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Author:  	Mr. Neal A. Davis (ndavis@mail.utexas.edu)
School:		University of Texas School of Law
Course:		Professional Responsibility
Year:		Summer 1996
Professor:	John Dzienkowski
Book:		(1) Cases and materials on the Professional Responsibility of Lawyers by John F.
 		Sutton, Jr., and John Dzienkowski.  (2) Professional Responsibility:  Standards,
 		Rules & Statutes (95-96 Abridged Edition) by John Dzienkowski 

Message from the Author:

Thank you for downloading this outline.  I hope it is as helpful to you as it was to me.  If you use this outline, please send $1 cash to help cover my time and effort in making this and future outlines available.  My address is:

Neal A. Davis
1071 Clayton Lane #1403
Austin, TX  78723

If you have any questions, feel free to e-mail me at:  ndavis@mail.utexas.edu

Your support will be greatly appreciated.  Good luck!

Sincerely,
Neal A. Davis

Professional Responsibility

Prof. John S. Dzienkowski, University of Texas

Summer, 1996

Note

	Students at American law schools other than the University of Texas School of Law should find this outline particularly helpful, since Prof. John Dzienkowski is one of only six law professors who actually writes the questions for the MPRE. 
Also, a warning:  Prof. Dzienkowski’s summer school class and this outline cover the major areas on the MPRE, but I highly recommend reading the BarBri or West outlines in order to be fully prepared.  For example, Rule 8, judicial ethics, and a few other rules are not covered in this outline, but are covered in the BarBri or West outlines. 
	The page numbers that follow refer to Dzienkowski’s casebook on professional responsibility, which was used in this course.  It is not necessary to purchase or read this casebook in order to do well in Dzienkowski’s summer class.  Just study and understand Dzienkowski’s hypos below, which often are drawn from the cases, and attend Dzienkowski’s class every day.

Exam

- Exam is a combo of 30 multiple choice (modeled after MPR exam), 20 true-false, and 4 short answers.
- Exam will be open-notes and open-book, but no commercial outlines are allowed.
- We will study ABA Model Rules (MR), some state rules, some rules of evidence, and some FRCP rules.
- Before taking the MPRE, read Dzien’s pamphlet on judicial code. 
- Also, study Dzien’s ordering of MR, which are more logical than ABA’s ordering.  The questions following Dzien’s ordering are in-depth and good study preparation for actual MPR.
- Dzien says that he grades the essay portions of the exam on a 0-5 scale.  You get a 3 if you mention only the corrects MRs, but you can earn a 4 or 5 if you go into the facts of the essay question. 
- To prepare for Dzien’s exam and the MPRE, do the CCALI computer exercises in the library and take old MPRE exams.

--1.2:  Scope of Rep.  L can’t assist C to carry out crime.

--1.5 (very important—lots on exam):  Fees and reasonableness of fees (cont. must be in
writing, no cont. fees in crim or family cases, etc.)

--1.6/Atty-Client Priv under FRE/3.3/1.16 (very important—lots on exam, esp. in essays):
Confidentiality/att-client priv./candor to the ct./withdrawal

--1.8 (very important—lots on exam, especially 1.8(a)):  L’s fiduciary duty to C and L’s
prohibited transactions with C.  L cannot exploit info. relating to the representation to C’s disadvantage (i.e., L learns that C is going to invest in certain real estate, and buys that prop. before C invests in it),  L cannot enter any transactions with C unless the terms are fair and reasonable, L must finish rep. C b/f getting portrayal rights, aggregate settlement rule, etc. 

--1.7/1.9/2.2/1.10 (very important, and make great essay questions): Gen. rule re conflict of 
interest—deals with conflicts between present Cs/…between a past C and present C, and L’s conflict if he leaves a firm/intermediary (“best interest of Cs”)/Impaired disqualification—deals with conf. of interests and firms representing one if their L’s cients.

--1.13 (very important):  Org. as C—L represents gove., pub. corp., or closely-held corp.

--1.14: L represents a C with certain disabilities.

--1.15 (MPRE tests this a lot):  L as trustee.  C’s prop. must be kept in separate bank account, 
in jurisdiction of law office, etc.

--2.2 (“testable”) 

--3.1/Rule 11 of FRCP:  Frivolous lawsuits and judicial sanctions for filing them 

--3.7 (very important—on exam):  Advoc./Witness rule holds that L cannot represent C in court if he may be a material witness during the trial (but he can write depos, etc.)

--4.2 maybe on test:  Communicating w/ a person (i.e., a C or an expert) rep. by counsel.

--4.3 on test:  L should make it clear who exactly he represents (Billy Joel ex., H&W situations).

--5.1/5.2 (very important, and make good true-false questions):  These two rules go hand in hand,
and deal with the responsibilities of a partner supervising an associate, and the responsibilities of
	a subordinate associate.  

--5.4 (very important):  Prof. Ind. of L:  Ls sharing legal fees with non-Ls, and prof. ind. of Ls.

--5.5 (probably not on exam):  Unauthorized practice of law by Ls.   

--5.7 (not as important as 5.4): Ls and law-related services (Ls working for Sears, etc.).

--all of the 7 rules (the facts of the Sup. Ct. cases are important for these):  Advertising and
solicitation, specialization on ads, etc.

--8.1, 8.3 and 8.4 will all each have a question:  Bar admission and disc. matters, reporting
prof. misconduct, and what constitutes malpractice.

Introduction to Professional Responsibility

I. 	Introduction

A. 	The American Bar Association (ABA) and the Model Rules (MR)

1. 	In 1983, the ABA replaced the 1969 Model Code (MC) with the MR.  45 states
currently adopt the MR, although many of these states have significantly changed
the rules as they see fit.  TX has substantially changed almost all of the rules.  ABA has lost power as a result of these changes.

2. 	The ABA created state bars. The ABA is a voluntary group of lawyers. 
All but 10 states have state bars.  The Supreme Court has held that the states can establish their own criteria of who is admitted, who is disbarred, and who is disciplined, so long as the criteria are constitutional.

3. 	There are 3 forums of regulation of lawyers:

a. 	State disciplinary system:  The state bar disciplines the attorney.  A private
citizen complains to the bar, and the bar investigates, holds a hearing, then
sanctions.  The problem is that private citizens often do not turn lawyers in,
although this disciplinary system is good for client-trust investigations,
situations that “shock the conscience” (i.e., overcharging clients), and failure
of a lawyer to complete the work for his client.  In short, this system works
at the level of bright lines, but not gray areas.

b. 	Private malpractice:  Private citizens file malpractice suits against lawyers.  
Posner supports these.  Big firms are often targets.

c. 	Judicial regulation of lawyers’ conduct:  A judge can sanction an attorney 
for discovery abuse or frivolous lawsuits under, say, Rule 11 of FRCP.  Dzien
thinks that state judges should regulate the “gray areas” that state bars cannot
adequately address.

II. 	Exam, Education, Age, Citizenship, Residency, and In-State Office Requirements

A. 	State bars require the following to be a lawyer:

1. 	Education:  at least an undergraduate and a law degree.  Law has to be ABA accredited, but the exception is that state bars allow local schools that are not
		       ABA-accredited to take the bar in their respective states.

	NOTE:  The Clinton Administration has challenged the ABA requirements for 
accreditation of law schools, which has caused the ABA to relax some of its requirements.  This has allowed many law schools, which could not previously attain ABA accreditation, to get ABA approval.

2. 	Age:  Most states have a 17 or 18 year-old minimum to be a lawyer.

3. 	Examination:  A state bar must be passed.

4. 	Citizenship and Residency:  

a. 	Citizenship:  In 1973, the Sup. Ct. in Griffiths held that it was
unconstitutional to require a person taking the bar to be a U.S.
citizen.  If a person is a legal resident and has a green card, then
he can take the bar under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Am.
	But a non-resident of the U.S. has no Const. protection.

b.  Residency:  States used to require that bar-takers be state residents,
but the Sup. Ct. in Piper held that state-residency requirements were
unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The Ct. also held that practicing law was a fundamental right, not a privilege.  While
facial discrimination (explicitly using “residency” in rule) is unconstitutional, it is not clear if impact discrimination is unconstitutional.  This meant that a state could only discriminate against lawyers if:

(1) 	The state has a substantial, compelling interest, AND
(2) 	The state’s discrimination is narrowly tailored to
achieve this interest.  

