be co-extensive.  They can be for 
different amounts of time. 

c. 	The question of when performance (i.e., payment) is due is 
independent of when the contract exists. 

EX:  A has B, a builder, build a house according to specifications.
A has no obligation to pay until contract is completed.  This has nothing to do with whether K existed at the outset.  Thus, if K is
not completed, the owner can sue for a breach even though he has
not paid on the contract.  

B.  The problem of mutuality: In order for there to be a promise, the promisor 
and promisee must limit their freedom of  voluntary choice in the future.  Furthermore,  a prediction of future willingness is not necessarily an expression of present willingness and is not a promise.  There must be mutuality of promises in some minimal way, meaning that the promises of both parties must be substantive enough to limit their freedom.  

In the following examples, lack of obligation—or mutuality—is used by a party in order to avoid carrying out its alleged promise.  In these cases, the court either:

(i) 	characterizes the insubstantial promise as illusory and thus 
	      lacking consideration  OR
	
(ii) 	read the apparently insubstantial promise so as to give it
substance that it appears otherwise to lack, so that it is not
illusory and there is consideration.

EX:  P writes to D that it “may order from time to time” some iron.  After P ordered iron a few times, D refused to supply it anymore.  D argued that K was void for want of mutuality, saying that since the company did not bind themselves to take any iron from D, his promise to supply them with iron was without consideration.  Ham says there is no promise or consideration here, since P’s offer did not control its future action.  P could have made an offer with consideration if: 1) P wrote that D would be P’s exclusive supplier (which would create a requirements contract); 2) P agreed to buy a certain amount per year from D; 3) if P made a standing offer (i.e., it would pay D $20 to fill each order for the next year); or (4) the written agreement implies that both parties are relying on each other, and thus there is consideration.  The court ruled that D’s performing on agreement was consideration for P’s promise, and that if D had told P, before he filled the first order, that he would not perform the agreement, then he would be justified in saying there was no consideration in K.  Great Northern v. Witham

EX:  D tells P, “If I can buy the ship, I will charter your lumber from the U.S. to
	Latin America.”  P accepts the offer.  When D acquires the ship, he charters it to 	
	a third party instead of hauling the lumber, and thus does not comply with K.  
D argues that, because his offer was a condition and not a promise, that there is no K for want of consideration and mutuality of obligation.  Held:  Once D bought the boat, his freedom was curtailed—his offer was converted into a promise, and he had to perform K within a “reasonable time.”  Scott v. Moragues Lumber

1. The requirement of mutuality does not mean that the promisor’s obligation must be exactly co-extensive with that of the promisee.  It is enough that the duty unconditionally undertaken by each party be regarded by the law as sufficient consideration for the other’s promise.

EX:  D leased a filling station to P.  D reserved the right to terminate the lease upon ten-days notice.  D canceled P’s lease.  P filed suit, arguing that the lease is lacking in mutuality since the lessee can terminate K upon ten days notice, while no similar privilege is granted to lessor.  Held: this contention was without merit, and the requirement of mutuality does not mean that the promisor’s obligation must be exactly co-extensive with that of the promisee.  Lindner v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.

2. 	If there is any right to enforce the promise, then that would constitute 
		consideration, and if that right existed, even for the shortest space of time,  
	then it is enough to bring the contract into existence.  

	EX:  D entered into an agreement with P to ship glass, with  a provision to 
allow P to cancel order if it so desired.  D refused to ship glass at P’s request, so P filed suit.  D claimed that since buyer had the unconditional right to cancel, there was not consideration for D’s promise to sell.  Held: Since D might have shipped at the same time that he accepted, there
was one clear opportunity to enforce entire K, which the buyer could not have prevented or nullified by exercising his option.  Gurfein v. Werbelovsky

NOTE:  Ham says this case takes finding consideration (and Linder) to the “extreme”

3. 	Requirements and output contracts: Under a requirements contract, the seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy all of the goods of a particular kind that the buyer may require in its business.  
It assures the buyer a source of goods.  Under an output contract, the seller agrees to sell and the buyer agrees to buy all of the goods of a particular kind that the seller may produce in its business.  It assures the seller a source of goods.  Ham says that these types of Ks do not necessarily need a high degree of specificity.  A buyer’s agreement to buy goods at a certain price is sufficient, since it is implied he will only buy those requirements, if he buys them at all, from that
particular seller.  

a. 	Earlier approach - In the past, the courts held requirement Ks invalid for lack of consideration.  They held that although the seller had undergone a detriment (by promising to sell at whatever price the buyer required), the buyer had not in fact bound himself to do anything at all, since he could refrain from having any requirements. See Schlegel v. Cooper’s Glue. 
	
b. 	Modern approach - But such requirements and output Ks are
	verly likely to be enforced today, at least if it can be found that 
	the buyer has implicitly promised to use his best efforts to
	sell the goods (or that the seller in an output K has implicitly 
	promised to attempt to maintain his production at a  
	reasonable level), and the bargain is not otherwise unduly one-
	sided.
	
c. 	UCC approach - Under 2-306, the UCC validates requirements and output Ks.  Under 2-306(1), the court decides whether:
		
(i) 	the quantity by the output of the seller or requirement of the buyer occur in good faith  AND
(ii) 	the quantity is not unreasonably disproportionate

2-306(2) contemplates that the buyer in a requirements K will deal exclusively with the seller with whom he has contracted--  he will buy all of his requirements from that seller—and that he will use his “best efforts.”  Comment 5 discusses the “reasonable diligence” and “good faith” in performance of contract.

			     When a change in market conditions occurs (i.e., because of
			     a recession or technological advances), then a seller cannot 
			     get out of a K and the buyer can not dramatically increase 
			     purchasing goods, since these would violate the “good faith”
			     and “unreasonably disproportionate” clauses of 2-306.  
		  
			     UCC 1-201 defines “good faith,” but this does not really help.
			     Posner implies “good faith” is present where there is a sound
			     economic rationale.  Good faith does not mean the best reason
			     in the world, just a good one.  Posner says that the “good faith”
			     clause of 2-306(1) applies to situations when the buyer demands			                 less (due to economic reasons) from seller than the agreed upon 
amount, while “unreasonably disproportionate” clause applies      to situations when the buyer demands more.  Empire Gas v.
American Bakeries

4. “Good faith” is one of the terms most frequently supplied by the courts in cases not necessarily falling under the UCC.  This implied “good faith” promise is used as sufficient detriment to P to constitute consideration.  Ham says that courts often imply “good faith” in commercial contracts.

EX:  D, a fashion designer, gives exclusive rights to P to market her clothes.  D puts her endorsements on the designs of third persons, so P sues for b/K.  D claims that K fails for lack of consideration, on the grounds that P did not bind himself to do anything, since he was not obligated under K to sell anything at all.  Held:  P can be impliedly found to have promised to use “reasonable efforts” to market D’s designs.  This implied promise  of  “good faith” is used as sufficient detriment to P to constitute consideration for D’s counter-promise that she would not place he endorsement on anyone else’s designs.   Wood v. Lady Duff

5. Restatement 77:  A promise which reserves to the promisor several alternative performances is generally consideration only if each of the alternative performances would have been consideration (restricts the future freedom of the promisor) if it had been bargained for alone.  R77 makes all conditional promises acceptable, even though it is within the power of the person to act or not act on the condition.  

	 	EX:  A promises to B: “I will choose to do what I choose to do, or I
might possibly sell you the boat.”  This is not a promise because neither option restricts A’s freedom in the future.  Similarly, A promises B: “I will either get a job, or perhaps I will go to college if I feel like it.”  While the first option restricts A’s future freedom, the second one does not, and thus this promise lacks consideration.

EX:  A promises to B, “If I buy a boat, then I will charter your lumber.”  This can be broken down, under R77, into two separate (alternative) promises: 1) I will not buy a boat  or  2) If I buy a boat, I will charter your lumber.  Ham says that each of these alternative performances restricts A’s freedom, and thus there is consideration.  

6. Termination of dealership or franchise: One situation in 
		which the court is frequently asked to imply a term is where one
		party holds a franchise or dealership for another’s products, and
		the latter exercises a right, recited in the contract, to terminate the
arrangement without cause.  When this happens, the franchisee or seller commonly asserts the existence of an implied duty on
		the part of the franchisor/manufacturer not to terminate without
		cause, and to provide reasonable prior notice of termination.  The
court generally will not use the obligation of good faith (UCC 1-203) or find an unconscionable clause (2-302) to override a specific contractual clause, particularly when there are
two sophisticated parties involved.

EX:  D, an appliance manufacturer, and P, an appliance distributor,
sign a contract in which P receives the exclusive right to distribute D’s products.  The contract provides that it may be terminated by either party “at any time for any reason” on ten days’ notice.  D gets angry with P and terminates the agreement, and P files suit, claiming that the termination was in violation of the UCC obligation of good faith.  Held:  The good-faith obligation of 1-203 cannot be used to override or strike express contractual terms.  The good-faith concept should be used only as an implied contractual provision for application in situations where the contract is no explicit or is ambiguous.  The clause here is not unconscionable, since it allowed parties to nullify the contract without consequent litigation or if they found a better economic deal.
		
NOTE:  Auto dealers and franchises have gotten state legislation passed that holds that there should be no termination of contracts 
	without “good faith” or “good cause.”
		
7.  Employment at will:  Employers traditionally have been able to fire employees at will for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being guilty.  This doctrine has been considerably eroded.  Legislation now protects employees from being fired because of their race, gender, age, handicap or union membership.  Also, the courts have argued that firing an employee is “against public policy” if he refused to violate the law.  Belline v. K-Mart.  Furthermore, courts have interpreted employee handbooks and written policy in such a way as to impose contractual limits on the employer’s right to fire.  Finally, if an employee has worked for a long time, or they have survived, say, a three month probationary period, then “good cause” generally must be shown in order to fire him.

		NOTE:  Ham says that the problem with these policies is that, 	
		while they protect the employee, the put a heavy burden on the
		employer should he decide to fire someone.  Furthermore, he is someone 
skeptical when it comes to the court, as it did in Belline, making policy, which is best left up to the state legislatures.

III. 	Pre-existing Duty as Consideration; Modification and Discharge of Contractual Duties

A. 	The previous few sections dealt with whether there was a return promise
(mutuality), or whether the return promise is illusory.  This section deals with
a promise that already exists, and whether an employee has a duty to carry out
that promise.

B.  The pre-existing duty rule: Where one person promises another that he will do what he is already legally obligated to do for that person, then this promise is
not a “detriment” sufficient to satisfy the consideration requirement.  Courts
will often look for duress or extortion, and whether the re-negotiation was reasonable and fair under the circumstances,  when deciding how to apply the pre-existing duty rule.  

Rationale:  Courts want to deter “hold-up” behavior by which one party attempts
to take unfair advantage of the other by threatening not to live up to his obligations.  Courts want to cut down on opportunism and exploitation by people already under a legal obligation.

EX:  Ps, a group of workmen, sign a contract at a fixed rate to work on D’s ship during the salmon canning season.  When the ship arrives in Alaska, Ps tell D that they will not work anymore unless D gives them a substantial increase in raise.  Ps claimed their nets were bad, but the court disagreed with this (had the nets actually been bad, then Ps could have gotten out of K because bad nets were not contemplated in the original K).  Since D has nowhere to get replacement men, he agrees to the raise, and Ps work.  D then refuses to pay money, so Ps bring suit.  Held: D’s agreement to pay the extra money was without consideration, since Ps were simply agreeing to do what they were already bound to do under the contract.  Furthermore, Ps conduct was coercive. Alaska Packers

1. 	Rewards and bonuses:  Generally, it is held that a promise to pay a reward or bonus will be unenforceable for failure of consideration, if the promisee is already under a legal obligation to perform the act being rewarded.  But Ham suggests that a promise to pay a raise or
give a bonus should be enforced for reasons of equity.  He says that
consideration in this situation is the employee working harder.
Now, if a raise is given strictly based on past performance, there is
generally not consideration, but a smart lawyer will include in the
raise some kind of consideration.

EX:  B, a contracted employer, works for a week for A, his employer.  During that week, A says to B that he is such a good worker that he will pay him twice as much.  When it comes time for an increase, A either changes his mind or dies.  Ellenborough’s principle states that if one is under  a legal duty to another, that person ought not to exploit his duty, even in non-emergency situations.  Thus, according to Ellenborough, it is all right for A to back out of his promise.  Ham says that this principle, if applied literally, causes unreasonable and unjust results.  He thinks employer ought to pay his promised raise, while Ellenborough would let him off.  A court could stretch to find consideration, saying that the consideration in this situation is the employee working harder as a result of the raise.

2.  Re-negotiation: Of course,  if situations or conditions arise that are not contemplated in the original contract, then courts will allow the parties to re-negotiate K, so long as there is no duress or exploitation. 
		
		EX: A signs contract to fish on Saturday for B, his employer.  The weather 
		is not very good—cloudy with a very high tide.  Good weather was 
implied in K.  If A refuses to fish unless he is paid double, and B agrees to
pay A double, then a court will most likely find consideration since bad
weather was not contemplated in the original K.  

3.  Manipulation:  The pre-existing duty rule can be manipulated and has a “certain capacity for mischief.”  Lawyers, in particular, can manipulate this rule.

EX:  Employer forms a contract with fisherman, but the parties agree to re-negotiate it.  Employer pays fishermen a nominal fee for their work.  Then  the fishermen agree to terminate the contract.  The next day, the parties
re-negotiate and form a new agreement.  This agreement is valid because there is consideration.

4.  “Right to breach”:  Some courts will stretch to find consideration, arguing that the ability to breach is itself consideration.  We saw this in one case.

EX:  Ps agree to get married.  Shortly before their wedding, D agrees to pay them $2500 a year following their marriage.  After paying for 10 years, D stopped paying Ps.  P brought suit, and D defended himself by
arguing that there was no consideration since Ps were already engaged and
bound to go through the wedding.  Held:  There was consideration because Ps could join together legally (mutually rescinding) and call off the 
engagement.  DiCicco v. Schweizer

5. 	No consideration in the line of duty:  If a person already 
has a legal obligation to carry out his duty (i.e., a police officer), then he cannot collect rewards because there is no consideration.  Otherwise, there would be bad policy.

EX:  A posts a sign offering $1000 to find his stolen car.  B, a waiter, finds
the car, and can collect the reward since he has no pre-existing duty to find the car.  But C, a police officer, cannot collect the reward if he finds the car, since he did it within the line of his duty.  

Rationale:  Police, for example, would search all day for stolen goods with rewards if they could collect rewards.   

6.  Partial payment is not consideration for liquidated debts (the Foakes rule):  The Foakes rule holds that since the debtor owes his creditor the full amount, he is not by paying a partial amount doing anything  that he was not already legally obligated to do.  Thus, the creditor’s promise not to require payment of the full amount due, or giving the debtor extra time to pay the debt, is not binding for lack of consideration.  The Foakes rule has been limited to only when the debtor makes part payment of an amount that is indisputably due (“liquidated”), and due on the date that the part payment is made.  In these situations, there is no consideration.