			The Sup. Ct. has never found a residency requirement to be constitutional.

			EX:  Sup. Ct. held unconstitutional, under P&I Clause, a VA rule which
			permitted VA residents to practice w/o taking the bar while making non-
			VA residents pass the bar in order to practice.  P. 60.

			EX:  Virgin Islands had a rule to limit bar membership to state residents.  The
			state claimed that the compelling interest was:  (1) VI’s distance to the
			mainland, and (2) the administrative hassle of keeping up with potential
			bar members around the world.  Sup. Ct. held this rule unconstitutional, saying
			that the VI could cover the administrative hassle by simply increasing costs
			to all potential bar members.  P. 60.

			HYPO:  TX has a law requiring that a person can only take the state bar if
			he has an office in-state.  There is no explicit mention of the word “residency.”
			Is this constitutional?  Not clear.  If office means a full-functioning office, then
			probably not constitutional, but if it means a mailbox, then probably so.

			HYPO:  LA creates a law requiring those who have attended law school outside
			of the state to take a year of law in LA in order to practice in LA.  This could
			be constitutional, since LA could make the strong argument that its Napoleonic
			system of law requires a year of in-state instruction.

III. 	Character and Fitness to Practice Law

A. 	State bars require that a person have the proper character and fitness to practice law.  The
bars consider the following:

1. 	Violation of civil and/or criminal law:  Messing around with taxes or extensive
business litigation are important to the bar.  In terms of criminal law, DWI, and alcohol and drug abuse are very important.  Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) will sometime in the future very likely prevent the bar from not admitting alcoholics or drug addicts.

2. 	Business behavior:  Stealing money, mismanaging funds, and large, unpaid debts
will be scrutinized.  

3. 	Bankruptcy: It cannot be used to not admit a potential member of the bar.  But the
bar can consider pre- and post- bankruptcy behavior (i.e., did applicant to the bar make
a good faith effort to pay his bills before declaring bankruptcy).

B. 	Model Rules

1. 	MR 8.1:  Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.  An applicant to the bar shall not 
knowingly make a false statement or fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension or knowingly fail to respond to questions.

IV. 	Out of State Practice (Including Pro Hac Vice)

A. 	There are three ways in which a lawyer licensed in one state can practice in another:

1. 	Reciprocity:  Many states have extended full membership to their state bars upon
filing an affidavit that the individual is admitted to practice in another state and by
fulfilling certain special conditions.  This method for admission often waives the 
examination requirement for bar membership, but not other qualifications such as
character review.  

2.  Regular, traditional way:  In those states that to not have reciprocal agreements, then
a person can practice law in another state only if he is cleared by the bar and passes the exam.

3. 	Pro hac vice (only applies in litigation):  “For one time only.”  The courts decide 
whether they will allow a lawyer from another state to argue pro hac vice in their state.  Pro hac vice is granted at the beginning of the case.  State and federal courts often impose various requirements for allowing pro hoc vice:
	
	(1)  Lawyer must be a regular member of the bar in a state.
	
	(2)  He must have not been subject to discipline.
	
(3) 	Most of the time, the lawyer has to be associated with local 
counsel (this is economically burdensome to the client).

(4)  The lawyer must show some kind of “need” for representing     his client “pro hac vice.” 			

The court can examine how much delay or inconvenience is caused when deciding whether it will allow pro hac vic (p. 87, note 3).  	
	
a. 	State v. Federal courts and pro hac vice

1.  State courts:  A state court can deny pro hoc vice without a hearing,
and there is no Due Process violation.  

2.  Federal courts:  Unlike in a state court, a federal court must hold a hearing for a pro hoc vice motion and the court must have a reason for
denying the motion.

		HYPO:  C wants a TX L to represent him in OK.  L must explain to C that:  (1)  he is
		not licensed to practice in OK;  (2)  that an OK court will most likely require him to be
		associate with another L; (3) the risk that L will not get pro hoc vice.

B.  Unauthorized practice of law by L:  If a lawyer practices without permission in another state
jurisdiction, then he may violate the state’s unauthorized practice of law statute.  In addition to
disciplinary charges under MR 5.5, this action may subject the lawyer to criminal misdemeanor
charges, a permanent injunction against the lawyer’s practice in the state, or a forfeiture of the
client’s fees.  Clients often use unauthorized practice of law as an excuse for not paying their attorneys.  The following three factors are involved in deciding whether or not there is an
unauthorized practice of law:

1.  Where the client is from,

2.  Which state’s law is applied, AND

3.  The location (or “situs”) of the actual legal assistance.	

Many states allow an atty to get around the unauthorized practice of law by allowing him to associate with a local attorney, but this can be costly to the client.  The common defense that an attorney should get paid for work that is non-legal in nature (i.e., negotiations, tax help, etc.) has generally been rejected by courts (as it was in Lazoff below).

EX:  An atty licensed to practice in WI participated in an Ill. real estate negotiation involving Ill. property.  When the deal fell through, his Ill. clients refused to pay for his services.  The lawyer filed a contract action for recovery of fees and the client rightly filed an unauthorized practice of law defense.  Lozoff v. Shore Heights

HYPO:  A TX lawyer gives advice on his New York client’s K that says TX law will govern in NY if his client is sued over a property transaction.  Here, the lawyer’s advice would not be an unauthorized practice of law.  However, if he closed the deal, there would be an unauthorized
practice of law, unless the lawyer associated himself with a NY attorney.

	EX:  A Minn. Lawyer travelled to ND to provide tax help to his client.  The client refused to pay 
	his lawyer, claiming unauthorized practice of law.  The N.D. Supreme Court held that if the lawyer 
	had physically worked where he was licensed, he could get paid, but he could not get paid for work
	he physically did in N.D.  Ranta v. McCarney
	
C. 	Model Rules

1. MR 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law.  Protects against the lawyer from the unauthorized practice of law.
 
V. 	Federal Practice
	 
A. 	In addition to the system of state-by-state admission, federal courts have imposed their own requirements on the admission of lawyers.  Thus, those who wish to practice before a federal court must seek either regular or pro hoc vice admission.  There are two aspects of federal practice:

(1) 	Federal courts (i.e., a district court, circuit court, or US Sup Ct)  AND
(2) 	Executive, legislative, or agency practice.

1.  Federal Courts:  Regular membership typically requires the following:

a. 	Lawyer must be a member of the bar in which the court sits (i.e., atty is
licensed in TX and thus a member of the bar of the Fifth Circuit Ct. of Appeals).

b. 	The lawyer has not been disciplined by the bar.

c. 	The lawyer has practiced for at least five years.

The U.S. Sup. Ct. has held that a federal court cannot require that the attorney either reside or maintain an office in the state where the federal court sits in order to become
a regular member of that court.  Frazier v. Heebe, where Supr. Ct. held that a LA fed.
ct. could not prevent a Miss. atty., who had passed the LA bar, from going to fed ct.
just because he did not have an office or residence in LA.

2. 	Executive, legislative, and agency practice:  Federal agencies have set their own
criteria for regular membership, and often times non-lawyers can practice law in these
agencies and call themselves “attorneys” if they meet these criteria. Some examples:
Patent Office (if someone passes the patent bar, he can call himself a “patent attorney”
and the Supremacy Clause prevents the states from interfering with this), ERISA (allows
a person, if he passes the test, to practice ERISA law), Taxes (in tax court, a CPA can
litigate, while in federal court only a licensed attorney can litigate).

VI. 	Unauthorized Practice of Law by Non-Lawyers and Other Restrictions

A. 	States have adopted statutes that restrict the practice of law to licensed attorneys.  Violating
these statutes can lead to any number of consequences:

		(1)  A criminal prosecution (rare),

(2) 	An injunction preventing the non-lawyer(s) from doing any more work,

(3) 	One can lose his fee (like an attorney can lose his fee for unauthorized
practice of law)

(4) 	Any practicing non-lawyer is held the same standard as a lawyer if he
is sued for malpractice.

1. 	Dzien points out that the problem with these statutes is how one defines “practicing law”—

			a.  Any court representation is practicing law.

b.  If a person is given certain facts and he applies the law to these facts, then
he is practicing law.

c. 	If you charge money, then you are more likely than nor practicing law.

d. 	When lawyers begin moving into a certain area that they did not 
previously inhabit, such as immigration, then a non-lawyer in that area
will probably be found to be practicing law.

e. 	Writing books is not practicing law, since the First Amendment protects
that.  However, legal advice over the internet is a gray area.

f. 	The practice of law depends on the difficulty of the legal advice—how easy
is it to discover the law v. the risk of error and consequences.  EX:  It is not an
unauthorized practice of law to tell someone that they cannot run a red light.  But
a non-lawyer drawing up a will is the unauthorized practice.  

NOTE:  Non-lawyers will often claim the First Amendment as a defense in cases where they are charged with the unauthorized practice of law.

2. 	Two typical kinds of unauthorized practice by non-lawyers:

a. 	Non-lawyers practicing on the edge of the law, such as family and 
immigration legal clinics.

b. 	Entities such as banks drafting Ks in conjunction with other ventures (unless K is routine, non-negotiable, and warns client—see below).

		HYPO:  Can X, a non-lawyer, open a divorce clinic? No.  What about an immigration 
		clinic?  Some states also hold no (p. 235, note 3).  

		The following are historic exceptions to the unauthorized practice of law:

a. 	Child protective services.

b. 	Sports agents.

c. 	Filling out forms and evicting a tenant.

d. 	Routine Ks that are non-negotiable and warn client that they have not
			been prepared by attorneys.  EX:  A bank drafting a mortgage.

e. 	Insurance companies are given some latitude (but generally are required
to use lawyers for complex transactions, such as settlements).  p. 238, note 5

		EX:  Can a bank draft a will?  Persche v. Jones holds that it cannot.  (Of course, as a
 		bank can draft a mortgage).

		EX:  Can a real estate agent or broker prepare a real estate contract?  Some courts have
		held yes, as long as the K is not too complicated (p. 235, note 2).

B.  Model Rules:  

1. MR 5.4:  Deals with professional independence (a lawyer shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except in certain situations).  See p.242 for how some states have tried to change this rule.

		2. MR 5.5: Protects against the lawyer from the unauthorized practice of law or
		helping another with the unauthorized practice of law.
		
3.  MR 5.7: Deals with lawyers getting involved in law-related services.
Example:  Whitman & Breed owns a title co.  Under 5.7, the firm should build a wall, giving the title co. a separate name, and should inform the clients that they own the title co.

		Hypo:  Sears cannot provide legal services on its own from a booth.  But Sears could
		hire local law firms to provide simple legal services, such as drawing up wills.
	
		Hypo: IBM has 10,000 employees and 250 lawyers.  IBM can use its attorneys to take
		care of legal help, such as transferring an employee from the FL office to the TX one.
		But the lawyers could not assist IBM employees with divorces, etc.

		Hypo:  A paralegal drafts a will for a client.  The lawyer signs the will.  Is this legal?
		Yes, if:  the lawyer (not the paralegal) advertised to get the client, the lawyer met
		with the client before the will was drafted, and he supervises the paralegal’s drafting
		of the will.

The Attorney-Client Relationship

Obtaining a Client

I. 	Advertising and Solicitation:  The Constitutional Principles

A. 	Advertising:  In Bates v. Arizona, the US Sup Ct held that a lawyer has the constitutional
right to advertise:

1. 	When it comes to routine legal services, you can post your price.  Judges must
review each case to see if the legal service is routine.

2. 	Advertising is not unprofessional, and that states nowadays often require ads to be
informational.

3. 	An atty has the First Amendment right to advertise AND the public has a right to
have access to info about legal services (i.e., to compare prices). 

In Zauder, the US Sup. Ct. said that putting a picture of, say, the instrument that supposedly caused harm to people is okay—as long as it is truthful (i.e., the ad must say the instrument “allegedly caused harm”).  In Re RMJ, the US Sup Ct said it is a violation of the First Amendment for a 
state to dictate what can or cannot be said in an ad (of course, the ad must meet above criteria
and those of MR).  TX requires that you simultaneously submit your ad to the bar or get a
pre-clearance.  Otherwise, if you violate the advertising rules, then you must disclose you fee
and you could lose it.

B. 	Solicitation: Solicitation occurs when L contacts C either in person or live by telephone 
(telephone machines are legal).  The bottom line—if you cannot yourself solicit a potential
client, then you cannot use some agent (i.e., a doctor, a messenger, etc.) to solicit that client
for you.  Lawyers get around solicitation by setting up “seminars” and “informational meetings” at, say, the hotels of victims.  Also, as stated below, letter writing is acceptable and is not 
considered “solicitation.”

Hypo:  A plane crashes.  L can use the public media to get people to call him, as long as it is not a personal request.  A lawyer can also set up a seminar or informational meeting in the hotel of the victims.  But he cannot talk to the people directly and solicit them.  He also cannot pass out his cards in the hospital with the victims.  However, a doctor or nurse can recommend him
so long as a patient first requests an attorney.

C.  Model Rules

a.  MR 7.1:  Governs misleading communications concerning a lawyer’s 
			services in advertising.  There can be no testimonials by famous people 
			unless they have used the atty.  TX requires Ls to actually appear in the ads,
			but it is not clear if this is constitutional.  7.1(b) prevents an ad that, say,
creates the perception that L always wins.  It also prevents a judge-become-lawyer from saying he can speak to other judges about his clients’ cases, but a judge can list his experience.  Under 7.1, an ad must be primarily informational.

b.  MR 7.2: Governs advertising and prevents a for-profit atty from paying
someone to recommend his services.

c.  MR 7.3 (OFTEN TESTED):  Governs soliciting potential clients or writing them letters.  L cannot solicit a potential C, unless:

(1) 	C is a family member, a previous client, or another lawyer, OR

				(2)  The solicitation is for free legal services.
	
			The Sup Ct. in Primus held that  letter writing is not considered solicitation. 7.3
			requires that any letter written to a prospective client known to be in need of 
			legal services must include the words “Advertising Material” on the outside of 
			the envelope.  Some states, like TX, have “barratry statutes” that require a 
certain amount of time to pass before a L can send out letters and gifts to Cs in need of legal services.  It is not clear if these are constitutional or not.  

d.  MR 7.4:  Governs how/if a L can present the area of law in which he is
specialized.  There are two approaches:

(1) 	FL approach:  A person can designate himself a specialist (it
up to the lawyer to do this).

(2) 	TX approach:  A lawyer has to pass the tests in order to
advertise that he is board certified.  TX requires all lawyers
to report whether or not they are board certified in their ads. 	
		
			SEE DIAGRAM IN NOTES FOR HOW 7.4(c) PROVIDES CHOICES
			TO STATES.

e. 	MR 7.5: Strict requirements for what can be a firm name and what can
be on the firm’s letterhead.  There cannot be a law firm called “UT Law Firm,”
for example.

			Hypo:  Can a L pay a Dr for a referral?  Never.  This is a violation of MR 5.4 
			(sharing fees with a non-lawyer).  Under 7.2(c), this is also prohibited.  It is
			also a violation of 8.4 (which states that it is professional misconduct to violate
			the rules of professional conduct through another person—in this case, the Dr.).				
			Hypo: L tells potential C, “Please keep me in mind.”  This is informal—not a 
			direct solicitation—and thus it is legal.
			
			Hypo:  Can L pay a person to pass out brochures about his firm? Yes, but
			he cannot pay for each head the person brings into the firm (otherwise, it would
			be a runner scheme).  
	
			Hypo:  A large law firm can mail to potential a clients a description of its firm,
			its lawyers, representative clients, and cases.  But if the clients are in need of
			legal services, the envelope must say “advertising materials” under 7.3.

			Hypo:  A law firm can hire a PR agency for a monthly fee to publicize its 
			high profile cases.

II. 	Group Legal Services

A. 	Unions

1. 	Bars objected to unions that provided their members with legal services, arguing that	
there was an unauthorized practice of law, conflict of interest, etc.  These bars wanted an absolute ban to the unions’ legal services.  There were three kinds of legal
services provided by unions:
		
a. 	Unions had a list of attys that did the unions’ work.

b. 	Unions had in-house attys that represented workers.

c. 	Unions had outside attys but with reduced fee schedules.