EX:  P obtains a judgment for 2,000 against D.  The parties agree that P
will accept in full satisfaction of this judgment 500 in cash and the rest 
in installments. D fully complies with this agreement, and pays of the balance.  P then brings suit for the interest on the part paid off in installments.  D claims that the “installment payment plan” constituted a discharge of any obligation by D to pay interest.  Held:  The extended payment plan cannot constitute consideration for a promise of discharge, since D only promised what he was already obligated to do.  D must pay the interest.  Foakes v. Beer (1884)

NOTE:  Courts generally do not apply the Foakes rule to unliquidated debts because it would discourage a useful commercial transaction and breed litigation.

7. 	Partial payment is consideration for unliquidated debts (exception
to Foakes rule):  The Foakes rule applies only to debts which the
parties are in agreement as to amount and liability (called “liquidated debts”).  If the debtor in good faith and not unreasonably disputes his
liability on the debt, or if he reasonably and in good faith disputes the amount of the debt (an unliquidated debt), then a settlement by which the creditor agrees to take less than he thinks is due is enforceable.  There is
consideration here because a new agreement is made.

EX:  Creditor asserts that Debtor owes him $1000.  Debtor claims, reasonably and in good faith, that he owes Creditor only $500.  Creditor agrees to accept a $750 check in settlement of the debt.  Debtor’s payment
of $750, since it is payment on a claim that is legitimately in dispute (an
“unliquidated debt”), is a detriment and is consideration for Creditor’s
promise to discharge any part of the debt which might still remain.

8. 	Unliquidated debts and checks:  Where the creditor accepts a check marked “paid in full” for a “part payment” of an unliquidated debt, then the full debt was discharged.  Where the amount of a debt is
unliquidated (in dispute), the tender of a certain sum as “payment in full”  followed by its acceptance and retention constitutes an accord and satisfaction.   State Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Corp.
	
a. 	“Paid in full” must be legibly written and noticeable on the
check (it cannot be in superfine print).

b. 	If the creditor does not think the debt is “paid in full,” then
he should not endorse or deposit the check.  He should immediately return it to the debtor and contest the amount.

c. 	The written memo must be in good faith.

			EX:  A owes Visa $1000.  He knows that he owes this amount and 
			that he cannot contest it.  He sends in a check for $500, with
“payment in full” written in the memo section.  This debt would not be discharged because the memo would not have been written 
			in good faith.

9.  Executory accords:  An executory accord is an agreement by the
parties to a contract by which one promises to render a substitute
performance in the future, and the other promises to accept that
substitute performance in discharge of the existing duty.  The original contract is not discharged, and creditor can still enforce it, until
the is accord and satisfaction.

EX:  Debtor (D) has a contractual duty to pay Creditor (C) $1,000 in 30 days.  C promises D that if D pays $1,100 in 60 days, C will accept this
payment in discharge; D promises to make the $1,100 in 60 days.  The new agreement is an executory accord.

Executory accords can be viewed in two ways:

a. 	The nature of the agreement is to substitute a contractual
obligation for an unliquidated (disputed) claim AND

b. 	An agreement to settle is not accord and satisfaction until the
debtor pays the agreed-upon amount.

EX:  A hits B’s car, and it is unclear who is at fault.  The Damage to B’s car is $500.  A asks B if they can settle, and B agree to settle for $300.
There is an executory accord here ($300 will be paid in exchange for discharging the $500). Once the $300 is paid, there is an accord and
satisfaction.  An agreement to settle is not accord and satisfaction until the
debtor pays the agreed-upon amount.  If the amount is not paid (there is
never accord and satisfaction), then lawyers will sue on the original
amount, not the agreed amount, for damages.  They can do this because
it is an executory accord, which means that the original amount due
($500) is not discharged and can be enforced.

10. 	Substituted agreements: Unlike an executory accord, the previous 
contract is immediately discharged and replaced with a new agreement.  It is can often be difficult distinguishing an executory
accord from a substitute agreement, but the answer usually depends on
what the “intent of the parties” is.  Under a substitute agreement, the
original contract is discharged and the creditor immediately loses
his right to enforce that original contract.  

EX:  D promises to pay C $1,000 in 30 days.  C says to D, “If you promise to pay me $1,100 in 60 days, I will immediately cancel the $1000 debt due in 30 days.”  Debtor promises to do so.  The parties have made a substituted agreement, immediately discharging the original debt.

11.  UCC and pre-existing duty:  The UCC contains many principles inconsistent with the common law view of pre-existing duty.  The following provisions—1-207, 3-311, 2-209, 3-303, and 3-304--deal with the pre-existing duty in some way:

a. 	UCC 1-207:  Majority of courts say that 1-207 does not apply 
to situations where a creditor writes “under protest” on a check that has “paid in full” filled in the memo section, and then
proceeds to endorse or deposit the check.  1-207 does not apply to checks.  It generally applies to situations where, for example, a manufacturer is afraid of continuing with his performance for fear that it will waive the other party’s breach.

b. 3-311: This section deals with the check problem, covered under
1-207, more explicitly.  Under this section, where the creditor accepts a check marked “paid in full” for a “part payment” of an unliquidated debt, then the full debt was discharged.  The debtor,
of course, must have acted in good faith.  But the debtor must show
that the employee of the creditor that received the check or the creditor, if it is an organization (as opposed to an individual), knew that the debtor was proposing an accord and satisfaction.

b. 2-209:  2-209(1) explicitly removes the consideration requirement to modify an existing contract.  This goes against the common law, which does not enforce modifications absent new or different consideration under the pre-existing duty rule.  2-209 also provides that modification must be in writing if the contract as modified would be within the Statute of Frauds (i.e., is for more than $500).  However, there is a caveat to 2-209(1)—other provisions in the code hold that any change to an already existing contract:

(1) 	must be done in good faith (1-203) AND

(2) 	Must not be unconscionable (2-302)

However, 2-209(2) and (3) are merchant specific (i.e. apply to car dealers, not some Joe selling his car to his neighbor) and hold that there can be “no oral modification” of the contract if there is a clause in K explicitly stating something like “this contract cannot be subsequently modified except in writing.”   But 2-209 (4) operates as a “waiver” to 2-209(2) and (3) if, say, there is detrimental reliance on what the merchant’s oral modification.

c.  3-301(1):  See White & Summers

d. 	3-304: See White & Summer

12. 	Waiver of claims:  If there is a breach of an extended contract, one
must act on it at the time he learned of the breach, or he could end up waiving his claim.  This waiver does not need consideration or detrimental reliance for it to be binding, since it is not really a promise.

Rationale:  This prevents people in extended contracts from bringing up
complaints later on, after there has been a breach. 

EX:  After their separation, D agreed to pay P for alimony and child support in exchange for P allowing D visitation rights and to allow him
to declare children as deductions for income tax purposes.  D’s promise was dependent on P’s promise.  A few years after this agreement, P 
stopped D’s visitation rights, but D kept paying child support.  Over ten years later, D stopped paying alimony, and P brought suit.  D defense was
that he stopped paying alimony because P did not allow him to see his children.  Held:  D intentionally waived his visitation rights by not filing suit for b/K in a timely manner.  D should have brought suit immediately against his wife for breaching their agreement, instead of waiting so long to make the charge as a defense to his wife’s suit, and thus he has waived his claim.  P is entitled to recover past-due alimony.  Wheeler v. Wheeler

IV.  "Past”Consideration and Moral Obligation

	A.  A moral obligation is not consideration for a 	promise (Majority view):  A 	subsequent promise to pay for unrequested services is not enforceable, even if the 	recipient has incurred a substantial benefit from those services.

	EX:  P took care of D's son without being requested to do so and 
	for so doing was promised compensation for expene arising out
	of the rendered care by D.  D later refused to compensate P.  
	Held:  The existing moral obligation is not a sufficient basis
	for the enforcement of an express promise to render the 
	performance that the obligation requires.   Mills v Wyman     
 
	Rationale:  There are several reasons for this rule: 1) the 
	promise was made without real thought as to the 	consequences   2) No 	bargained for exchange and 3) No reliance on the part of promisee.

	B.  There are a number of exceptions to this rule, where 
	promises are held to be binding even though there is no 
	consideration:  

		1.  Debts barred by Statute of Limitations
			
			a.  A new promise to pay a debt, where SoL has run, 					starts the statutory period running again.

		2.  Debt of infants
		
		3.  Debts of people in bankruptcy 

	C.  A moral obligation is consideration for a promise (minority view):  A 	subsequent promise to pay for unrequested services is unenforceable, if the 	recipient has incurred a substantial benefit from those services.

	EX:  A saves B's life in an emergency.  B promise A $15 every 
	two weeks for the rest of A's life, but stops paying after eight
	years when B dies.  A brings suit.  Held: B's promise is 
	enforceable, even without consideration, because B incurred
	substantial benefit from A's act, even though B did not
	request the act.  Webb v. McGowin

	NOTE:  Ham thinks Webb is a "stretch," presumably because of
	the rationale he stated above for the majority view.

	D.  The Second Restatement, Part 86: R86 adopts the minority  view above, "to 	the extent necessary to prevent injustice."  R86 generally applies to commercial 	transactions, but a similar approach, as in Webb, has been used in highly
	emotional cases involving individuals.       

	E.  Quasi-contract: In certain situations (i.e. emergencies), the law of quasi-	contract, or "restitution," allows the person rendering the services to recover their 	reasonable value.  A subsequent promise by the recipient to pay a particular
	sum may constitute evidence of the value of the services, even though the promise 	is not enforceable.

	F.  Implicitly or explicitly requested acts, and a 
	subsequent promise to pay:  A subsequent promise
	 for a previous act done at the request of the promissor is sufficient 	consideration for that promise to be legally 	binding.  This request may be an 	implicit or express one.

	EX:  Between 1930 and 1949, P provided peronal services to
	D (his aunt) and her corporation.  In 1949, D signed 	"agreements" stating hat she 	would pay P $150 per month for his services between 1930 and 1949.  D argued 	that these were past services, and thus could not be consideration
	for a promise.  Held:  The subsequent promise for a previously
	requested act is consideration.  D's request was implied, and D's services were not 		gratuitous, and thus had consideration since they were of a business nature.  Reece 	v. Reece

V.  Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment

	A.  A person can collect for quantum meruit on the theory of unjust 	enrichment if he can prove that another person benefited from using his idea.

	EX:  P wrote an unsolicited letter to D suggesting it come out 
	with a new line of soap called "Blue."  Subsequently, D
	came out with a soap called "Blue Cheer," so P sued claiming
	D was unjustly enriched by P's idea.  Held:  Case was dismissed,
	since there was "considerable doubt whether P could sustain 
	her burden of proof at trial.  Glannis v. Proctor and Gamble

		1.  One way companies can protect themselves from these
		types of suits is to establish a fire wall between 						researchers and the people who read the letters.

WRITE A SECTION ABOUT QUASI-Ks

Intention, Interpretation, Implication,
and Related Mysteries

I.  Determining whether there is a Contract

	A.  Objective v. Subjective Intent
	
		1.  Objective intent (general approach):  The general view is that the 			objective intention of the parties--what they said and how it would be 			interpreted by a reasonable person under the same or similar 				circumstances--is the test for whether or not there is a contract.  The acts 			and words of a party, not its intent or beliefs, determine whether there is 		a contract.  It does not matter whether or not both parties think they are 			bound; what matters is whether objectively there is a contract.  

		Rationale:  It is very difficult to prove what one thought
		subjectively.  Subjective intent is elusive.
	
		EX:  A tells B he will sell B his $100 watch for $80.  A is joking, but B 			takes him seriously.  If it is reasonable for B to take A seriously (i.e., B has 		no way of knowing that A is a joker), then there is a binding contract, even 
		though A will deny it.  But if B knows A is joking, then 
		there is no K.

		EX:  P's written employment contract expired, and he
		demanded that D either re-hire him or he would quit.
		P alleged D said, "Go ahead, you're all right.  Get your
		men out and don't let that worry you."  D denied that
		he intended to create a K.  Held:  The secret feelings,
		intentions or beliefs of a party will not affect the 
		formation of a contract if their words and acts
		indicated that they intended to enter into a binding
		agreement. J/P. Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods

			a.  If parties know that they are joking when
			they make promises to each other, then there is 						no contract, even if they think they are bound legally.

			Rationale:  There is no social value or benefit in
			enforcing such promises.

			EX:  A draws a check for $300 payable to B and 						delivers it to B in return for an old silver watch worth $15.  Both A 			and B understand the transaction as frolic and banter, but each
			believes they are legally bound.  No contract. 

		2.  Subjective intent (rarely applied):  Very 
		rarely, the subjective intent of the parties 
		determines whether or not there is a contract.

		EX:  P brought suit, alleging that D promised to provide
		helicopter services for a construction project.  P said
		that he felt in his own mind that there was a binding
		agreement with D.  D disagreed.  Held:  In face-to-face
		negotiations, words and acts are not everything, and
		factfinder can take into consideration what a party
		thought he was doing. J/P. Kabil Developments v. Mignot	

	B.  Attaching Different Meanings to a Contract

		1.  If parties reasonably attach different meanings, then there is no K 			(Peerless rule): The traditional approach, rarely used today, is
		that there is no K if parties reasonably attach different meanings to a 			material term.  The most common cause of attaching different meanings is 			an ambiguous term.  Ham calls the Peerless approach "extreme."
				
		EX:  A offers to sell B goods shipped from Bombay on the steamer 			"Peerless."  B accepts.  There are in fact two ships in Bombay named 			Peerless, one leaving earlier and the other leaving later.  A subjectively 			intends later Peerless, while B means the earlier one.  Held:  There is no K
		because A and B reasonably attached different understandings to 				"Peerless," and neither had reason to know of the other's different
		understanding.   Raffles v. Wichelhaus Ham says there would be a K had a 		person  with superior knowledge taken advantage of the other person.

		NOTE:  Ham says that "meeting of the minds" is a misleading, 				disengenuous term.  Do not use it on an exam.  The better term is:  At one 			point in time, both parties had the same idea. If this point in time 			occurs, then there is agreement of terms and thus a K.

			a.  Party with superior knowledge cannot take advantage of the 			one with inferior knowledge:  If there is an ambiguous term, and 				one party knows that he has a different understanding as to the 				meaning of that term than does the other party, a contract will be 				formed on the term as understood by the other unknowing 				party.  

		2.  Second Restatement, Section 20: R20 adopts
		Peerless rule.

			a.  R20(1):  There is no contract if both 							parties, or neither party, is at fault.

			b.  R20(2): The party more at fault runs the 						risk of having the opposite party's 								interpretation to be found binding.

		3.  If parties reasonably attach different meanings, then there is a K 			(modern approach): Today, the courts will strain to find that there is 			a K, particularly when there is partial or full 	performance. The courts will 			resolve ambiguities through interpretation.  

			a.  Approaching ambiguity:  The courts will:

				1.  See if the term is truly ambiguous.  If it is
				not (i.e., it is not used in a trade or does not 
				have a special import), then courts will 							interpret the word as to what it commonly 							means.   If it is ambiguous, then  
		
				2.  Courts look into the background of 
				the word and how it has been used in a 
				special manner (i.e., in a trade)--see below
		
			b.  Trade usage:  A party has leeway in showing 						that a particular term is in accord with custom
			or usage.  A party or the court can get at trade 						usage a number of ways:

				(1) Call in experts in the industry to testify
				how the trade uses a certain word.

				(2) See how the term in question is used
				in communication surrounding K (perhaps							parties did understand, or should have
				understood, what the terms meant from 							communication leading up to the actual K).
			
			A person cannot claim ignorance when it comes to certain 				trade usage--he is bound by that usage, whether he understands 				the trade terms or not. But some courts, as appeals court did in U.S. 			Naval, will hold that the burden is on the party familiar with the 				trade usage to explain to the other unknowing party what that usage 			means.

			c.  Burden of persuasion:  The burden is on 						the party seeking to interpret the K terms in
			a narrower sense than their everyday use or 						trade usage.  Thus, if the evidence is split down
			the middle, then ruling will probably be in D's favor
			if P has the burden of persuasion and does not
			meet it.

		 NOTE:  Ham emphatically states that in these cases where there is 			ambiguity, the courts will look to, say, the use of the word 					in a trade and, if necessary, the circumstances surrounding K, but they 			generally do not look to the parties' subjective intent (they may 				say this, but they don't do it).  Courts do what is reasonable given the 			circumstances of K, and try to reach an equitable result.
  
		4.  UCC approach:  The UCC takes a relaxed, liberal approach towards 			interpreting vague terms in a contract.  There are three sources in the UCC 		dealing with K terms: course of performance (2-208), course of
		dealing (1-205(1)), and usage of trade (1-205(2)).  Keep in mind that the 			following principles are broader than just transaction of goods, and
		there is really no reason why 2-208 should not fall under Article I.

			a.  UCC 2-208:

				(1)  2-208(1)--Course of performance:  A "course of 					performance" refers to the way that parties have 						conducted themselves in performing the 
				particular contract at hand.  The idea is 							that the parties' own actions supply evidence 						as to what they intended the contract terms 							to mean.  Note 1 emphasizes this.

				(2) 2-208(2)--Hierarchy of 
				interpretation:  The court shall try
				to reasonably interpret contract.  But if
				K is too inconsistent, then the ct. should 							follow this hierarchy of most to least
				important priorities in interpretation:

					(a)  Examine express terms
					(b)  Examine course of perf.
					(c)  Examine course of dealing
					(d)  Examine usage of trade

				EX:  A agrees to sell B 100 dozen rabbits.  
				If they have never had such a transaction,
				then 2-208(2) holds that 100 dozen means
				1200 rabbits.  But if they had a contract,
				and A already shipped B party of the 100
				dozen shipment and it was clear that a 
				dozen equaled 10 rabits, then under 2-208(1)
				"one dozen" would be interpreted as 10.  
				R220 holds this view, stating that trade 							usage should be read as part of K if 
				that usage is present in K.

				NOTE:  This hierarchy is not the only one way 						of approaching vague terms.  The court might,
				say, decide that even if there is no course
				of performance or course of dealing, then 							usage of trade will override the express 							terms.  Ham says that a court, if goods are 
				involved, will read 2-208(2) in such a way that
				will allow for an equitable, reasonable outcome.
				They will find a way, if there is evidence of it
				in parties’ agreement, to hold that 100 dozen means
				1000 rabbits.

			b.  UCC 1-205:

				(1) 1-205(1)--course of dealing:  A 
				"course of dealing" refers to how the parties'
				prior transactions define their obligations and 
				duties.  It refers to past contracts, not to
				the contract in question.  Thus, if a particular
				term in a prior K had been interpreted by the
				parties in a certain manner, this 								interpretation would be admissible to show 							how the terms should be interpreted in the 							current K. 

				(2) 1-205(2)--usage of trade:  The 
				meaning attached to a particular term in
				a certain region, or industry, would be
				admissible.   

		5.  Supplying and defining essential terms to clear up vague or 				ambiguous contracts:  If a term essential to a determination of the 			parties' rights and duties is either missing or is vague, then a court can 			supply or more specifically define the term if it would be reasonable 			and equitable under the circumstances. A major or essential term is 			one that goes to the substance of the contract.

			a.  Second Restatement: R204 Adopts
			the view above.  R33 adds that if K is
			definite enough to 1) determine when there
			is a breach and 2) allow for reasonable
			damages to be awarded, then K is not void
			for indefiniteness.

ASK HAM IF THIS APPLIES ONLY TO ORAL Ks, OR IF CTS EVER READ TERMS INTO WRITTEN Ks.

		EX:  D verbally promised P that if P worked for him, D would  "provide 			medical insurance for P."  P got injured on the job, and D refused to 			provide the insurance. Held: Oral K was too vague to enforce.  Actions 			Ads v. Judes. 	But Ham says that this ruling would be devastating, since
		it would nullify informal K situations for want of specificity.  He says that 			ct. could supply the essential terms missing from the promise, and that it 			should have followed R204.   

		EX:  A promises to give B a raise if B continues working
		for A.  B backs out.  Under traditional view, cts. would 
		say that the "bonus" is too vague and thus unenforceable.
		But Ham says the bonus should be upheld, as long as the
		court can reasonably flesh out the details.

		EX: P entered into a long-term K with D.  D stated that
		P have adequate shipping capacity available and P 
		would use such capacity if P wished to transport the	iron.  The actual K 			stated, "If, in any season, there is no regular...contract rate...the parties 			shall mutually  agree upon a rate...taking into consideration the rate
		being charged for similar transportation by other shippers."  The parties 			agreed to agree on a price. The parties referred to "Skillings Mining 
		Review," a publication, to establish their rates.  After 25 years of P 				shipping D's iron, the iron market bottomed out and D could no longer pay 		the high price of shipment.  P sued, saying that K was enforceable up until 			2010, and asked ct. to set a price.  P argued that price should be $9 a ton 			and D argued that K was not valid because pricing mechanism had broken 			down.  Held:   K clearly established the intent of parties' intent to be bound 		to work together.  Consequently, in this situation the court could 				reasonably fill in the price to obtain a fair result.  UCC 2-305(1) is a good 			guide, even though this is a non-goods situation, and $6 per ton is a 			reasonable market price.  Oglebay Norton v. Armco	
	
		EX:  In 1924, D, New York City, entered into a K with
		two towns, saying that it would take care of their
		sewage and keep up any subsequent operation and
		maintenance of the sewers it constructed.  D also
		agreed to extend sewer lines "necessitated by future
		growth."  In 1975, P, a developer, wanted D to 
		construct sewers for his 50-house development, but
		D did not do this because the sewage system was
		already overloaded.  Held:  Where K is vague as to 						duration of K, it is not assumed that the parties are perpetually bound;  the 			court establishes a reasonable period of duration for K that is not contrary 			to public policy. J/D.  Haines v. City of N.Y.  Ham says cts. legislate 			all the time to resolve Ks like this.
	
		NOTE:  Ham says that it is more difficult for cts. to fill in terms of real 			estate contracts since they are "site specific" and are more difficult to 			value than, say, cars or other goods.  Terms included in a real estate 			transaction, such as "reasonable rent," or using the Consumer Price
		Index to account for increases or decreases in prop. value
		due to inflation, can help.  Cts in general are reluctant,
		though, to fill in terms of a real estate K.  When
		negotiating a real estate K, Ham says that there should
		be enough specificity for "court to hang its hat on."

			b.  UCC approach:  The UCC has liberal provisions
			allowing the court to fill in the terms, so long as
			goods are involved. (But courts have sometimes 						applied the approaches of these UCC to non-good 						situations, such as in Oglebay example above).

				(1)  2-204(3):   As long as there is
				1) intent to enter into K and 2) a
				reasonable basis for a remedy,
				then a K for goods is enforceable. 
				The Official Comment states that
				the more terms left open, the less
				likely there is a K.

				(2)  2-305: As long as there is intent
				and a reasonable basis for a remedy under
				2-204(3), then the parties can omit 
				many terms.  The courts can fill in the
				following terms:  price, place for 
				delivery, time for shipment or delivery,
				time for payment, etc.  See actual
				UCC for penciled in sections depending
				on missing terms.

			c. Williston:  Argues that courts should be
			able to provide minor terms, not just major
			or essential terms, if they are missing from K.  

		6.  Impossible to get rid of all ambiguities and
		vagueness in a contract:  Ham points out that it is
		not possible to draft an airtight K because:

			a.  Blind spots are difficult to spot
		
			b.  One can never predict what will happen. 							Unexpected events arise AND

			c.  It becomes hopeless to address all potential
			scenarios.

		Ham, who considers himself an excellent contract 
		draftsman, says you gotta bite the bullet and use
		vague language.  If it is reasonable, the courts will
		try their hardest to resolve vague or ambiguous language.

		7.  Agreements to agree: The parties may form an agreement about 			something, with an essential term or terms unfilled, intending to agree 			upon that term or terms in the future.  This is an "agreement to 				agree."  Sometimes, courts have to determine whether such an agreement 			is a contract.  The following elements taken into consideration when 			deciding whether an agreement is a contract or a non-binding tentative 			agreement:

			a.  Whether a party in writing or verbally expressly reserves the 				right to be bound only when the actual written contract is signed.

			b.  Whether the party objecting to the agreement
			accepted partial or full performance.  (If so, it
			is likely to be found that there was a K)

			c.  Whether all essential terms of the contract
			are agreed upon in an agreement to agree.

			d.  Whether the magnitude of the agreement was
			such that the parties expected a formal contract
			to be drawn up and specify the details.  

		NOTE:  Ham points out that there is objective test here,
		not a subjective test of parties' intent, to determine if there is a K.  
			
		EX:  A says to B, "I'll buy your various properties for
		$100 million" at a cocktail party.  B accepts the offer,
		but the next day B backs out.  A sues B, claiming that
		the agreement to agree was a binding K.  This broad
		of an agreement on such a complex transaction would
		probably not constitute a K, since so many details had
		to be worked out.  How would property be financed?
		How would A pay B? etc. 	

		EX:  P agrees to buy a 3/7 share of the Getty entities, and they sign an 			agreement to agree on the amount and price of shares to be sold.  The day 			after the agreement, the Wall Street Journal breaks the story.  D, Texaco,
		then tries to make a deal with Getty, squeezing P out of the picture, and 			Getty negotiates.  P takes D to court for interfering with the deal.  D 			defends, saying that the agreement was not a binding K.  Held:  There is
		a great deal of evidence supporting view that the agreement is a K, 				including the fact that Getty held numerous press conferences and gave 			"golden parachute" retirement benefits to its employees.  Texaco v. 			Pennzoil. Ham added that the D could argue that the agreement was 			illustrative of the parties' attempt to negotiate in good faith, and that D 			interfered with this good faith negotiating.  Because of this interference, D 			could say it only owed the cost to Pennzoil for the negotiations,
		not billions in punitive damages for interference.

Offer and Acceptance

I. Offer and acceptance

	A.  Offer and acceptance in general:  "Offer" and "acceptance" are necessary 		elements of a contract.  The offeror is the person making the offer while the 	offeree is the person to whom the offer is addressed.  The offeror 	is the master 	of his offer--he decides to whom it is addressed--while the offeree has the power 	to enter into a contract by making his acceptance.  Only the
	offeree can respond to the offer.  Thus, if the offeror 
	addresses his offer to A, then A, not B, can act on that offer.

	INCLUDE BASIC TERM. HERE FROM 431-

	B.  Promise contained in offer: In most cases, the offer
	will contain a conditional promise, and will propose that the
	other party accept the proposal by making a promise in
	return.

	EX:  A makes the following offer to B: "I offer to buy your 1974
	Buick for $2,000 delivery and payment to occur three months
	from now."  What has done through his offer is to make a 
	promise to pay B $2,000 conditional on B's making a promise to
	deliver the car to A. Thus A has proposed that the parties
	exchange promises.
	
	C.  Offer and acceptance specifically:  There is no specific, definite language 		that unequivocally creates an offer.  Even language, such as "this offer expires 	12/31," does not necessarily create an offer.  Generally, though, "I offer" or "I 		guarantee" will more often than not create an offer, while "In my opinion" or "I 	quote" will not. The reasonable person standard is the test of whether there is 	an offer--would a reasonable person in the position of the offeree have 	understood the offeror as having made an offer, not just stated an opinion or 	an invitation to bid or offer.  This is based on the language of the offer, the 	circumstances 	surrounding it, whether recipient has reason to suspect that 	the 	communication is an offer and not an advertisement (i.e., it 	has previously been 	solicited by the seller), and so on.

	EX: Ham says to his contracts class, "I offer to sell my Toyota truck for $500 to 	any member of this class."  This is an offer since there is a specific offeree--any 	member of the class.  It also helps that the price as well as the quantity and type
	of good being sold are specifically mentioned.
	
	EX:  D sent a letter to P, stating: "Gentlemen: I have about 1800 bu. or thereabout 	of millet seed of which I am mailing you a sample.  This millet is recleaned and 	was grown on sod and is good seed.  I want $2.25 per cwt. for this seed." P 	responded, requesting a sample, but D refused to deliver and P brought
	suit.  Held: This is not an offer.  The language of the letter is general--"I want" 	instead of "I offer"--the kind used in an advertisement. The letter clearly intends to 	be a request for bids, not an offer. Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh.  Ham added that 	clearly a reasonable person, in the position of P, would understand the letter 	as an advertisement and a request for bids, not an offer.  Also, this letter is plainly 	not an offer because there is a limited amount of seed (1800 bu.) that is enough 	for a single or just a few purchasers, and this supply could not possibly meet every 	buyer's demand.

		1.  Responding to specific requests:  If a seller places an ad and a buyer 			specifically responds to the ad and requests the price and quantity of what 			is being sold, then if the seller responds there will most likely be
		found to be an offer.  But if the buyer just requests
		a price list, then the seller's response would probably
		not be considered an offer since the buyer's request
		lacked specificity (i.e., items and quantity available).

		EX:  P writes to D, asking for the "lowest price you can make" on a certain 		number of Mason jars.  D writes back, "We quote you Mason...jars...pints, 			$4.50...for immediate acceptance." P responds and requests"10 carloads as 		per your quotation," but D declines the order, so P sues.  Held: D's use of 			the phrase "for immediate acceptance" must have meant that P was
		empowered to book the order immediately, without further approval, and 			thus the quotation was an offer (Ham says that "for immediate acceptance" 		could also mean that the price is available for immediate response,
		and is not in itself an offer in tender).  Fairmount Glass Works v. 				Grunden-Martin.  Ham adds that one could argue that this is also an offer 			because the seller responds to the buyer's specific request that included
		price and quantity.