The US Sup Ct has held that unions, under First Amendment right to associate, had
a right to provide counsel to its members, and it was unconstitutional for states to
have an absolute ban against the unions’ legal services.  States could only ban such
services case by case.  One could argue, under this ruling, that private corporations,
such as IBM, could provide legal services to its members (so long as attys were not
providing, say, divorces).

B. 	Model Rules

	1. MR 5.4:  Professional Independence of  a Lawyer.  SEE ABOVE for ex. of this rule.

Professional Considerations in Accepting a Client

I. 	Wrongful and Frivolous Litigation

A. 	A lawyer cannot counsel, urge, or assist a client in violation of the law, nor can he
assist a client who seeks to file a frivolous lawsuit. MR 1.2(d) and 1.16 deal with wrongful
representation, while MR 3.1 and FRCP 11 deal with frivolous lawsuits and sanctions.

B. 	Model Rules

1. 	Assisting a client to violate the law:

a. MR 1.2:  Scope of Representation. 1.2(d) prevents a lawyer from counseling, urging, or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.  However, L can discuss the legal consequences of his C’s conduct or can assist C in determining the scope, meaning, or application of the law.  But the pros. has circumvented this rule and charged attys for various crimes, such as conspiracy, accessory before and after the fact, aiding and abetting, etc.  The pros. especially goes after attys who provide legal advice to white collar criminals, organized crime, and crimes that cause bodily harm (see hypo below). 
	Since L must testify to defend himself, pros. often charges Ls with these 
	crimes—when pros. has strong evidence—so they can break atty-client priv.

Hypo:  Client asks if it is a violation of RICO to kill a witness before a mob trial.  L can answer this under ABA rules, a cts (as they have done) could convict him for aiding and abetting in a crime.  Thus, there is a disparity b/t ABA MR 1.2 and what cts have actually done.
		
Hypo:  C asks L how to open and operate a house of gambling.  Can L respond?  Under 1.2, L could respond.  However, the pros. could charge him with aiding and abetting.
	
Hypo:  L represents X Plumbing, which recently burned down.  He learns from a reliable source that the fire was really an arson.  L should not handle the insurance forms.  Dzien: Ls should not get involved in potential criminal acts where insurance cos are involved.

b.  MR 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation.  L must withdraw under 1.16(a) if L’s representation of C will definitely result in a violation of MR.  Under 1.16(b)(1), L may withdraw if there is a reasonable belief
that C is engaging in criminal or fraudulant conduct.  Under (b)(2), L may
withdraw if his client, after he has won, tells him that he committed the crime.
1.16(a)—when L must withdraw:  (1)  His rep. will result in a violation of law or
MR (i.e., L knows C is involved in a fraud), but J will make L stay on the case
so there is no revolving door; (2)  L’s mental or phys. condition requires
withdraw; (3)  C tries to fire L, but J will usually force L to stay on the case.
Under 1.16(b),  L may withdraw when: (1)  He reasonably believes (not knows) that C is involved in a crime or fraud; (2) C has used L’s services in the past for a crime or fraud; (3)  if L thinks C’s objectives are imprudent or repugnant 
(i.e., C does really crazy things); (4) C either fails to pay his bills or does not
provide evidence, but L must give reasonable warning here; (5) unreasonable
financial burden (comes up a lot in ct-ordered appointments—see 6.2 in this event).  1.16(c) allows good cause—death, birthday, emergency, etc.—for L
to get out of a case. 1.16(d) requires L to always protect C’s interest (i.e.,
confidentiality, not returning calls, etc.).  

Hypo:  Individuals in X Pharmaceutical Co. violate FDA standards.  The in-house attys can be charged with aiding and abetting, conspiracy, etc., if they know of X Co’s violations but do not report them.

2. 	Frivolous Cases:

a. 	MR 3.1:  Meritorious Claims and Contentions.  L cannot bring suit for C
unless it is not frivolous—in other words, there is a good faith arg. for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Dzien says it is difficult
to catch someone under 3.1 for filing a frivolous suit.  In criminal trials,
3.1 	says that it is not frivolous for D’s L to make pros. prove all elements of the
crime (i.e., prove that the substance C had was indeed cocaine). 

b.  FRCP 11: Gives the judge power to sanction L for frivolous lawsuits, but
it rarely used because the new rule, effective in 1993, provides a 21 day safe harbor provision to withdraw a frivolous complaint.  Also, unlike old rule, 
which mandated punishment for frivolous lawsuits, FRCP 11 leaves it to
the discretion of the judge to punish. 

C. 	Anders brief requirement in frivolous suits (only applies to ct.-appointed atttys)

1. 	If L is ct.-appointed and his C’s appeal is frivolous, then some states require that L 
write an Anders brief showing the most colorable arguments, even if he admits his suit is frivolous.  Dzien criticizes this as essentially doing the prosecution’s work for it.

II. 	Competency of Counsel

A. 	Model Rules

1. 	MR 1.1:  Competence.  L should provide competent representation to his client.  Just
because an L is not familiar with an area of law does not mean he cannot represent his C
in that area, so long as he does some research to become competent in that area.  In order
to charge L with incompetence, it must be blatant (i.e., missing SoL, not returning calls, etc.)  A bad brief or a poor courtroom argument is not sufficient to rise to incompetence.

2. 	MR 1.3: Diligence.  A L should act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

The Attorney-Client Contract

I. 	Employment Arrangements and Compensation

A. 	Avoiding liability in malpractice suits

		1. If L works on only a part of the suit, then he cannot be sued for malpractice.

B. 	Compensation (fees)

1. 	Fee must be reasonable:  A lawyer’s fee must be reasonable, and MR 1.5(a) lists 8 
factors to determine the reasonableness of the fee.  As explained below under the
Model Rules, there are two standards for reasonableness, depending on whether
L’s client is sophisticated and corporate or not.

2. 	Contingency fees:  Under 1.5, contingent fees are not allowed in family or criminal
cases, and must be in writing.  The rationale for not allowing these types of contingency fees is that there could be a conflict of interest—the L might, say, eagerly attempt to plea bargain so he could get a higher fee.    If L is fired in contingent fee case:

a. 	If he is fired for good cause, then he will have a hard time getting any fee.

b. 	If he is not fired for good cause, then what he can get depends on the
state:

(1) 	CA.: You can get paid for the value you added to the case, but
you have to wait until the case is over.  If the case is lost, you get
nothing.

(2) 	LA: You get the highest contingent agreed upon by C.  If the
case is won, you split the money with the other L. 

NOTE:  Most Ls deal with the potential problem of being fired by writing a
clause in their K that allows for the contingency fee to be converted into
an hourly rate.

		NOTE:  Some states, like FL. And CA., have caps on contingency fees.  

3. 	Fee shifting: Either a contract or a statute allows for fee shifting.  The 8 factor
test under MR 1.5 determines whether the fee is reasonable or not.  Particularly
important is a “lodestar”—how much time you put in and a normally charged rate.
An example is Steven Smith, the plaintiffs’ attorney in Hopwood, forcing UT to
pay his legal fees.

4. 	Fee waiving:  The US Sup Ct in Evans held that a D could agree to settle with P
if P waived his atty fees (UT could have settled with Hopwood and Co., and required
them to waive Smith’s fees).  An atty could attempt to say to his client at beginning of
a case that his fee could not be waived, but this would violate 1.2(a).  

5. 	Splitting fees w/ another L:  If it is in the same firm, L can divide the fee in any 
way he wants.  If L has an “of counsel” arrangement with a firm or a lawyer, then he can divide it in any way.  Advising the client is all that is required before splitting fees with outside counsel.  The client has the burden of saying that he does not want you to hire someone else.  If your fee increases as a result of bringing in outside counsel, then L must have the permission of the client.

6.  The forwarding fee/referral fee:   Can L1 advertise his law practice, and anytime a potential client goes to him, he refer him to L2, then collect a percentage of the fee L2 collects from client? No forwarding fees are permissible in 45 states, unless one lawyer is at least minimally involved. Usually what Ls do is write a “memo” to each other, and this is sufficient to allow fee splitting.  Lawyer a must be completely on the hook malpractice-wise.

7.  Protecting fees:  The best way to protect against a fee is to get an advance from
C and bill against that advance.  When the advance runs out, request another one.  Some
states require that this advance be kept in a separate account.  Any money left over from the advance of course must be given back to C.  Obviously, L could not protect his fee
in such a way if it were contingent.