ASK HAM IF IT WOULD BE AN OFFER IF SELLER JUST SENT A STANDARD PRICE LIST IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC REQUEST

		3.  Advertisements as offers:  Most advertisements
		appearing in the mass media (on TV or in newspapers or
		circulars), in store windows, etc., are not offers to sell,
		because they do not contain sufficient words of 
		commitment to sell and they do not specifically 	
		create the power of acceptance in the oferee.
		Even if an ad says, "not valid with any other offer," it
		does not necessarily mean that ad is an offer.

		EX:  The Greensheet has an ad: "Tulips for $20 a dozen
		at Capa Verde Flowers."  This general advertisement
		is not an offer since it does not create the power of
		acceptance in an offeree.  Otherwise, a person could
		request 500 dozen and deplete the entire stock of
		tulips.  If a person did request 500 dozen tulips, then
		this would be an offer to the florist, and the florist
		can either reject or accept this offer. 

ASK HAM IF SUIT IN WINDOW DISPLAY IS CONSIDERED AN AD
AND THUS NOT AN OFFER, AND IF NOT, WHY?

			a.  Caveat:  But if an advertisement contains 
			words expressing the advertiser's commitment or
			promise to sell a particular number of units,
			or to sell the items in a particular manner,
			then there may be an offer.  "First come, first
			serve" in an ad will probably create an offer.

			EX:  D placed two separate ads: "Saturday 9 A.M. sharp, 3 brand 				new fur coats, worth to $100, first come, first served, $1 each" and 				"Saturday, 9 A.M., 2 brand new pastel mink 3-skin scarfs,
			selling for $89.50, out they go."  When P arrived Saturday morning 			to purchase the merchandise, D said that there was a "house rule"
			that the ad was intended for women, not men.
			P sued, and D defended by saying that he could
			revoke the offer any time before acceptance.  
			Held:  This is an offer. It is true that an offer may
			be revoked or altered before acceptance, but here
			D  revoked the offer after P had accepted it.  
			Furthermore, the the language here is so clear,
			definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open
			for negotiation, that there must be an offer.							Damages will be awarded for the second ad, but
			there can be no expectation damages for the
			first ad since it is too difficult to assess the
			value of the coats, which could be worth "up to
			$100" (which means anywhere from 1 cent to
			$100).  Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus

			b.  Misleading Ads and Scams:  Courts will
			often find an offer in a misleading ad, if a 
			reasonable person would do the same.  Superfine
			print will be disregarded if the ad
			as a whole is clear.  Courts come down hard
			on misleading ads and scams, such as the 
			bait-and-switch routine, where an offer is
			made not in order to sell the advertised product
			at the advertised  price, but rather to draw the
			customer to the store to sell him another similar
			product which is more profitable to the advertisor.

			EX:  D, a car dealer, placed an ad in the newspaper, 						stating that any trade-in will contribute a m							minimum trade-in credit of $3000 toward a new 						car.  P attempted to trade in his car and buy a pick-						up, but D explained to P that he misunderstood the
			ad and that fine-print at the bottom of the ad 
			stated that the credit only applied to a new 
			Aerostar or T-Bird.  P sued.  Held:  A contract must
			be viewed as a whole, and any repugnant clauses
			must be given an interpretation that will reconcile
			them.  Applied to this case, this rule would 
			disregard the superfine print.  This ad is a classic
			example of the "bait-and-switch" scam.  A
			binding offer may be implied from the fact that
			misleading advertising intentionally lead a 
			reasonable reader to the conclusion that such an 
			offer existed.  Izadi v. Machado Ford

			NOTE:  Ham says that contract law was not
			intended to apply to misleading ads.  
			Legislative acts dealing with false advertising
			and unfair trade practices is better equipped
			to deal with cases like Izadi.  Ham also thought
			that offer and acceptance can be stretched 						too far in non-contractual situations (i.e. seeing a college 				application or a ticket spitter as offers).

II. Revocation, Rejection and Counteroffer as well as the “Mailbox Rule”

A. 	Revocation:  Prior to acceptance, an offer can be altered or revoked.  After 	
acceptance, an offer cannot be altered or revoked.  However, there are several
	exceptions to this rule allowing revocation:  (1) the standard option contract;
(2)  “firm offers” under the UCC; and (3) temporary irrevocability as the result of
	the offeree’s part performance or detrimental reliance.

	EX:  On Wednesday, D gave a writing to P giving P until 9 A.M. on
	Friday to accept D's offer to purchase land and buildings upon
	it.  On Thursday afternoon, D sold the same property to another
	person, Allan.  P heard of the sale, just before it occurred, and
	left a letter with D's mother, an elderly lady, stating his acceptance of the offer.  	D's mom forgot to give the letter to D, and the sale went through.  P sued for 	specific performance.  Held:  There was no acceptance of the offer.  D could not 	have reasonably known that P accepted his offer.  Since there was
	no consideration given for the promise, D was free to do whatever he wanted 	before receiving P's acceptance. Dickenson v. Dodds

	NOTE:  Had it been found that D did form a contract for one piece of property 	with two different people, then those people can: 1) seek specific performance or 	2) seek damages (i.e., reliance). Each person will be awarded one or the other of 	these remedies.

		1.  Notice: A revocation by the offeror does not become effective until 			it is received by the offeree.  This notice can be either direct or indirect
		(through a third party).

			a. Indirect revocation:  If the offeror behaves
			in a way inconsistent with an intent to
			enter the contract he has proposed, and the
			offeree learns indirectly that the offeror has
			taken such an action, there is a revocation,
			even though the offeror never intended to 
			communicate directly with the offeree.  Thus,
			in Dickenson, there was revocation when P learned
			from a third-party that D was going to sell
			the property to Allan.  The test here is if a reasonable
			person in the position of the offeree would interpret
			the indirect notice as a revocation (the same test for whether
			or not there is an offer).
	
		UCC 1-201(26) adopts the same standards as the common law for 			determining whether there has been notice and revocation.

2. 	Exceptions to general rule of revocation:   There are three 
exceptions to the rule that an offer is irrevocable anytime before acceptance:  (1) an “option contract,” (2)“firm offers” under UCC 2-205, and (3) temporary irrevocability as the result of the offeree’s 
part performance or detrimental reliance. 

a. 	Option:  In an option, there can be no revocation.  An 	
example of an 	option would be if A pays B nominal consideration ($1) or more for Blackacre.   A then has three months to decide
if he want to pay $10,000 to purchase Blackacre. An option can be viewed as:

				(1)  Keeping the contract open OR
(2) 	An irrevocable form of an offer

			Generally, option state a fixed price (the “strike price”) and
			a period of time within which buyer can act on the option.

b. 	UCC 2-205 (“firm offers”): 2-205 allows the formation of an 
irrevocable offer under certain circumstances when there has been no consideration paid.  An offer by a merchant (defined in 2-104 to mean a person dealing  professionally in the kind of goods in question) to buy or sell goods is irrevocable if:

(1) 	It is in a signed writing AND
(2) 	It gives explicit assurance that the offer
will be held open.

			Whether or not a time period is stated or not, an offer under 2-205
			cannot be made irrevocable for a longer period than three 				months.  If the time period is not stated, then it is irrevocable for
			a “reasonable time” (within three months of course).  

			NOTE:  Ham has used 2-205 on exams before.

			c.  Part performance or detrimental reliance:  Discussed below
			under “Acceptance by Performance or Promsise”

B. 	Rejection:  A rejection terminates an offer, and the offeree cannot come 
back later to accept the offer unless: 1) the offeror indicates that the offer still
stands despite the rejection or 2) the offeree states that although he does not now 
intend to accept the offer, he wishes to consider it further.  

C. 	Counteroffer:  If the offeree makes a counteroffer, his power to accept the
original offer is terminated just as if he had flatly rejected the offer. 

1. 	Rephrasing counteroffers:  Counteroffers can be rephrased is such
a way so as to not destroy the power of acceptance.

EX:  Ham advertises his truck to A for $500.  A responds, “I will only 
accept for $350.”  A’s response is a counteroffer and his power to accept
the original offer is terminated.  But if A says, “I will pay $350 right now
for your truck; otherwise, I’ll think about it,” then he has not made a 
counteroffer and has left the deal open.

2. 	Conditions v. Counteroffers:  Do not confuse adding conditions
with a counteroffer.  An example of a condition added:  “I accept, but if
you can deliver it tomorrow.”  Conditions occur when, after acceptance,
conditions are added.

3. 	Options and counteroffers:  If there is an irrevocable offer due to
an option, then the general rule that a counteroffer terminates the power of
acceptance does not apply.  Ham says the traditional law of offer and
acceptance does not apply in these kinds of cases, since options are more
like a property right (i.e., the buyer decides if he wants to act on option and take possession of the real estate, securities, etc).

EX:  In return for a payment of $50 by Buyer (B), Seller (S) gives B a two-
month option to purchase a certain tract of land on certain terms.  Before
the option expires, B sends S a letter stating that B will exercise the option
if S will give better terms. Soon afterwards, B attempts to exercise the 
option on the original, less favorable terms, but S claims B’s attempt to get
better terms was a counteroffer that terminated the option contract.
Held:  “If the original offer is an irrevocable offer [in this case as an option
contract] the rule that a counteroffer terminates the power of acceptance
does not apply.  Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Westside Investment Corp.

D. “Mailbox rule”:  The so-called “mailbox rule” applies to letters, but
	also acceptances and revocations dispatched by other means (i.e., telegrams).  E-	mail, faxes, and other forms of modern communication have rendered the mailbox 	rule anachronistic in many states.

	NOTE:  The mailbox rule almost exclusively applies to bilateral contracts--
	where there is one promise in exchange for another promise—since unilateral
	contracts request performance (or some act in exchange for the promise).

		1. Acceptance:  Acceptance is effective and the contract is 
		formed when the letter is sent, not when it is received.  
		
		Rationale:  After mailing the acceptance, the offeree is likely to 
		change position in reliance on the existence of a contract since
		he will assume the offeror desires the transaction.  It also protects				offeree in the event that offeror tries to pull out, before he receives the 			letter of acceptance, for economic reasons (i.e., due to market changes).

			a.  Lost transmission: If the acceptance is properly 
			dispatched but is never received, is received after a reasonable time 			passes, or is received after a time and date established by the 				offeror, then a court will most likely discharge the offeror from his 				contractual obligation.

			EX:  A mails to B an offer to lease land, saying, “If I
			do not hear from you by noon Friday, I shall conclude No.”
			B telegraphs “yes,” but the telegram is not delivered 
			until after noon on Friday. Any contract is discharged.				
			b.  Acceptance followed by rejection and vice-versa:

				(1)  After offeree first sends acceptance, then he
				sends a rejection, the rejection is invalid, even if 						rejection reaches the offeror before the acceptance does.

				(2)  After offeree sends rejection, then he sends
				an acceptance, the acceptance is valid, if it is
				received by the offeror before the rejection.						Here, the date the acceptance is mailed is not
				relevant—what is relevant is when the letter is received.  					Otherwise, the rule would be irrational.

			NOTE:  If there is uncertainty as to whether there is acceptance,
			the burden is on the offeror to see if there is acceptance (i.e., to see
			if a letter has been mailed).  

		2.  Offers, revocations, and counteroffers: Effective only at the 
		time they are received.

a. Crossing communications:  If identical offers cross in the
mail, a contract is not formed since neither offer intended to manifest assent to the offer of the other.  But in a more realistic scenario—if negotiations are underway and the parties exchange crossing communications which, taken together, indicate agreement on all terms, then there is a contract

III. 	Acceptance by performance or promise

A. 	Temporary irrevocability caused by party performance or detrimental 
reliance:  There are a number of situations in which an offeree might, before the
formation of a formal contract, take action in reliance upon the offer.  He might,
for instance, begin the performance that is called for by an offer looking to
a unilateral contract.  Or, he might make costly preparation in anticipation of a 
contract before he actually accepts the offer.  The Second Restatement therefore recognizes three situations in which an offeree’s actions in reliance upon an 
offer may render that offer temporarily irrevocable: 

(1) 	The offer is for a unilateral contract, and the 
offeree begins to perform (Second Restatement, Section 45 applies)

(2) 	It is not clear whether offer is for a unilateral or 
bilateral contract, and offeree begins to perform 
(R32 and 62 apply) OR

(3) 	The offeree makes preparations to perform prior
to acceptance (R87 applies)

	NOTE:  Ham says it is sometimes very difficult to distinguish “beginning to
	perform” and “preparing to perform.”  There is a fuzzy line between the two.

1. 	Offer for a unilateral contract: If the offer makes it clear that
acceptance can occur only through performance, and not through promise
(i.e., the offer is for a unilateral contract), the beginning of performance 
by the offeree creates an option contract.  That is, once the offeree
starts to perform, the offer is irrevocable. R45(1). (Wormser’s
early approach, which seems inequitable since it makes offeree 
“pay for it,” holds that the offer is irrevocable up to when performance is complete).  Under R45, the offeree has no obligation to complete performance.  The effect then is to restrict the power of the offeror. 

EX: D tells P, “If you provide me with a loan commitment within 30
days, you will receive 1% of amount of the loan as payment.”  This
is clearly a unilateral contract. P spends considerable time and money in 
negotiating such a loan.  He submitted an application to D which called for
a loan which did not exactly conform to the requirements of the 
agreement.  D rejected it, and declared the contract over, even though the
time had not run. P brought suit for breach, and D claimed that, since it
was a unilateral contract, it was revocable any time prior to performance.
Held: The expenditure of time and money is sufficient part performance
of a unilateral contract to render it irrevocable. Ham adds that the real
issue in this case is D’s anticipatory repudiation before the 30 day period
was up. Sunshine v. Manos  Ham says that D should have waited 30 days, then walked away and not paid since P had not met the requirements of the agreement.  Obviously, if contract had expired and P had not performed at all, it would not be possible for D to collect damages at all since it is up to P to accept the contract.  

a. 	Offeror’s duty is conditional upon complete performance 
by offeree:  Although in this unilateral contract situation, the
beginning of performance by the offeree makes the offer 
irrevocable, the offeror’s duty under the contract is conditional
on the offeree’s completing performance as specified in the offer.
R45(2). He must complete performance within the time specified or, if that is not specified, within a reasonable time.

EX:  D, a widow, writes to Ps, her daughter and son-in-law, 
who live in another state.  The letter states that if Ps give up
their home, and come to live with and care for D during her
life, she will leave Ds her farm when she dies.  Ds give up their
home, move in with D, and begin caring for her. No contract
exists until Ps have completed the performance asked for in D’s
letter (i.e., until they have care for her up to her death).  However,
because Ps have begun to perform, D is bound by an option contract, and her offer is irrevocable as long as Ps continue to perform. Ps are not bound by any contract, and may cease performance whenever they wish (thus declining to exercise their option).  Brackenbury v. Hodgkin. Ham says this case was
decided unfairly.  Ps should have been awarded reliance damages
under R90.  Also, court should probably not be a referee for 
family’s problems.  

ASK HAM WHY R90 WOULD APPLY HERE?  DOESN’T R90 ONLY APPLY WHEN THERE IS DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE AND NO CONSIDERATION (OR IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, WHICH DOES NOT REQUITE CONSIDERATION, AND R90?  IN BRACKENBURY, THERE IS CONSIDERATION (future payment).  WHAT ARE DAMS FOR an R45 situation where buyer has breached K?  

HYPO:  A says to tailor, “Make me a suit, and I’ll pay you $1000.”
After tailor starts making the suit, A revokes.  Under R45, tailor
has already begun performance and an options contract was 
created.  Thus, he should receive reliance and lost profits damages.
But he might have an obligation to mitigate damages.

b. 	Two limitations to the types of situations with which R45 is
designed to deal:

(1) 	Unilateral Ks:  First, R45 is limited to cases where the
offer is for a unilateral contract, i.e., where the offer calls
for acceptance by performance, rather than by promise.
(If it not clear whether acceptance is to come by promise or
performance, then R62, not R45, applies).

(2) 	Preparations for performance: Secondly, R45 takes
effect only when the offeree starts the actual performance
requested by the offer.  It does not take effect upon preparations to perform.  

				EX:  D holds a mortgage on P’s property. D offers to give
				P a $780 reduction in the amount of the principal if P will
				pay off the mortgage before the end of May.  In late May,
				P goes to D’s house and tells him, “I have come to pay off
				the mortgage.” D replies that he has sold the mortgage.  
				P shows that he has enough cash to pay the principal less
				the $780 discount, but D refuses to take it. Here, there
clearly a unilateral K—a promise (to discount the mortgage) in exchange for the performance of an act
(tendering the payment by a certain date).  D could
revoke his offer any time before acceptance—which he
did—and D in this case had notice of revocation.  P sues
				D claiming that he accepted an open offer for the $780
				reduction.   Held:  The only act requested by D’s offer was 
				the actual tender of payment.  Until that tender, D was 
				free to revoke his offer. Since D revoked before P made the
actual tender, there was no contract. J/D.  Petterson v. Pattberg.  Ham says that if P had whipped out his money
and said, “I tender you $4000” before D had been able to say “I revoke,” there would have been full acceptance, since there was tender before D refused to take the money.  Ham also says that, if envelope of money was pushed through D’s mail slot, that would probably be acceptance (otherwise, it seems unfair). He adds that the court may have been too rigid not finding acceptance here (nowadays, formal tender is not often required). Note that the mailbox rule does not apply in this case since D has to 
act—tender the money—not just send an acceptance.

d. 	Prior to common-law view:  Prior to the enactment of R45,
a court would find that the offeror could revoke and offer for
a unilateral contract any time up until complete performance of K.  Wormser adopted a similar view (A offers B $100 for
crossing a bridge—A can wait until B is halfway across and revoke).  Ham says this was just not equitable.

e.  Measure for dams under R45:  Under Rule 45, the measure of 
damages is “expectation” (i.e., lost profits), while under R87(2) P only receives “reliance” damages (i.e., the amount by which he has suffered by relying on the offer).

2. 	Unclear whether offer is unilateral of bilateral:  Suppose that the 
offer does not make it clear whether it is to be accepted by a promise or performance. This will often be the case, for example, where a buyer sends a seller a purchase order that does not make it clear whether acceptance is to occur by the seller’s promise to perform (i.e., his sending an acknowledgment form), or by his actual performance (i.e., his actual
performance). In this situation, the offeree may accept either by promising to perform or by performing, at the offeree’s option. R32.  Also in this situation, an acceptance occurs as sonn as the offeree begins to perform. R62.

NOTE:  Ham says that R32 applies to almost all day-to-day contracts
where it is unclear whether a unilateral or bilateral K is being offered.
Examples of pure unilateral Ks, and when R45 would apply, are suretyships, awards, etc.

EX: A tells B, “I’ll give you $1000 for a suit.”  B says, “I accept.” Under
R32, B’s promise to perform is acceptance of A’s offer.  A is bound.

a. 	Effect of beginning to perform (offeree is bound to 
complete performance):  Where the offeree has a choice between accepting by promise or by performance, he is protected against the offeror’s revocation.  In this respect, he receives the same protection under R62 as he does under R45.  However, there is one crucial difference between R62 and R45:  Under R62, once the offeree begins to perform, he accepted the contract and is bound to complete performance, while under R45 he is not bound.

b. 	Preparations for a performance:  R62, like R45, only
takes effect when actual performance has begun, not when 
preparations for performance are made.  Here again, however,
preparations may make the offer temporarily irrevocable under R87(2) (discussed below).

c. 	Notice of acceptance under common law when contracts
			take a long time to perform:  If the performance is lengthy, and
			not likely to come to attention of the offeror, then offeree must
			give notice to offeror of performance (Restatement 54):

			EX:  A tells B to build a porch at his lake house, which will take 
			two months to complete.  Under R54, B must give notice to A
			that he is beginning performance or accepting the contract,
			otherwise the contract lapses and is not binding.

d. 	Notice of acceptance required under UCC 2-206(2):  2-
206(2), like R62, states that an offeree may bind both himself and the offeror by beginning his requested performance. Under 2-206(2), however, the beginning of performance operates as an acceptance only if the offeror is notified of the acceptance within a reasonable time.

3.  Bilateral contract; offeree makes preparations prior to acceptance:  R45 and R62 apply only to situations where the offeree begins actual
performance.  What happens if the offeree makes preparations which are
necessary before performance may begin?

a. 	R87:  R87(2) holds that preparations to perform (and thus 
when there is not yet acceptance) and his reliance turn the offer into an irrevocable one. 

b. 	Offers by sub-contractors: R87(2) is often used in the case of
offers by subcontractors to general contractors.  Where the 
sub-contractor submits a bid to the general contractor, who then
relies upon it in figuring his own over-all bid, the sub-contractor’s
bid is usually held to be irrevocable.

NOTE:  Detrimental reliance only applies to the contractor.  While
the sub-contractor is bound after the contractor accepts his offer,
the contractor is never bound, even after acceptance. He can shop
around for other subs and try to get a lower price, and the sub cannot sure for detrimental reliance.

EX:  D, a sub-contractor, submits a written offer for paving to P, a 
general contractor.  Since D’s bid is the lowest, P relies on it for 
preparing its own bid.  D then notifies P that D’s bid was too low because of an error.  P’s bid for the general contract is accepted,
and D refuses to perform.  Held:  Because P justifiably and
substantially relied on D’s offer (in his bid), D’s offer was irrevocable.  R90 and R45 allow P to collect  Drennan v. Star Paving.  Learned Hand applied these two sections, instead of
R87, because R 87 had yet to come out. 

c.  Remedies under R87:  Offeree is subject to reliance
damages.		 

B. 	UCC approach to partial performance (2-206):  The UCC does not deal
with whether an offer may become temporarily irrevocable upon the beginning
of performance by the offeree. Comment 3 to 2-206 leaves this to the common law (supposedly codified by R45).  The UCC does specify, however, that where
the beginning of performance would be a reasonable form of acceptance, it is effective as an acceptance only if the offeree seasonably notifies the offeror that he has accepted (2-206(2)).  Ham says to recognize that 2-206 was drafter when
R45 used to be the official position.  

C. 	Other scenarios of acceptance

1. 	A person’s actions toward contractual obligation can waive his specified manner of acceptance: When the buyer-offeror makes an offer to purchase by means of a form supplied by the seller-offeree, the buyer-offeror has the power to waive any specified manner of acceptance in such a form, and thus the offer can be deemed accepted and ripened into a K if the seller-offeree takes actions that directed toward the contractual obligation.

		EX:  D, the seller-offeree, submitted a “sales agreement” to P, Empire 
		Machinery, for installation of a phone system.  P signed the agreement,
		which included a clause that stated that the “agreement shall become 
effective only upon approval, acceptance and execution by D’s home office.”  After P purchased $12,000 in phone equipment at D’s request, after D cashed P’s $8000.00 check (which was a down payment), and after 
		P signed a “sales agreement,” D refunded P’s down-payment and informed
		P that it would not be able to install the new phone system.  P sued D for
b/K.  Held:  D cashing P’s check, getting P to sign a waiver, etc., was evidence that D accepted P’s offer to purchase.  This, along with the fact that P had the power to waive the clause in the “sales agreement,” which required D’s home office approval before D could accept, is sufficient to find D accepted P’s offer to purchase.  Empire Machinery Co.

2. 	Acceptance of unilateral Ks:  When an offer is accepted in a 
unilateral in a manner not likely to come to offeror’s attention,
 		then the offeree must give the offeror notice in a reasonable manner.
Acceptance a certain way (i.e., a letter in the mail) is sufficient if, given the circumstances and previous dealings of the parties, such a manner of communication is reasonable.  

EX: D wrote a letter to P stating that if D’s brother needed money, D would see to it that it was repaid if P assisted in obtaining the money.  P, in reliance on D’s letter, acted as as surety on a promissory note executed by D’s brother.  P then sent a letter, properly addressed, to D, informing him that the note had been executed.  Subsequently, P was held under the note and sought indemnification from D,  who denied liability and said he never received the letter.  P sued for b/K.  Held:  The offer in this case was a unilateral K—when P acted as surety, he accepted D’s offer to re-pay
the money, if D’s brother did not pay, and thus a K was created.  P gave D
reasonable notice, which was required, by sending the letter.  Bishop
 
		NOTE:  The letter (or notice) in this case is a condition subsequent.  If 
notice is not given, then the surety will be invalidated after a period of time.

Statute of Frauds (SoF)

I. Statute of Frauds

	A. Introduction

		1. Rationale:  SoF protects people against false assertions that a K was 			made (although Ham says SoF is really not effective in preventing fraud).

			NOTE:  Generally, a contract in writing under SoF should set out 				the specific terms and state the agreement of a party.  It provides 				certainty of terms.

			NOTE:  A contract that fails to comply with SoF is only voidable 				at the option of either party (as long as neither party has perfomed); 			thus, the parties can fulfill the contract if they choose.

    		2. Oral can be enforced:  Most contracts can be valid despite the fact that 			they are only oral.  A few types of contracts, however, are unenforceable 			unless they are in writing (they fall within SoF).
	
		3. There are three justifications for putting a contract in writing:

			a. Evidentiary -- Prove that contract was created; this serves as 				protection against fraud and mistake.
 
			b. Cautionary -- Assures deliberation before making a promise 				concerning important matters.

			c. Channeling -- It warns of the possible legal consequences if 				there is a breach.  “It gives an intention a legal effect.”

			Mnem:  ECCe

4. 	Restitution and reliance dams available if contract within SoF is 
not in writing: When contract is unenforceable due to SoF, look for other restitution and reliance damages are available. 

		5. There are five categories which fall within SoF:
		
			a. Promise of Executor/Administrator --  A contract for an 				executor or administrator to answer for a duty of his decedent;

			b. Answer the debt of another (“suretyship”) -- A contract to 				answer the debt of another;

			c. Land contract -- A contract for the sale of an interest in land; 

			d. One year -- A contract that is not to be performed within one 				year from the making. 

			Mnemonic:  PALO alto	

6. UCC approach (goods for more than $500 must be in writing) -- In addition to the above five classes of contracts which must be in writing to be enforceable, the UCC requires a writing in the case of a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more (2-201).

			Example:  Someone comes to you and offers to buy your car for 				$400.  Is this enforceable?  Yes, it does not need to be in writing -- 				and thus does not fall within SoF -- because it is for a value less 				than $500.

	B. A Contract to Answer the Debt of Another (“Suretyship”)

1. A promise to pay the legally enforceable debt or default of another is within SoF, and is therefore unenforceable unless it is in writing.

			a. The suretyship provision only applies where there is a guarantee 				of another person’s legally enforceable debt or obligation.  If the 				other person does not legally owe the duty in question, the fact that 			the “surety” orally undertakes liability is not enough to bring the 				promise within SoF.

				Example:  S calls up Retailer, and says to him, “Deliver 					three pair of pants to me, and if D doesn’t pay for them, I 					will.”  D is not liable for the goods, since he has not 					ordered them.  Therefore, S is not a surety, and his promise 					does not fall within the suretyship provision of SoF.  S’s 					promise is thus enforceable, even though oral.

				Example:  M calls Art Supply Store and says, “Send a box 					a magic markers to B at his studio, and I will pay for them.”  				If the markers cost $25, must M’s promise to pay be in 					writing?  The answer is no, because since B did not order 					the markers, he has no legal debt.  As a result, M’s promise 					does not fall within the suretyship provision of SoF, and his 				promise is enforceable. 

					NOTE:  If M had said, “Send the markers to B; if he 					doesn’t pay for them, I will,” his promise would 						require a writing (since he is offering to pay B’s 						debt).  This is unless, of course, it can be shown that 					B made this promise for his own benefit (main 						purpose rule).

			b. Promise must be made to the creditor, not to the debtor. 

				Example:  Surety says to Debtor, “If you can’t pay your 					debt to Creditor, I’ll pay it.”  Because this promise has been 				made to Debtor, and not to Creditor, it does not fall within 					the suretyship provision of SoF, and is enforceable even 					though oral.

2. Main purpose rule: If the promiser’s chief purpose in making his promise of suretyship is to further his own interests, his promise does not fall within SoF.  This rule is often called the main purpose rule.

			Example:   D owes C $1,000. C is about to levy an attachment
			on D’s factory.  S, who is a creditor of D’s, fearing that the 
			attachment will ruin D’s business and thereby destroy his
		 	own chance of collecting his claim, orally promises C that if C
			will forbear to take legal proceedings against D for three months,
			S will pay D’s debt if D fails to do so. S’s promise violates
			the main purpose rule—since it is in his economic benefit if D’s
			prop is attached—and thus it is enforceable and does not fall
			within SoF.

			NOTE:  The direct benefit to promisor is usually economic.

	C. Land Contract Provision

		1. A promise to transfer or buy any interest in land is within the SoF.  

			Example:  An elderly widow who owns a homeplace needs 					assistance, and there is a neighbor’s daughter who’s willing to help 			widow; widow makes it clear that if daughter helps, then she’ll get 				the land.  Widow dies.  Who gets land, daughter or heirs?  The 				answer is heirs, because transfer of land falls within SoF.

				NOTE:  Daughter should be able to get restitutionary 					damages, however, in the form of:  1) market value of her 					job (look into community for comparable work); 2) equal to 				the value of the land (K price); OR 3) reliance under 					restitution (opportunity cost).   

			Rule:  When contract is unenforceable due to SoF, look for other 				forms of damage, including restitution.