8.  Minimum and non-refundable fees: A minimum fee is when client gives L a
certain amount (i.e, $1000) that is non-refundable. Small firms and big shots like
Gerry Spense collect minimal fees to prevent conflicts.  Large firms collect them
to throw their weight behind a case.

a.  Family cases (an exception in some states):  Some states, like NY, do not allow minimum fees in family cases.

			b.  Experts:  Experts can request a minimal fee, since their name & reputation
are being used on the witness list.  Also, this fee prevents the expert from later switching sides and working.

9.  Collecting Fees:  There are a variety of ways an L can attempt to collect his fee.

a. 	In contingent fee cases (“charging lien”):  L can use a “charging lien.”  
This means that L has a lien on his fees and expenses in a cont. fee case, and this lien is enforceable until it is paid off (assuming L actually won the case).

b. 	In fixed-fee cases (“retaining lien”):  L can use a “retaining lien” if client 
cannot pay his up-front fixed fee.  If there is a retaining lien, L can refuse to hand over any files to C until the fee is paid (this is rarely done).

c. 	ABA recommendation for collecting fees (arbitration):  The ABA
recommends arbitration to collect a fee, and this arbitration is only binding if both L and C sign an agreement.  Dzien says that an L should not sue his C
for a judgment, since a C will counter-sue and claim malpractice.  So L 
should just write off the uncollected fee as an unpaid debt.

C. 	Model Rules

1. 	MR 1.2:  Scope of Representation.  Under 1.2(a), L handles the means (present args 
to ct., etc.), while C handles the objective.  1.2(c) allows L to limit his scope of employment.

2. 	MR 1.5: Fees.  1.5(a) states that a fee must be reasonable, and 8 factors set out what 
exactly constitutes “reasonable.”  There are two standards for reasonableness:

(1) 	Sophisticated, corporate clients:  There is more leeway given to
what exactly constitutes “reasonable” here.

(2) 	Unsophisticated clients: What is reasonable is that which does
not “shock the conscience.”  Charging $500 for a name change is
unreasonable and shocks the conscience.

 1.5(b) states that a non-contingency fee should preferably be in writing, while a contingency fee must be in writing. 1.5(d) does not allow cont. fees for family or criminal cases, since this could create a conflict of interest.  Some states, such as CA or FL,
put a cap on the amount of contingency fees. 

Performance of the Attorney-Client Relationship

I. 	Nature of the Relationship

A. 	There are three ways to classify the atty-client relationship:

1. 	Agency:  L is an agent for C.  L sets the means, while C sets the objective (under
1.2).  

a. 	Lawyer-as-agent in a crim. trial: C decides his own plea and can
waive the jury if he chooses.  A judge can inquire into the voluntariness of this.

b. 	….in a civil suit: C decides what he wants to do (i.e., sue, settle, etc.).
What if L settles w/o C’s consent?  C can sue L.  However, in class actions, Ls can settle without C’s consent. 

2. 	Fiduciary: L has fiduciary duties to C.  This kind of relationship if often invoked
under 1.8. Comes up in cases involving confidentiality, transactions, various kinds of
representations, etc.  L cannot exploit info. relating to the representation to C’s
disadvantage (i.e., L learns that C is going to invest in certain real estate, and buys
that real estate without C’s consent before C invests in it). 

3.  Trustee:  L is a trustee and C is a beneficiary.  This kind of relationship is most
often seen in property cases.  MR 1.15 applies here, and it is the most frequent rule
used to disbar Ls.  If L is a fiduciary, then:

a. 	He must set up accounts for his Cs separate from his own (but this does not
mean that each C should have his own separate account—L only needs one
account for all of his clients).

b. 	These accounts must be in a bank.

c. 	The bank must be in a jurisdiction (state) where L’s office is.  

d. 	Other property should be safeguarded.

e. 	All records should be kept.

B. 	Clients with disabilities

1. 	L can represent a C with a disability under MR 1.14.  There are 3 contexts:

a. 	C has a mental disability (i.e., Alzheimer’s, schizo, etc.):  In these cases,
L is allowed to do what is in C’s best interest.  In TX, L must interview C,
discuss the case with C, and tell C that he can hire his own atty if he does not 
like L.

b. 	C is a minor (i.e., in a civil dispute): In the case of minors, L can argue
C’s interest and also what L thinks C’s interest should be (if they differ) to
the court.

c. 	C is in a coma: Judge will often times allow L to simply do what is in C’s
best interest. 

C.  Model Rules

1. 	MR 1.2: Scope of Representation. Deals with L as agent for C.  Under 1.2(a), L sets 
the means, while C sets the objective.  1.2(b) allows L to limit the scope of representation, which is good if he wants to avoid (or fears being a target of) malpractice suits against him.  For example, client comes into L’s office needing help in a certain area, but only can pay for 1 or 2 hours.  L should send him a letter after C leaves confirming the arrangement—that he is only working for 1 or 2 hrs on case—which works as a kind of disclaimer of liability.

2.  MR 1.15 (one of the most frequent rules used to disbar attys): Safekeeping Property.  Deals with L as trustee. L:

a. must set up accounts for his Cs separate from his own (but this does not
mean that each C should have his own separate account—L only needs one
account for all of his clients).

b. 	These accounts must be in a bank.

c. 	The bank must be in a jurisdiction (state) where L’s office is.  

d. 	Other property should be safeguarded.

		EX:  L gets $1 million of C’s money.  L tells secretary to deposit the check.  She
		ends up stealing the money.  L is liable under MR 1.15 and 5.2.

3.  MR 1.8:  Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions.  Deal with L’s fiduciary duty.
He cannot exploit info. relating to his C to C’s disadvantage.  See above and Comm. 1
on p. 32.
	
4.  MR 1.14: Client under a Disability.  L must try to mantain a normal atty-client
relationship with someone who is a disability.  L can only seek appointment of a 
a guardian or take other protective action if he reasonably believes C cannot adequately
act in his own interest.  In comm. 5 on p. 52, L should not disclose C’s disability if
it could adversely affect C’s interests (i.e., lead to him being committed to, say, a
mental ward). In TX with cases of mental incompetence (i.e., due to schizo. Or
Alzheimer’s), L must interview C, discuss the case with C, and tell C that he can hire his own atty if he does not like L.

5. MR 1.4: Communication.  L shall explain a matter to C to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit C to make informed decisions (i.e., L cannot get C to sign a
settlement to L’s advantage without C knowing what exactly he is signing).

II. 	Entity as a Client, and Confidentiality and Privilege

A. 	Entity as a Client

1. 	MR 1.13 applies here, and L must decide whether he represents the entity
or each individual.  

EX:  Boxer, his manager, and his agent, all approach L.  L must memorialize
which of these he is going to represent.  1.113 Arises when these individuals 
want to form an entity.  

1.13 most often comes up in issues of fraud.

B. 	Confidentiality and atty-client privilege:

1. 	Confidentiality:  MR 1.6 applies here, and it is in effect 24 hrs. a day.  L cannot
disclose what C tells him, without the consent of C.  As with atty-client priv., there
are exceptions to confidentiality (discussed below under the MR).

2. 	Atty.-Client priv.: FRE 503 on p.442 applies here.  This privilege only applies
(can be used as a defense) to court-ordered testimony when the court attempts to get the lawyer or client to reveal priveleged information.  This privilege, unlike confidentiality, is not in effect 24 hrs. a day.  L is not disciplined under MR if he violates this rule.  This priv. is owned by C, and he can choose to break it if he so chooses.  As with confidentiality, there are also certain exceptions that allow for this privilege to be overcome (discussed below under MR).

	C.  Model Rules:	

1.  MR 1.13 (very important): Organization as Client.  Tied into conflicts of interest (MR 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9) and confidentiality (MR 1.6). 1.13 is often times used in cases of fraud. 1.13(b) applies to 3 situations, and to either in-house or outside attorneys:

a. 	Government:  If L works for a governmental organization (i.e., as a lawyer
for Nixon admin.), and there is a crisis (i.e., Watergate),  then L must act to protect the government (i.e., not Nixon).  1.13 lists the various steps that L
			should take.  If no one higher up does anything, then L can publicly 
			reveal what is going on to the press.  Here, there is a duty to the public,
			and L can go public with info. regarding org.’s improprieties.
 
b. 	Public Corp. (Fortune 500):  If L works for a public corp., such as
a pharmaceutical co., he cannot disclose improprieties to public, since the
stocks will plummet.  L’s has a duty to resign (or withdraw) under 1.16, but cannot go public.