			NOTE:  Keep in mind that not only a promise to transfer an 				interest in land, but also the promise to pay for such an interest, 				falls within SoF. 
		
		2. Other interests -- In addition to the transfer of a fee simple interest in 			land, there are a number of other kinds of interests in land which fall under 		SoF:

			a. Leases -- Leases are generally held to be interests in land.  				However, statutes in most states make an oral lease enforceable if 				its duration is one year or less.  A lease for more than a year falls 				within the “one year” provision of SoF.

			b. Mortgages -- A promise to give a mortgage on real property as 				security for a loan is usually held to be within SoF.

			c. Crops -- Crops are not interests in land.  Minerals, such as oil 				and gas, involve an interest in land if they are removed from the 				ground by the buyer (UCC 2-107(1)).

			d. Contracts only incidentally related to land -- It is irrelevant 				that the performance of contract will create an interest in land, if 				the subject matter of the contract itself is not the transfer of such an 			interest.  Thus a contract to build a building is not within SoF, nor 				is a promise to lend money with which to buy land, or a contract 				between partners to buy or sell real estate and divide the profits.
	
				NOTE:  Hamilton says that agreements to convey land in 					the future include:  sell, buy, lease, exchange.
 
3. 	Effect of vendor’s performance or vendee’s part performance
(ONLY APPLIES TO LAND) -- Even if an oral contract for the transfer of an interest in land is not enforceable at the time it is made, subsequent acts by the parties may render it enforceable.  There are two ways in which the contract can become enforceable: (1) By virtue of full performance on the part of the 	vendor; OR (2) by virtue of detrimental reliance by the vendee.

			a. Conveyance by vendor -- If the vendor under an oral land 				contract conveys the land, the vendor may recover the 					contract price.  In other words, although the promise to pay for the 				land was originally in SoF, it was removed by the vendor’s 					conveyance of the land to the vendee.

			b. Vendee’s part performance -- The vendee under an oral land 				contract may in reliance on the contract take actions which both 				furnish evidence that in fact an oral contract was made, and also 				create a reliance interest on the part of the vendee in having the 				contract enforced.  If the vendee performs such acts, he may be 				able to have the contract enforced through specific performance 				(i.e., a judicial decree ordering the vendor to convey the land) 				notwithstanding the fact that the contract was originally 					unenforceable due to SoF. 

			NOTE:  The “part performance” doctrine allows only specific 				performance, not a claim for breach. If the court finds the criteria 				for specific performance have not been met, its only alternative is 				to grant a quasi-contractual recovery for the value of the vendee’s 				performance. It may not award the profit that the vendee would 				have been able to make had he been conveyed the property as 				contracted for.

	D. One-Year Provision

		1. If a promise contained in a contract is incapable of being fully 				performed within one year after the making of the contract, the contract 			must be in writing. 

			NOTE:  The one year period is measured from the time of the 				execution of the contract, not the time it will take the parties to 				perform. 

			Example:  On January 10, 1993, Harvard law professor Arthur 				Whore Miller promises to make a one-hour television appearance 				on February 1, 1994 to discuss personal injury law.  This contract 				is within SoF, and thus must be in writing to be enforceable.

		2. The one-year provision applies only if complete performance is 				impossible within one year after the making of the contract.  The fact that 			performance within one year is highly unlikely, or that the parties fully 			expect that it will take more than one year, is not enough to make the 			contract fall within SoF.

			Example:  D, an insurance company, orally promises to insure P’s 				house against fire for five years. P in turn promises to pay the 				premium within a week.  The contract does not fall within the one-				year provision, since it is possible (however unlikely) that the 				house might burn, and that D pays off the policy within a year.

			a. Must be looked at ex-ante -- The possibility of performance of 				the contract within one year must be judged at the time the 				contract is made, not by benefit in hindsight.  

			b. But if the contract provides that performance is to continue for 				more than a year, the fact that the contract might be discharged by 				impossibility, frustration, or some other excuse for non-					performance will not take it out of SoF.  It is only the possibility 				of “performance,” not the possibility of “discharge” that takes a 				contract out of the one-year provision.  The point here is that the 				“possibility of impossibility” within one year of the making of the 				contract does not stop the contract from being within SoF. 

				(1) Personal service contracts --  For instance, all personal 				service contracts terminate at the death of the party who is 					to perform the services. Yet, according to most courts, the 					possibility that that party might die within one year is not 					enough to prevent SoF from applying.  

(2) Difficult line to draw (essential purpose test)--  It will often be difficult to tell whether a certain kind of possible termination is by performance or by discharge. The test is whether, if the termination in question occurs, the contract has fulfilled its principal purpose; if so, there has been performance. The test produces the following results:

					(a) Lifetime employment:  A promise to employ 						someone for his lifetime will probably not fall 						within the one-year provision, and thus need not be 						in writing, since if that person dies, the essential 						purpose of guaranteeing him a job forever has been 						satisfied.

					(b) Furnishing of support:  A promise by the 						father of an illegitimate child to pay the latter’s 						living expenses until the age 21 is not within the 						one-year provision, and thus need not be in writing, 						since if the child dies, the object of furnishing him 						with necessaries will have been satisfied.

		3. Alternative performances:  If the contract gives one or both parties the 		choice between two or more performances, the contract is not within the 			one-year performance if any of the alternatives can be performed within 			one year from the time of the making of the contract.

		4. Full performance on one side:  Suppose that a given oral contract is, at 		the time of the making, not capable of being fully performed on both sides 			within one year.  If one party to the contract fully performs, many courts 			hold that his full performance takes the contract out of SoF, even though it 		actually took that party more than one year to perform.
	
		5. One-year provision applies to all contracts:  The rule that a contract 			that is incapable of performance within one year after its making must 			satisfy the Statute, applies to all contracts. A contract for the sale of 			goods that is incapable of being performed within a one-year period (i.e., a 		contract for goods where the delivery is specified for 18 months after 			signing of the contract) must meet SoF even though under the UCC rules 			regarding sales contracts, only contracts for more than $500 are covered.

	E. Contract for the Sale of Goods

		1. General rule as to goods:  UCC 2-201(1) provides that “a contract for 			the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way 			of action of defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that 			a contract for the sale has been made...”  That section goes on to state 			fairly lenient rules as to what this writing must contain; these are discussed 		below under satisfaction of the statute by a memorandum.  The rules for 			determining when the writing requirement applies:

			a. One sale vs. several:  Suppose the parties agree on the sale of 				several lots of goods, each lot costing less than $500 but the total 				price for all the lots exceeding $500.  Must SoF be met?  It is up to 				the court whether the parties intended one single contract (in which 			case SoF applies) or several different contracts.

			b. Contracts combining services and goods:  SoF under Article 2 			only applies to goods.  If there is a contract for goods and services, 				the contract does not fall within Article 2, and it is only the 					provision of the common-law SoF (i.e., contracts not performable 				within one year) that may apply.

			c. Exceptions to the UCC Statute:  Even if a sales contract is for 				more than $500, it is exempted from SoF requirement in three 				situations, by 2-201(3):

				(1) Goods specially manufactured:  No writing is required 				“if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the 					buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 					ordinary course of the seller’s business and the seller, 					before notice of repudiation...has made either a substantial 					beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their 					procurement.”  The reason for this exception is that the 					seller is highly unlikely to start producing custom-made 				goods for the buyer unless there has in fact been an oral 				contract.

				(2) Estopell by pleading or testimony:  Nor is a writing 					required “if the party against whom enforcement is sought 					admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that 					a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not 					enforceable under this provision beyond the goods 						admitted.”

				NOTE:  The sales contract defendant who wishes to assert 					SoF must therefore be very careful in his pleading and his 					testimony not to concede that some oral agreement was 					made.

				(3) Goods accepted or paid for:  A writing is not required 					“with respect to goods which payment has been made and 				accepted or which have been received and accepted.”  					This is a sort of “part performance” doctrine, by which if 				the contract is partly performed on either side, it is 						enforceable as to the part which is performed.  The court 					will presumably attempt to apportion the contract price 					(i.e., if there is a sale agreed upon for 100 units at $10 per 					unit, and the buyer accepts 10 units, he will have to pay 					$100, regardless of the market price of the units accepted). 
	
		NOTE:  Under UCC, a contract is not void if it does not comply with SoF.  		A contract is voidable only at the option of either party as long as the 			parties have not yet performed.  Thus, the parties can fulfill a contract that 			violates SoF if they so choose.

	 F. Satisfaction of the Statute by a Memorandum

		1. In some cases, the “contract,” in the sense of the entire agreement of the 		parties, will be in writing.  If so, SoF is obviously satisfied. But SoF may 			also be satisfied by something less than the complete written agreement 		of the parties; this something less is usually called a memorandum of the 			agreement.

2. 	What memorandum must contain -- A memorandum satisfies SoF if
it:

(1) 	Reasonably identifies the subject of the contract,
	
(2) 	indicates that a contract has been made between the parties, 

(3) 	states with reasonable certainty the terms of the contract; AND 

(4) is signed “by or on behalf of the party to be charged.”

			a. “Essential terms” -- There is no standard formula for 					determining what the “essential terms” are that must be listed in 				the memorandum.  Many courts require only that the defendant’s 				promise must be spelled out, and that the consideration he is to 				receive for his promise (i.e., in a bilateral contract, the plaintiff’s 				promise) does not have to be contained in the memorandum.

			b. Oral evidence to supplement or interpret memo --  P may 				introduce oral evidence to aid in the interpretation of the 					memorandum, if it is ambiguous. But he may not introduce oral 				evidence to supplement the memorandum, if an essential term is 				simply missing rather than ambiguously recorded.

			c. Item not intended as memo -- A writing may suffice as a 				memorandum for SoF purposes even though it was intended for a 				completely different purpose.  Thus even a memorandum 					repudiating an oral agreement may suffice.

				Example:  A and B enter into an oral contract by which A 					promises to sell and B promises to buy Blackacre for 					$5,000.  A writes and signs a letter to B in which he states 					accurately the terms of he bargain, but adds “our agreement 				was oral.  It, therefore, is not binding upon me, and I shall 					not carry it out.”  The letter is a sufficient memorandum to 					charge A.

			d. Generally, a memorandum does not have to be made at the 				time of contracting.  It may come into existence any time after the 			contract, even after the suit has begun.

		3. Signature -- A memorandum must be signed by or on behalf of “the 			party being charged” (i.e., the party against whom enforcement is being 			sought).  In the ordinary case this will be the defendant, but in the case of 			the counterclaim, it may be the plaintiff.

			a. Definition of signature -- “Signature” is liberally construed; it 				serves an authentication requirement.  A party’s initials will 				suffice, as will the typewriting of his name, if done under his 				direction.  So will a fax with the party’s signature.  Hamilton says 				that letterhead might suffice.  Electronic communication -- such as 				E-mail with no signature, telephone conversations,  videotapes, and 			so on -- are so controversial that it is unclear at this point whether 				one can confidently say that they would satisfy SoF.

				NOTE:  Hamilton says that only the signatory is bound 					under SoF.

			b. UCC exception -- Under UCC 2-201(2), a memorandum sent 				by one 	merchant to another may under certain circumstances be 				enforceable against the recipient, even though the latter did not 				sign it (see merchant exception below).

			c. Enforceable against only one party -- Observe that the 					requirement of a signature by the party to be charged means that 				some contracts will be enforceable against one party, but not 				against the other. 

			d. Agent’s signature -- If the memo is signed by a party’s 					authorized agent, it will normally be enforceable against the party, 				even if the agent’s authority is not in itself in writing.  Most states, 				though, require the agent’s authority to be in writing.

			Example:  In November 1985, University of Detroit athletic 				director agrees with Kansas athletic director to schedule a game 				against one another on February 2, 1987.  In December 1986, 				Kansas is given an offer to play UCLA on national TV -- the same 				day it had scheduled to play Detroit.  Kansas spurns Detroit, whose 			athletic director strenuously objects.  The latter comes to you.  Is 				there anything he can do?

			Analysis:  Even though the contract falls within SoF -- it did not 				take place within one year after the agreement was made -- Detroit 				does have the opportunity to provide written verification of the 				agreement.  They might be able to find a memo verifying the 				agreement, or more likely, a schedule of Kansas Basketball.  This 				written verification need not be signed -- Kansas Basketball 				letterhead should be enough.  In real life, Detroit easily produced a 				schedule, and Kansas played against them as scheduled.

				NOTE:  An e-mail concerning the game -- or a videotape -- 					would be uncertain.

		4. UCC memorandum requirements:  The UCC imposes a somewhat 			more lenient memorandum requirement than is imposed by the non-UCC 			statutory and case law of most states.  2-201(1) provides that where SoF 			applies, it must be satisfied by “...some writing sufficient to indicate that 			a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by 			the party against enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 			broker. A writing is not insufficient because it limits or incorrectly states a 		term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph 			beyond the quantity of goods shown in writing.”

			Example:  Ross orally agrees to order 400 videotapes for copying 				pornography from Maxwell at $20 a tape.  He accidentally 					scribbles down on a paper bag that he has ordered 40 tapes at $20 a 			tape, and initials it.  Because the goods, as written down on the 				bag, total $800, they fall under the UCC.  According to UCC 2-				201(1), Ross is only liable for the 40 tapes under SoF, and 					Maxwell cannot collect for goods beyond the 40 tapes stated in 				writing.
	
			a. Error or omission -- In non-UCC cases, the omission of a 				material term, or an error to such a term, renders the memo 					ineffective. But under the UCC, the memo is effective provided 				solely that it indicates “that a contract for sale has been made 				between the parties.”  Comment 1 to 2-201(1) says that the memo 				does not need to indicate price, time and place of payment or 				delivery, the general quality of goods, or any particular warranty.  				The buyer and seller also do not need to be indicated.  But the 				quantity of goods must be stated in the memo.

				NOTE:  If the price is not mentioned in memo, then P can 					introduce evidence showing that a particular price was 					agreed upon.  For example, he might show that they 						intended the current “market price.”  But remember also 					that, under 2-305(1), the court may fix “a reasonable 					price at the time of delivery” if the parties have left the 					price term open.  Thus, P can even claim there was no oral 				agreement on the price of goods, and still collect!

			b. Confirmation from one merchant to another:  In the non-				UCC cases (less than $500), the memo must be signed by the party 				against whom enforcement is sought.  This is generally true under 				the UCC, with one important exception: “Between merchants if 				within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the 				contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the 				party receiving has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the 				requirements [of writing] against such party unless written notice 			of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is 				received.”  2-201(2).  In other words, a merchant who receives a 				signed confirmation from the other party may under some 				circumstances be bound by it, just as if he had signed it.

			c. Requirements of writing:  Official Comment to 2-201 requires 				that the writing must:

				(1) Be evidence of contract:  “Evidence of a contract for 					the sale of goods” (i.e., “a basis for believing that the 					offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction”);

				(2) Generally, be signed (letterhead will do; the actual 					signature is not needed), except in the case of a 						confirmation from one merchant to another.