HYPO:  X Corp. makes drugs, but L learns that X does not report the side
effects to the FDA, as it is required to do.  L has to first move up the ladder,
taking his complain of improprieties all the way to the board of directors.  If 
the board does not do anything, then L must resign under 1.16.  One professor
has suggested that L in this situation should “noisily” resign, making others
suspicious of why that L resigned.  Dzien points out that the ABA’s mandating that L resign is not a very effective solution.

c.  Closely-held Corp.:  Here, what L can do depends on whether he represents
the entity (i.e., Exxon or Toyota) or multiple clients (i.e., the shareholders).  If L represents the entity, he cannot go public, but he has a fudiciary duty to the members of the entity.  

EX:  L represents medical corp. with two doctors in charge.  One Dr. tells L
that he wants to push the other Dr. out of the business.  L has a fiduciary duty
to both Dr.s, and thus he cannot assist in squeezing out the other Dr.  Fassihi

2. 	MR 1.6 (very important rule): Confidentiality.  1.6 is a very narrow rule, and is in
effect all of the time (24 hrs. a day).  1.6(a) states that L cannot reveal confidential info. relating to the representation of his C unless his C consents to it after a meeting with L.
1.6(b) is controversial. 1.6(b)(1) states that L may, not must, reveal confidential info. to prevent his C from committing an imminent crim. act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.  This means that any crime too far into the future or a non-
violent crime (i.e., fraud) may not be disclosed by L (but L may still have to withdraw in such an event under 1.16).  But some states, such as TX, require that L must disclose confidential info. if death or bodily harm is imminent.  These states, though, say that L may disclose confidential info. regarding civil acts (i.e., fraud) that his C has been, is, or will be involved in.  Finally, there is the tort standard, which can differ from ABA position that atty may disclose.  Under tort standard, L must act as a reasonable L under the same or similar circumstances, and he can be held civilly liable if, say, his non-disclosure leads to a murder or to fraud.  1.6(b)(2) allows L to reveal confidential info. as a defense to a claim if that info. is relevant.  Some nuances to 1.6:

	a.  If a ct. forces disclosure of info., then atty-client priv., not 1.6 confidentiality,
	would apply.
			
			b. 1.6 is completely different from the issue of withdrawal.  If L cannot disclose
			confidential info. under 1.6, he may still have to withdraw under 1.16 (i.e., in
			the case of a white collar crime).  
			
		Hypo: C tells L he is going to kill a witness.  First, L has to see if imminent death is
		likely under 1.6, and if C has the ability to carry out the crime.  Second, if L decides 
		that C can carry out imminent crime, then he may disclose under MR 1.6.  But under
TX (and most states’) law, L must disclose and go to a J, the target of the threat, etc.  If L is in a state that does not require disclosure, L can still be sued in civil court by the victim’s family, assuming the murder was carried out, and he’d be held to the tort “reasonable tort” standard.  Now, L cannot counsel C on how to get away with killing the witness or he would be violating 1.2.

		Hypo:  C says he is going to kill himself.  Under 1.6, L may report this.  Then, L
		should look at state law.  If suicide is a crime in TX, then L has to disclose it, since
		imminent crimes of death or serious bodily harm have to be disclosed.

		Hypo (actually used on one of Dzien’s exams):  Buyer and seller of a shopping center.
		L represents S. At closing, S tells his L that tenant of prop. is not moving out for a
		while.  If L does not disclose this to B, then he can be sued under tort law for acting
		unreasonably under the circumstances.

		Hypo:  Firm finds out that a co., OPM, is engaged in a fraud.  Pres. of OPM tells firm that
		he stopped fraud a week ago, thus making the crime a past crime.  But in reality,
unbeknownst to the firm, OPM was continuing its fraudulent operations. The firm keeps the client, and does not warn any potential customers or the court of OPM’s fraud.  The
firm is sued for negligence under the tort standard, and loses because it failed to
investigate whether or not OPM was still engaged in fraud and because it did not disclose
the fraud to anyone.  TX allows L to rectify consequences of past fraudulent crimes 
if the firm discloses those frauds in the present.  TX also allows L to disclose a 
current fraud.

Hypo:  C tells L to hold onto a $10,000 check because there is not enough money in
the escrow account.  In most states, insufficient funds (ISF) is a crime.  But L did 
nothing—he closed the deal.  The bar publicly censured L, saying he should have withdrawn from the case instead of holding money in an escrow account.  Under MR,
L should not disclose ISF, but he should withdraw.  In TX, L may disclose and
withdraw.

3. 	FRE 503 (p.442): Attorney-Client privilege.  Unlike confidentiality, atty-client
privilege only applies to court-ordered testimony, and thus is not in effect 24 hours
a day.  The client can waive this privilege.  There are exceptions to 503:

a. 	Casual conversations are not covered by priv. (C must have sought 
legal services to apply).

b. 	C must intend conversations to be confidential; otherwise, they can be
disclosed (this is what happened in Byington case, when ct. said that C
had not intended her map to be confidential and thus was discoverable).

c. 	A future or continuing crime is being committed will destroy priv..  Pros.
loves to use this (as they tried in Byington case) to break atty-client priv.  Not having a Christian burial is an example of continuing crime, while knowing that
C plans on murdering someone is an example of a future crime.  Under ct.
order, this info. must be revealed.  In cont. crime situations, C is in awkward
position of saying that he is innocent while also asserting that the victim is 
no longer alive (as in Byington case).

d. 	A crime or fraud being carried out can overcome this priv.  Dzien says that
this is the most important exception.  (A crime or fraud does not necessarily
overcome confidentiality).

e. 	Co-clients can also break privilege if they so choose (also an important 
exception).  For example, husband and wife rob a bank.  They hire L.  Either
      			H or L can waive the privilege.  This often happens when pros. plea-bargain
			with one D so he will rat on the other.  For this reason, it is a big risk for one
			L to have multiple Cs in a case, and he should recommend that each C get his
			own L.

f. 	Breach of duty by L or C can overcome this priv., should a court order
seek info from L or C.

g. 	Jurisdictions are split over whether or not a L must disclose the identity of his C if the other side does not know C’s identity.  For example, C hits another car and goes to L.  Pros. learns of this, and attempts to get a court order to overcome priv. and force L to admit who caused the crime.  Another ex:  L files tax returns for an anonymous C, and IRS seeks a court order to get L to reveal his C’s identity so they can confirm C is not engaged in illegal activity.

III.  Candor to the Court—the Exception to Confidentiality

A. 	Candor to the court:  MR 3.3 applies here.  Candor to the court was developed in the crim.
context, but it applies to both criminal and civil cases.  It also overrides the confidentiality rule.
L must disclose to the court if his C is lying on the stand.  L must also not knowingly offer false evidence.  But Spalding held that candor to the court does not mean that L must disclose possible evidence.  The rule here is “don’t ask, don’t tell”—if L’s C tells L he committed the crime but C puts in a plea of not guilty, then L does not have to disclose that C really committed the crime unless C lies on the stand under cross-examination.  There are two views of candor:

1.  NYU Prof. Monroe Friedman’s view:  Crim Ds have a right to lie on the stand.  The jury should decide D’s credibility.  But in civil cases, D should not lie on stand.

2.  ABA view: If C lies on the stand, and L knows (not just suspects) C is lying but doesn’t say anything to the judge, then L is violating candor under 3.3.  

	Because of 3.3, Ls are split whether or not they should ask their Cs if they are guilty.  Some say 
	that if L asks C if he is guilty, then L has to disclose this if C takes the stand (since it is hard
	for L to say he didn’t trust C, since he did ask C after all).  Others, like Dershowitz, say that
	L should let C tell him what happened on C’s own volition, and if the candor issue arises, L
	should say that he did not believe C when C said he was guilty.  If L knows C committed a 
crime, he also cannot get a fake alibi for C.  If L himself intentionally or negligently lies to the court, he can be charged for violating 3.3 or 4.1.
	
	NOTE:  Dzien says the best way to handle complex candor to the ct./confidentiality issues is
	to separate 1.6 from 3.3.  Then look at the discovery rules—FRCP and caselaw.

B. 	Model Rules

1.  MR 3.3 (very important):  Candor to the Court. L also cannot submit evidence that he knows to be false.  If C lies on the stand, and L knows (not just suspects) C is lying but doesn’t say anything to the judge, then L is violating candor to the court under 3.3. MR 3.3 overrides the confidentiality rule of 1.6.  L must disclose any facts which are distorted on the stand.  Obviously, L should disclose to J, not the Pros.  A hypo will illustrate just how 3.3 applies, and what steps L should take:

Hypo:  C tells L he is going to lie on the stand.  L should tell C either not to lie or
not to testify.  But under 1.2, L cannot prevent C from taking the stand, so C can
ignore L and lie on the stand.  What does L do?

(1) 	Immediately take a break and tell C to tell the truth on the stand or 
that L will have to withdraw under 1.16. 

(2)  If C continues lying on the stand, then L should tell judge that C is lying on the stand, and inform J what precisely C is lying about.  L will then request to withdraw under 1.16, since otherwise he would be
violating 3.3.  J will not let L withdraw, since this would create a 
revolving door that Cs could take advantage for.

(3) 	So L and J, since they do not want to elicit any lies, just simply sit
back and do not question C tells his story and perjurs himself on the stand.

(4) 	Pros. can then cross-examine C and can possibly question L as
a witness.

(5)  Finally, in his closing args, L cannot refer to the perjured testimony.     

		EX:  L represents C, who is a divorced mother.  C tells L that she is going to kidnap her
		kids so her husband cannot get custody.  Analysis:

(1) 	First, L must ask if there is an ongoing ct. proceeding.  If no,
then under 1.6 L has decide whether kidnapping causes serious 
bodily harm or death.  It does not, so L cannot disclose the kidnapping.
But L should withdraw from C’s case under 1.16.

(2) 	If there is a ct. proceeding, then L has a duty to disclose under 3.3.

Hypo:  Officer negligently killed his child when he was abusing him.  The officer panicked, buried the child, and reported to the police that his child was kidnapped.  Officer tells L that he has killed and buried his child.  What does L do? Analysis:

(1) 	There is no imminent death or bodily harm, so L cannot disclose
confidential info.  

(2) 	Probably not a present or continuous crime (it seems reasonable
the child is dead), so he may not overcome confidentiality of 1.6.
Past crimes do not have to be disclosed, unless there is a candor
to the court issue under 3.3.

(3) 	There is no court proceeding, so 3.3 does not apply.
Under this hypo, L does not have to disclose anything.

		Hypo:  L’s C, a husband who has just gotten divorced, testifies in court that he cannot pay
		child support to his wife because he is supporting his mother.  L knows C is lying.  L must
		take a break, tell C to tell the truth, etc.  L must follow the 5 steps above.

		Hypo:  X and Y get into a car wreck.  X sues Y.  X’s license says that he should wear
		corrective lenses.  X tells his atty that he did not wear lenses.  During depos, when Y’s
		atty asks X if he wore his lenses, X says that he did.  Should L take a break and follow
		3.3?  It is not clear if 3.3 applies to depos, although it probably does.

EX:  C lies to the police, giving them his brother’s name instead of his real name.  C goes to L, who knows him (and, of course, his name).  L sees C’s brother’s name on all of C’s police reports.  C has failed to give police his real name.  What can L do?  Since this is a continuing crime, MR 1.6 does not apply, but L should withdraw from the case under 1.16 since C is violating the law.  State v. Cadby

IV. 	L’s Conflict of Interest with Client         

A. 	MR 1.8 applies here, and outlines prohibited transactions of L. MR 3.7 also is a conflict with 
C, since it deals with the advocate/witness problem. Problems arise when L’s judgment is influenced by his own self interest, differing interests of other clients, and influences on on-clients.  One of the most dangerous conflicts is when L’s interest conflicts with C’s.  Some conflicts arise because of L’s financial stake in the litigation, or because of L’s role as witness and advocate in the trial.

B. Model Rules

1.   MR 1.8 (more Qs on MPR exam on this rule than any other; Dzien also emphasized this rule on his test):  Conflict of Interest:  Prohibited Transactions.  Under 1.8(a), L cannot enter into a business transaction with C unless the terms are fair and reasonable (L cannot get too good of a deal), and are set out in writing so that C understands them. Secondly, L must tell C to seek independent counsel.  Third, C must consent in writing.  Finally, Dzien’s added requirement—if any of L’s interest conflict with C’s (i.e., L represents the Police Dept., while C was caught stealing by that Dept.), then L should withdraw from the case.  Under 1.8(b), L should not use any info. to the disadvantage of C without C’s consent.  MR 1.8 deals with use of info., not disclosing it.  1.8(c) prevents L from drafting wills if he is related to the beneficiary unless the beneficiary is related to the donee.  1.8(d) states that L must finish representing C before L can discuss portrayal rights with C.  1.8(e)  is the “financial assistance” rule, which deals with L advancing money to C so C can pay his bills.  This rule is in contrast to 1.8(a), which requires that the business transaction with C be fair and reasonable.  There are two exceptions to 1.8(e)—contingency cases and when L represents an indigent C.  L can pay court and litigation costs (i.e., cost for C to travel to trial, C’s meals during trial, etc.) of C in a contingency case or in a case where his C is indigent (but his poor C must pay L back if C wins).  1.8(f) is the “accepting money from another C” rule.  It deals with two circumstances:  (1) Duty to defend—an insurance co. can defend one of its insured with an in-house attorney, and (2) Duty to cover—Someone C knows (i.e., his dad) pays his legal fees (but the person who pays cannot have access to C’s confidential conversations with L unless C consents under 1.6).  1.8(g) is the “aggregate settlement” rule, and requires that L, when he has multiple Cs, inform all C of the entire settlement being offered.  It only takes one of these Cs to hold out or break the entire deal, which is why we have class actions. 1.8(h) concerns “limiting malpractice liability to C” rule, and Dzien says it is a perfect testing rule.  Under 1.8(h), L, for past misconduct with a current or former C, must put his settlement in writing to C and advise C to seek independent counsel.  If L wants to limit future malpractice liability, then it must be permitted by state law and C is independently represented in making such an agreement.  1.8(i) states that L in one firm cannot go up against his relative in another firm unless they get consent from Cs.  However, L can go up against another firm if his relative works at that firm but L does not go up against his relative. 1.8(j) prevents buying or selling cases.

	2.  MR 3.7 (very important, and easy to miss on an exam):  Lawyer as Witness.
	If L is likely to be a necessary witness in a trial, then L cannot try the case.  There
	are three minor exceptions listed under 3.7.  But even if L is disqualified, another L
	in firm can take the case.  Also, many states allow L, if he is disqualified, to still
write briefs, etc., for C, but he just cannot sit at counsel’s table.  Cases where this rule usually kicks in:  if L is present at the line up, visits the accident, etc.  Rationale:  L’s testimony would be tainted, he would confuse the jury, etc. (see Comments to 3.7).  

Hypo:  L drafts a deed for C, who is selling his property.  A dispute arises between C and the buyer of the prop.  What happens?  L could be a material fact witness and thus have
to be removed under 3.7.  

Hypo:  The Dallas Cowboys, a client of firm X, plan to move their training camp from Austin to El Paso.  An L in the firm learns of the new camp site and buys the prop. just before the Cowboys move.  Is this ethical?  No, 1.8(b) prohibits L from doing this.  Unless L somehow can prove that his buying prop. did not disadvantage the Cowboys.

Hypo:  L represents Nations bank and Bank One.  Both banks have loans to Continental airlines.  L’s friend at Bank One tells L that Continental is going to declare bankruptcy, and he tells L to make sure that Nations gets its money before Cont. declares bankruptcy.
Can L act on his friend’s advice?  1.8(b) says that L cannot use Bank One info. if, by
using it, he would benefit Nations while disadvantaging Bank One.  The gray area is when
a 3rd party (i.e., a friend of L’s who does not work for either Nations or Bank One) tells L
of the bankruptcy.  