				(3) “It must specify the quantity” of goods, but not the 					price.

				Mnemonic: ESQ (Evidence; Signed; Quantity)

Remedies

I. Monetary recoveries

	A. Expectation damages (Generally, P’s first choice)

1. 	Purpose:  The purpose of expectation damages is to put the plaintiff 
in as good of a position as he would have been had the contract been fulfilled at the least cost to the defendant.  

NOTE:  Generally, Ps will first argue for expectation dams (unless 
profits are too speculative or restitution would give them more damages
before the breach).

		2. Theory behind expectation damages:  Balance two goals

			A. Incentive to perform:  These damages discourage breach by 				making you pay anyway (Hamilton calls this a moral concept); and 

			B. Economic efficiency:  Encourages breaches in certain situations 				(i.e., efficient breaches)

				NOTE:  Expectation damages (and contract remedies as a 					whole) are meant to compensate one party, rather than 					punish the other.

		3. Application of expectation damages followed by UCC:  As stated in 			UCC 1-106(1), damages “shall be liberally administered to the end that 			the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 			had fully performed.”  This says that expectation damages are the norm.

			a. Looking at traditional measures of damages for b/K

				Consider:

				$10,000	K price 		(exact figure)

				$1,900		Cost to date		(roughly exact figure)

				$7,000		Cost to complete	(must be projected)

				$1,100		Expected profit	

(1) Most common expectation dams approach (Lutin Bridge):  Cost to date + Profits = Damages 

			    		(1,900) + (1,100) =  $3,000

(2) 	Other formulas?

b. 	Hawkins approach to damages

(1)  Actuarial approach: Income with a good hand (i.e., as a machinist) and subtract this by expected income with a bad hand (i.e., as a chauffeur), discounting this total by present value.

				NOTE:  In response to this, D would:  1) bring in his own 					experts to testify about future income possibilities; and 2) 					argue that damages are too speculative

(2)  Cost of another operation:  This would be a way in which to put Hawkins in the same place as he would have been had K been fulfilled -- assuming another operation could make his hand a “perfect hand.” 

c. 	Cost of Completion (or Performance) vs. Diminution in Value
(for construction contracts)

				(1) Cost of Performance vs. Diminution in Value

(a) 	Cost of Completion (primary purpose breach):  
When there has been a breach of the primary purpose of the contract, then a homeowner is
is entitled to the cost of completion.

(b) 	Dimunition in Value (collateral breach:  When
					there has been a breach not involving the primary
					purpose of the contract, then the homeowner is
					only entitled to the difference between the market
					value of, say, the wrong pipe and the contracted 
					pipe.  Jacob and Youngs v. Kent

				Examples:

				(1) Reading pipe case:  Builder accidentally used wrong 					pipe, which was of comparable quality.  Since the breach 					did not involve the primary purpose of the contract, no cost 					of performance will be awarded (tear down and rebuild 					pipe).  As a result, the damages will be the difference in 					market value between the wrong pipe and the contracted 					pipe.  (Jacob and Youngs v. Kent)  

					NOTE:  Even if D would have breached 							intentionally, the award would have been the same.  

				(2) HYPO:  K on building ugly fountain that will decrease 					property value by $5000.  The builder stops after building 					$4000 (the whole thing costs $10,000 to build), and claims 					that no damages exist because he saved homeowner $1000.  				Builder is wrong, as homeowner could recover “cost of 					completion” because primary purpose of the contract was 					the ugly fountain.

				(3) HYPO:  K on house for 12 x 18 room for piano.  					Builder breaches by building a room that is 11’10” x 16.  					The cost of completion is $30,000 (tear down and replace) 					vs. $1500 in diminution in value.  Is this breach of 						substantial performance?  Hamilton says YES, since the
primary purpose of this K was to have a room fit the piano.

	B. Limitations on expectation damages

		1. Reasonable certainty:  P may only recover for losses which he 				establishes with reasonable certainty.  P must not show only that he
		would profit, but he must show amount of profits.

			a. Profits from a new business:  Courts are especially reluctant to 				award lost profits from a new business, that is, a business which at 				the time of breach was not yet in actual operation.

				NOTE:  For an experienced businessman, with a successful 				business under similar circumstances (i.e., experienced 					antique dealer), measure of damages would be less 						speculative.  Hamilton points out that the trend in these 					cases has been in favor of P.  (Ferrell case).

			b. Cost of completion unknown:  The reasonable certainty 					requirement may fail to be met where P cannot show accurately 				enough what his cost of completion would have been.  

				Example:  Contractor contracts to build house for Owner 					for $100,000.  After Contractor has done about half the 					work, Owner repudiates.  If the contractor cannot 						demonstrate what his cost of completion would have been, 					he will be unable to recover expectation damages, and 					will have to be content with either reliance or restitution 				damages.

		2. Mitigation:  Plaintiff has an obligation “not to dump on defendant.”

			a. Running up damages:  When notice of cancellation is received 				while a contract is still executory, the party cannot complete it and 				claim the contract price.  (Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge, in 				which damages were measured from the notice of cancellation).

			b. Mitigation in employment K (must be for a term, not at will)

				(1) Damages will be offset by “equivalent” work -- This 					work must be:  1) of same general character; 2) in a 					comparable location (generally same city); and 3) in a 					comparable time period (during same hours). 

					Example:  After anticipatory repudiation of 							employment contract, D offers P inferior work in a 						different field (work in the original field, which was 					seasonal, was no longer available).  Court rules that 					P was not obligated to take such work, and that 						damages in the amount of the contract were 							recoverable as long as P had been diligent in 						seeking comparable employment.  (Hussey v. 						Holloway). 

					NOTE:  Under UCC 2-610, Hussey may consider 						anticipatory repudiation sufficient communication 						for a breach (i.e., she does not have to show up for 						work).

					NOTE:  If P takes different work during old hours -- 					whether work is of same general character or not -- 						then damages are reduced by the new wage 							(breaching employer is considered to have “bought 						time”).  Hamilton says that, generally speaking, one 						cannot recover two wages (unless the jobs are 						mutually exclusive and P would have been able to 						do both:  “If she can do both jobs, then there can be 						no offset.”)

					NOTE:  If P finds comparable work at a higher 						wage, then D owes nothing. 

				(2) If no equivalent work available -- If no comparable 					work can be found (in accordance with conditions of 					comparable location and in a comparable time period), then 				P can collect damages in the amount of the contract.  					
				(3) Must reasonably search for equivalent work -- Once 					breach has occurred, however, P has an obligation to 					reasonably search for another such job (reasonably mitigate 					damages).

					(a) Rationale:  Judges have fashioned rule that P 						cannot 	just sit back and take a paid vacation at the 						expense of the breach  

					(b) No Search:  If P does not reasonably search for 						another such job, recovery will be reduced by 						market price of job.

				NOTE:  In the case of a construction contract, a breach will 				not preclude the construction company from collecting 					profit from another contract subsequent to the breach -- 					even if it is to complete the same project. (Olds v. Mapes-					Reeve Construction Co.).  Unlike Hussey, however, 						contractors are under no obligation to take similar work.  					
				NOTE:  The same can be said for commission for a real 					estate broker on the heels of a merger.  (Massengale case, 					in which court rules, “This is not an action against 						employer for damages caused by wrongful discharge, in 					which damages would be mitigated by plaintiff’s 						subsequent earnings.”)

				(4) General rule for mitigation:  The general rule, stemming 				from Olds and Hussey, is that if the innocent party can do 					both jobs, then he is entitled to expectancy, and may keep 					profits on other contract occuring at the same time.  The 					key question, then, is whether there is a plentiful supply 					of labor available to P.  If so, then there is no mitigation in 				damages awarded.

				(5) Mitigation offers by breaching parties:  If breaching 					party offers P work at a lesser price, courts are generally 					skeptical for the following reasons:  1) D’s offer may be in 					bad faith; 2) working relationship may be undesirable 					from the outset (especially if the employee is working and 					suing at the same time).  As a result, “old” job is generally 					not considered equivalent work.  (Golob case).		

				(6) Class conscious rule:  Working class (the hat makers of 					the world) will almost always have comparable work (and 					will thus be forced to mitigate damages), whereas elites 					will seldom (i.e., major league manager, Shirley 						MacLaine).

			NOTE:  Hamilton points out that the gut principle here is that P 				should recover for the cost of work to date.

			NOTE:  In real life, the fact-finding process is muddy and damage 				estimates are somewhat uncertain.

		3. Foreseeability:  Impact of Hadley v. Baxendale    

a.  UCC Test:  UCC 2-715(2) adopts a similar test to Hadley and is fairly liberal in awarding consequential damages to buyer.  (In reality, though, Hamilton notes that courts have been reluctant to award consequential damages absent some degree of certainty.

			b. Restatement:  The principles of Hadley are ensconced in 					Restatement 351:

				(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in 					breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result 					of the breach when the contract was made.

				(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a 					breach because it follows from the breach

					(a) in the ordinary course of events [Hadley’s 1st 					    	Branch], or 

					(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the 						ordinary course of events, that the party in breach 						had reason to contemplate.  [Hadley’s 2nd Branch]

(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation.  [Court has latitude to limit damages as it sees fit.]  

			d. Parties may allocate risks themselves (within limits):  One way 				to do this is for the plaintiff to give notice to the defendant of 				special circumstances, thus bringing the situation within the 				second rule of Hadley.  Alternatively, the parties may agree that 				the defendant will not be liable for “reasonably foreseeable” 				consequences which would otherwise fall within the first rule of 				Hadley.     

				Example:  Telegraph Company makes every sender of a 					telegram sign a contract which provides that any remedy 					for mis-transmission of the message shall be limited to 					refund of the price of the telegram.  This allocation of risk 					will probably be enforced by a court, even though in 					particular cases it will be obvious to Telegraph Company 					from the content of the message that substantial loss would 					result from the mis-transmission.  (Juries, however, tend to 					find for P in these cases.)

				NOTE:  Hamilton’s taxi cab hypo would be an example of 					the converse, in which the million dollar deal would not be 					foreseeable, but because actual notice was received by the 					cab driver, who promised success to the passenger (this was 				before the contract was agreed to), the cab driver could be 					found liable.  However, given the judicial latitude to limit 					damages in Restatement 351 (3), cab driver will almost 					certainly not be liable for the million dollars.

			e. Hadley and the UCC:  A liberal version of the Hadley rule is 				embodied in damage provisions of the UCC. 

				(1) First branch:  UCC 2-706, 2-708, 2-712, 2-713

				(2) Second branch:  UCC 2-715(2), consequential damages  

f. HYPO:  D is a motor reconditioner.  Dealer calls and wants a 
motor in 30 days.  You are 10 days late, and dealer loses a sale of $2,000.  He can recover because the dealer is a resaler, and as long as you know that, then you have contemplated (consequential) damages.

			h. HYPO:  You get a job in San Antonio, and you buy a used car 				with a 60-day warranty.  Car breaks down on the way to San 				Antonio, and you lose your job.  Can you sue the car dealer for lost 			job?  The answer is no, because these are not within the 					contemplation of the parties when K was made.   

				NOTE:  Hamilton says that, like proximate cause in torts, 					Hadley serves to limit consequential damages (vis-a-vis 					Hawkins).

		4. Punitive damages/Mental anguish

a. 	General presumption in contracts:  If damage is purely economic, then no punitive damages are awarded.  (You must be hard-nosed about it.)  But there are some exceptions, such as in the Pennzoil v. Texaco case, where the jury sacked Texaco
for billions in damages, but this was because there was tortious interference.

				NOTE:  Courts are wary of awarding punitive damages 					since they don’t want to deter efficient breaches, or make 					the business community too cautious.

			b. Restatement:  On the issue of mental anguish (emotional 					disturbance), Restatement 353 says: 

				“Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded 					unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or 				the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional 						disturbance was a particularly likely result.”

			c. Mental anguish/Punitive damages:  If contract involves matters 				of mental concern where breach is particularly likely to result in 				mental anguish, then damages for mental anguish, as well as 				punitive damages, can be awarded.  Courts award punitive 					damages to punish companies, and to deter them from operating in 				a similar manner in the future.  Examples include:

				(1) death telegram not delivered

				(2) woman kicked out of hotel in middle of night or 						passenger off train in certain situations

				(3) floating coffin

				(4) vacation cases (Hamilton says that this case really 					pushes the envelope as far as constituting the limit)

					(a) personal contracts with mental elements +

					(b) “near fraud” +

					(c) frustration over how to calculate damages

					[see Club Med. v. Stedry, p.72]

(5) Special relationship (i.e., client to insurance company) that can give rise to punitive damages (Ainsworth case, in which insurance claim was repeatedly repudiated). 

				NOTE:  Marriage K generally does not give rise to mental 					anguish or punitive damages

			c. HYPO:  Loss of a child because only doctor in town, who says 				he’ll be there for your birth, skips town on vacation.  Punitive 				damages would likely be awarded here.  

C. 	Reliance damages (generally used when damages are so speculative that 
expectation dams cannot be awarded)

		1. Purpose:  The purpose of reliance damages is to undo the harm which 			one’s reliance on the defendant’s promise has caused him.  Put another 			way, the object is the put P in as good a position as he was before the K 		was made. 

			NOTE:  These damages usually equal the amount that P has 				spent in performing or preparing to perform, not the amount that D 			has saved.

				Example:  D breached in refusing to publish P’s book.  P 					sought $10,000 (cost) to self-publish book.  This was not 					granted because $10,000 was not spent by P, but saved by 					D.  In this case, P was awarded only nominal damages.  					(Freund v. Washington Square Press).

					NOTE:  Hamilton says in this case that lawyers 						screwed up, and should have sought reliance for 						cost of P’s labor.

		2. When Can Be Awarded:  Generally, reliance damages can be awarded 			when P cannot show his lost profits with sufficient certainty (i.e., where 			this would be too speculative), but can nonetheless show items of 				expenditure.

			Example:  B is the manufacturer of an oil and gas burner.  He 				wishes to exhibit his machine at a convention in Atlantic City, in 				order to procure orders for it.  He contracts with D, a shipping 				company, for D to deliver the machine to the convention.  D 				breaches the contract by failing to deliver on time.  Court holds 				that B may not recover the profits which he would have made 				(from new orders) had the contract been performed.  He may, 				however, recover his expenses reasonably incurred in preparation 				for the convention.  (Security Stove case).  

				NOTE:  Where profits are denied because they are too 					speculative, the court awards reliance expenditures 					instead of, rather than in addition to, the lost profits.  In 					Security Stove, for instance, the items of expenditure 					recovered by P were items that he would have had to 					expend even had the contract been performed.  If P had 					been allowed to recover his lost profits, he would not also 					have been allowed to recover these items of expenditure, 					since that would put him in a better position than if the 					contract had been performed.

		3. Two types of reliance damages: P can recover for both:

a. Essential: This is the cost to perform the contract.  (i.e., in Luten Bridge, this would be the cost spent to build the bridge).  

			b. Incidental:  These are expenditures made by P relying on the 				original K (i.e., in Security Stove, this would be their hotel bill).  				Like Hadley, P would have to show that this reliance was 					reasonable and foreseeable.

				NOTE:  Most modern courts award recovery for both 					essential and incidental reliance, so long as the incidental 					reliance was reasonable and foreseeable -- this is 						Security Stove.

		4. Cases where reliance damages fit  

			a. Example:  D, a plastic surgeon, promises P, a professional 				entertainer, that two operations which D will perform on P’s nose 				will improve her appearance.  D performs the two operations, but 				P’s condition is worsened; a third operation fails to restore it to its 				original state.  There is no evidence that D acted negligently.  P 				sues on the contract.  (Sullivan v. O’Connor).

			b. Analysis:  P may recover reliance damages. 

				(1) Expectancy:  These damages are likely to be excessive, 					and they often lack certainty.  (Hamilton says that they are 					simply “speculation on the defendant’s pocketbook, or 					on his insurer’s pocketbook.”)   

(2) Restitution:  These damages would be too meager a recovery, since unjust enrichment would be limited to the fee paid to D.

(3) 	Reliance:  These damages would be proper in this case.  P would be entitled to:  1) the amount of the fee which she paid to D; 2) the difference in value between her nose as it was before the operation and her nose as it was thereafter (which is arguably expectation dams); and 3) her pain and suffering and mental distress to the extent that these exceeded what would have been involved in a successful performance by D.

					NOTE:  Hamilton says that, in these contexts, 						reliance is a better measure of damages than 							expectancy (Hawkins).

					NOTE:  The problem with awarding both reliance 						and expectation damages is double-counting 						(assuming expectation damages are calculated 						properly).  Hamilton does say, however, that 						expectation damages could be fashioned in such a 						way as to avoid this double-counting.  	

			c. HYPO:  You lease a large apartment and order a large sofa.  				Landlord breaches K.  Can you recover down payment for the 				sofa?  The answer is yes, if you state that you relied on K, and if 				Landlord subjectively contemplated that you would order large 				furniture in reliance on K.

5. Expenditures prior to signing of contract:  Ham believes that the following test should apply:  Any expenditures reasonably associated with the production of the contract can be awarded, even if they 	were expenses made prior to the signing of the contract. 

Example:  P is a boxing promoter, and D is Jack Dempsey, who 			breaches an agreement to participate in a fight promoted by P.  One 		of the items of reliance damages sought by P is the cost of signing 			the other fighter; this cost was incurred before the signing of the 			contract between P and D.  Ham says that since P relied on K in signing
the other fighter, D should pay reliance dams.

		6. Reliance damages under the UCC:  The UCC does not explicitly deal 			with the issue of reliance damages.  However, it is clear that in cases 			brought on the contract, where P cannot show lost profits with sufficient 			certainty, he may recover his reasonable expenditures made in connection 			with the contract.

			a. Incidental damages:  This is most clearly indicated by UCC 2-				715(1), which allows an aggrieved buyer to recover “incidental 				damages,” defined to include “expenses reasonably incurred...” 

			b. Consequential damages:  The Code also leaves open the door 				for reliance damages by means of UCC 2-715(2), which allows 				“consequential damages,” defined to include “any loss resulting 				from general or particular requirements and needs of which the 				seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which 				could not be reasonably prevented by cover or otherwise; 					and...injury to person or property proximately resulting from any 				breach or warranty.”

				NOTE:  Again, Hamilton notes that courts have been 					reluctant -- absent some degree of certainty -- to award 					consequential damages.

	D. Restitution damages

		1. Definition:  Hamilton says that restitution “requires the breaching 			party to return benefits conferred by innocent party.”  Restitution’s 			goal is to prevent unjust enrichment.  Restitution differs from other
		two types of dams, because P is not limited to contract price.

			NOTE:  For restitution damages, Hamilton says that 					contemplation is not necessary. 

		2. General Use:  The main uses of restitution damages are when:

				(1) A non-breaching P who has partly performed before the 					other party breached may bring suit on the contract, and not 				be limited by the contract price (as he would be under 					expectation and reliance damages). 
		
(2) 	If P breaches, then he limited to the contract price,
should his restitution theoretically exceed it.

		3. Restitution not limited to the contract price:  If the work done by P prior 		to D’s breach has already enriched D in an amount greater than the 				contract price, this entire enrichment may be recovered by P.

			a. Example:  Architect contracts with Owner, for Architect to 				design a house for Owner.  The contract price for the design work 				is $490.  After Architect has done part but not all of the work, 				Owner repudiates the contract.  At trial, Architect shows that the 				reasonable value of the work he did was $1,690.  The court held 				that the Architect could recover the full value of the amount he 				conferred upon the defendant ($1690), even though this amount 				exceeded the contract price.    

			b. Rationale:  One rationale for allowing P’s restutition to exceed 				the contract price (i.e., to allow restitution to exceed expectation 				damages) has been expressed as follows:  “to permit D to use his 				breached K to limit a recovery against him would be to pay him a 				premium for his own wrong.”

		4. Examples of situations where restitution is appropriate

			a. You call a plumber, he comes out to fix your sink, and you get a 				bill in the mail for $75  Must you pay him?  The answer is yes, 				because you have been enriched by P’s services.  (This is 					considered a contract implied-in-fact.) 

			b. You take your gun into a bank, hold it up, and abscond with 				$6000.  Have you made an implied promise to pay the bank back?  				According to Hamilton, the answer is yes, because the bank has 				enriched you.

			c. You have $185 in your bank account, and all of a sudden you 				find a balance of $10,185.  Have you impliedly promised to pay 				this money back?  According to Hamilton, the answer is yes (same 				principle).

			d. A contracts to sell a tract of land to B for $100,000.  After B has 				made a part payment of $20,000, A wrongfully refuses to transfer 				title.  B can recover the $20,000 for restitution.  The result is the 				same even if the market price of the land is only $70,000, so that 				performance would have been disadvantageous to B.

				NOTE:  If B can prove that land is actually worth 						$125,000, then he can recover $125,000 - $80,000 = 					$45,000.  This recovery, however, would be a measure of 					expectation damages, rather than restitution.

			e. A contracts to build a house for B for $100,000, progress 					payments to be made monthly.  After having been paid $40,000 for 			two months, A commits a breach that is not material by 					inadvertantly using the wrong brand of sewer pipe.  B has a claim 				for damages for partial breach, but cannot recover the $40,000 that 				he has paid A.  Rather, B could receive the cost of a good pipe -
			cost of bad pirpe (since breach was incidental, not material or
			“main purpose”).  

				NOTE:  Construction of a house is not the sale of goods.

			f. A contracts to work as a consultant for B for a fee of $50,000, 				payable at the end of the year.  B wrongfully discharges A at the 				end of 11 months.  A can recover in restitution based on the 				reasonable value of his services.  The terms of the contract are 				evidence of this value, but are not conclusive.  (i.e., A could 				recover more than K price if he can show that his enrichment to B 				was greater than that.) 

			g. You order groceries to be delivered.  Among the groceries is a 				low grade hamburger.  Instead, you find there to be a sirloin steak.  				You enjoy the steak.  Must you pay for the increased value of the 				steak?  Hamilton says yes, because you have been unjustly 					enriched by it.

			h. A 12-year-old kid agrees to cut his neighbor’s lawn for $20.  				The kid only cuts half of the lawn.  Is he entitled to $10?  Under 				Restatement 374, or by statute, the answer is yes.  

				NOTE:  Hamilton says that the philosophical premise 					behind this is that if kid could not recover, then neighbor 					could get someone else to cut the 2nd half of the lawn for 					$10.  This would be a windfall to the neighbor, as he would 				be receiving a $20 cut for only $10.

		5. Restitution not available where P has fully performed:  If, at the time of 			D’s breach, P has fully performed the contract (and D owes money, rather 			than some kind of performance), most courts do not allow P to recover 			restitutionary damages.  P is instead relegated to his expectation 				measure.

			NOTE:  Limiting the fully-performing P to the K price, but not so 				limiting the partly performing P, can produce the anomalous result 				that P is penalized for finishing off his performance.  As a result, 			some courts have strained to find that P has fully, rather than 				partially, performed, thus limiting him to expectation damages.  

		6. Determining unjust enrichment:  Different ways to measure

a. Market price (standard approach):  Bring in expert to testify what the value of such services are to a third party (i.e., market price), thereby imputing this value to D.  

			b. Contract price:  This would apply in Michigan Central, where K 				price was much lower than market price.  In the niece example, this 			would be the cost of the land promised to the niece.

c. Cost to P of providing services: The cost of life insurance premiums in Bollenback. 

				NOTE:  This is essentially tantamount to reliance.

			d. Opportunity cost:  In niece example, this would measure the 				value of the work she gave up in order to care for her aunt.

			e. Way of calculating can depend upon who breaches:  According 				to Restatement 371:

				A, a carpenter, contracts to repair B’s roof for $3,000.  A 					does part of the work at a cost of $2,000, increasing the 					market price of B’s house by $1,200.  The market price to 					have a similar carpenter do the work done by A is $1,800.  					A’s restitution interest is equal to the benefit conferred on 					B.  That benefit may be measured either by the addition to 					B’s wealth from A’s services in terms of the $1,200 						increase in the market price of B’s house or the reasonable 					value to B of A’s services in terms of the $1,800 that it 					would have cost B to engage a similar carpenter to do the 					same work.  If the work was not completed because of a 					breach of A, $1,200 is appropriate.  If the work was not 					completed because of a breach by B, $1,800 is appropriate.

		7. Restitution in Quasi-K:  It should be noted that a quasi-K is not a 			contract at all -- it is an obligation imposed by law to bring about justice 			and equity.

			a. No contract attempted:  The courts sometimes award P a 					recovery where no contract was even attempted.  The most 				common example is where P supplies emergency services to D, 				without first forming a contract to do so.

				Example:  P, a doctor, sees D lying unconscious in the 					street, and performs an expensive procedure on D.  The 					court will probably allow P to recover the fair market value 					of his services, in an action in quasi-contract.  (Cotnam v. 					Wisdom).

					NOTE:  The doctor’s special skills (expertise) in 						this case are crucial to his award.  To illustrate, if an 					individual finds someone lying on the sidewalk 						unconscious, and takes him to the hospital, then he 						cannot recover.  This falls under the Good 							Samaritan doctrine.  If, on the other hand, you call 					a taxi to take him to the hospital, then the cab driver 					could recover.  

					NOTE:  Cases like Cotnam, in which no contract 						exists, is often called a contract implied-in-law.

			b. Unenforceable contracts:  The parties may attempt to form a 				binding contract which turns out to be unenforceable or avoidable.  			This may happen because of the Statute of Frauds, mistake, 					illegality, impossibility, or frustration of purpose.  In any of these 				cases, the court will usually let P sue in quasi-K, and recover either 			the value of the services performed (restitution) or P’s reasonable 				expenditures (reliance).  

			c. Breaching plaintiff:  A plaintiff who has materially breached 				may normally bring a quasi-K suit, and recover his restitution 				interest, less the defendant’s damages for the breach.  This is 				sometimes called a “quantum meruit” (“as much as he deserves”) 			recovery, and it can never exceed the contract price.

				(1) Example:  P agrees to work for D for one year, payment 				of the $20,000 salary to be made at the end.  P works for 					six months, then unjustifiably quits.  P cannot recover “on 					the contract,” because he has not substantially performed.  					But he will probably be allowed to recover in quasi-K, for 					the fair value of the benefits he has conferred on D.  The 					court will estimate these benefits (which will probably be 					one-half of the $20,000 annual salary), and will subtract the 				damage to D of P’s not performing the second six months.

					NOTE:  This is the same as the lawnmower 							example. 

				(2) Construction cases:  Quasi-K recovery by a breaching P 					is most often found in construction cases.  Here, the 					builder gets to recover the value to the owner of the work 					done, even where the work does not constitute substantial 					performance of the K.

				(3) UCC gives partial restitution to breaching buyer:  The 					UCC gives a breaching buyer a right to partial restitution 					with respect to any deposit made to the seller before the 					buyer breached.  Under 2-718(2), the seller can only keep 					20% of the total contract price or $500, whichever amount 					is smaller -- the balance must be refunded to the breaching 					buyer.

			d. Measuring damages in quasi-K cases:  Courts almost never 				award expectation damages in quasi-contract suits.  Both 				reliance damages and restitution damages are frequently awarded 				in quasi-K suits (with courts deciding which of these two to use 				based on the equities of the particular case.)

			e. Other examples of quasi-contracts and unjust enrichment

				(1) Say you own a house that looks a bit grungy, you are at 					school, and a painter stops by and repaints your house.  					Must you pay him?  No, according to Hamilton, because 					the painter is an officious intermeddler.

					NOTE:  If the painter accidentally paints the wrong 						house (as long as the mistake is reasonable), then 						he is not considered an officious intermeddler.  

						NOTE:  Some states, like Texas, have 							mistaken improver statutes, which would 							compensate the painter in the case of a 							reasonable mistake.  

				(2) A woman is walking around in a supermarket, when she					decides to take a bite out of a big, juicy apple.  This would 					constitute a quasi-K situation, as the woman is exercising 					dominion over the apple.  [This is covered in UCC 2-					606(1)(c)].

				(3) You take an Oxford shirt to the cleaners to be washed, 					drop it thru the express-slot, and the tailor repairs a rip in 					the shirt.  Must you pay for this repair?  No, according to 					Hamilton, because the tailor can only assume that you want 				the minimum services available.

				(4) You are sent a tie in the mail, with the instructions that 					if you like it, then you can keep it and pay for it.  You give 					the tie to your husband, who wears it once, and then leaves 					it in his closet for good.  According to Hamilton, you must 					pay for the tie, because you exercised dominion in giving 					it to your husband.  (UCC 2-606(1)(c)).

		9. Hamilton’s four categories of unjust enrichment (all of which are 			restitutionary remedies); it should be noted that many cases are close calls

			a. That meant to encourage specialists to perform services 				(Cotnam).

			b. Reason to imply promise to pay under the circumstances (i.e., 				tailor repairing suit). 

			c. One who exercises dominion over property that he knows is not 			his (ATM example, tie example, and woman eating apple in 				supermarket). 

			d. Miscellaneous:  Cases that do not fall squarely within the other 				three categories.  In these cases, however, it seems reasonable to 				require payment, because we don’t want to encourage officious 			intermeddlers.  

				Example:  Dead whale in sitting in city’s habor.  After the 					city delays disposing of creature, a private entity takes care 					of it.  This private entity, according to Hamilton, should be 					entitled to restitution from the city.  

					NOTE:  When the duty is on another to perform, 						and you perform instead (like in the whale case):  1) 					You must give the other party an opportunity to 						perform; and 2) You can only recover in the most 						serious emergencies.