		Hypo:  L represents 100 people from a plane accident.  20 have been seriously injured, 60 
		have lost limbs, and 20 have nervous disorders as a result of the accident.  The airline
		wants to pay according to the injury (i.e., 20k for lost limbs, 40k for seriously injured, 
etc.).  L does not tell the people with lost limbs, when he gets them to settle with the airline,  that the seriously injured are getting paid more than them.  Is this legal?  No, L
has violated 1.8(i) since he did not inform all Cs of the entire settlement.  How do creative Ls get around this rule?  After the airline crash, they would hold an “informational meeting” and assign a point value to Cs’ injuries, telling them that they will get a portion of the settlement depending on the point value.  They try to get Cs’ consent before the airline actually decides what the dollar amount is of each injury.

V. 	Clients with Differing Interests

A.  Dividing Conflicts:  Most people divide conflicts between clients into two areas:

1.  Present client conflict:  MR 1.7 applies.  It always involves two present clients.  It 
often involves all kinds of interests (the clients’, firms, 3rd parties, etc.).  There are two conflicts covered by 1.7.  1.7(a) deals with directly adverse conflicts, when Cs sue each other, and 1.7(b) deals with when L’s own or C1’s interest interest materially limits L’s representation of C2. 
2.  Former client conflict:  MR 1.9 applies.  It always involves one present and one past client.  L cannot take a present client if it involves the “same or substantially related” matter as a past C’s without the past C’s consent.    

If there is a conflict between Cs, then MR 1.10 could kick in.  1.10 is a broad and damaging rule, and is concerned with preventing taint in a firm. 1.10(a) holds that one L in a firm cannot represent someone who has a conflict of interest with another L’s C in that firm (this applies to past or present Cs).  1.10(b) holds that once an L leaves a firm, that firm can still represent Cs who have
interests that are materially adverse to the leaving L’s Cs, so long as these interests are
not the same or substantially related to the leaving L’s Cs’ interests.    The exception to 1.10 is 1.11, which deals with government employees who have gone into private practice.

B. 	Model Rules

		1.  MR 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.  Prevent Ls from representing two present
		Cs with conflicting interests.  Conflicts with present clients can fall within two categories,			and sometimes the conflict will fall into both:

a. 	Directly adverse conflict (20% of cases), which is covered by 1.7(a):  2 Ps 
or Ds start suing other.

b. 	Materially limited conflict (80% of cases), which is covered by 1.7(b): L’s
own interests, or his responsibilities to C1, materially limit his representation of C2.

		When there is a conflict:

(1) 	L must do an ind. investigation to make sure that there is no 
adverse effect between Cs or L and C.  AND

(2) 	If there is no adverse effect, C must consent after a consultation 
with L, since there is a conflict after all.  This consultation must be a meeting where L meticulously goes into the conflict.

		Examples of a “directly adverse” effect under 1.7(a):

--L cannot represent 2 present Cs who decide to sue each other.  EX:  L represents to 2Ps or 2Ds who start suing each other.  Separate law firms must 
			represent the cross-claims between these parties.  Now, L can tell Cs to forego
			the cross-claims so he can represent them, since 1.7(b) allows him to 
			materially limit his responsibilities to Cs.

			--L cannot sue present C on an unrelated matter.  EX:  Firm cannot
			represent Exxon on a case and also sue Exxon on a separate matter.  TX
			allows present C to be sued on an unrelated matter (otherwise, big firms
			like Baker & Botts could never represent anyone).  Fifth Circuit has rejected
			the TX view and held that the ABA view applies to fed. cts. under Fifth Circ.
		
--L cannot represent competitors:  L represents Bank One, Chase Manhattan, and Frost banks.  These three banks represent three interests—local (Bank One), world (Chase), and an aggressive bank that wants to take over the rest of the country’s banks (Frost).  30% of the time, these banks are opposed to certain things and thus conflict with each other.  Can L represent them?  Maybe, but only if he tells them that he is not their general counsel, and that he does 
their work on a case-by-case basis.  They must also consent.  Generally, this only works with sophisticated entities. 
		
		Examples of “materially limited” conflicts under 1.7(b):

--L owns interest in C:  L owns 10% of Microsoft.  Can the firm L works in sue Microsoft on behalf of Word Perfect?  We have to look at MR 1.10, and ask 
ourselves if L could sue Microsoft under this rule.  1.10 states that if L has a significant financial interest in any party and his interest could affect the outcome of a case, then there is a conflict of interest.  10% is a significant interest, and there would be a conflict.  If there is no adverse effect and L’s
interest would materially limit his representation of C, he must then get C’s consent to have L represent C.

			--L cannot represent C2 who could materially alter his obligation to C1
without C1’s consent:  Can L represent Microsoft and WordPerfect while
representing in a separate suit IBM, who has just made a big deal with MS.
Yes, L can represent them all if he gets all of their consent.

--L must avoid materially altering his obligation with multiple Cs:  L can
represent multiple Cs if he explains to them up front that they cannot sue
each other, and he gets their consent.  Whether he should represent them or
not depends on the facts of the case.  If, after L begins representing Cs, Cs
start suing each other, then he must make Cs get separate counsel.  For
ex., A sues a corp. and its distributor.  Can L represent the corp. and distributor?
Yes, but he should explain to them that they cannot sue each other and he should
get their consent.  Another ex:  Police dept. and some of its officers are sued for 
a civil rights violation.  L should probably recommend that each officer and the
dept. have their own counsel, since there is a likelihood that they will start pointing the finger at each other or that they will claim bad counsel if they do
not win.  In the criminal context, L must ask himself two questions when deciding whether or not to take on multiple Cs:  (1) Are Ds charged with the
same crimes?, and (2) What are their positions (their stories)?  For ex., A
and B rob a bank.  A actually robs the bank, while B drives the getaway car.
Can L represent both the driver and the robber?  Probably not, since the 
driver would testify against the robber (in an effort to get a lighter sentence).
Can L represent them in separate trials?  No, because the driver might still
testify in the robber’s trial and vice-versa.  Often times, the government
plea bargains with one C, which results in preventing L from representing that
C any longer.  Finally, in civil and crim. trials, if L learned anything from one
C that is incriminating to another C, then he cannot represent both Cs if they plan on testifying.  For ex., twins are arrested for committing murder, but only one really did it.  L can only represent both if he is not told by them who committed the crime and the twins do not testify.

		Other misc. scenarios where 1.7 comes up:

			--Mergers:  Law firms that want to merge must follow 1.7.  They cannot merge 
			if their Cs could create a conflict of interest after the merger.

			--Beauty contest: P sues D for patent infringement.  P interviews with
			V&E, but decides not to hire that firm.  Then D goes to V&E and hires
			them.  V&E cannot represent D since one of V&E’s duties to potential
			Cs include a duty of confidentiality, assuming Cs are not sophisticated or
			complex.  The way V&E can avoid this dilemma is to tell any potential
			Ds not to reveal anything confidential.  The easiest way to do this is to
			have one L interview potential C, not 15 or 20.

--Deviating from normal course of practice:  Let us say that L, in his normal course of practice, always defends Insurance Cos.  His defense for these Cos
is that P never wants to settle in bad faith.  Can L then one time represent P
against an Ins. Co. and say that Co. is not settling in good faith?  There could
be a conflict here, but it is not clear.  Comm. 9 of 1.7 offers some guidance.

			--Insurance cos:  Let’s say that D wrecks into P, and P sues for damages.  
			D’s insurance co. wants to provide attorneys to D.  Can Ls from the insurance
co. represent D?  Yes, if co. is not denying D coverage (i.e., charging that D
did not report the accident in a timely manner).  In-house counsel can only
be used when the conflicts are minimal.  If they are significant, then 
insurance co. must hire outside counsel for their Cs.  For example, if a Dr.
wants to go to trial in a malpractice suit, but his insurance co. wants to settle,
then the insurance co., if they choose to represent him, must hire outside counsel.
			 
2. 	MR 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Clients.  Deals with one present and one former 
C—L cannot represent present C if it involves the “same or substantially related” matter as a past C’s without the past C’s consent (see below under “Former Client Conflicts and
Confidentiality”).  

3. 	MR 1.10: Impaired Disqualification:  General Rule.  1.10 is a broad and damaging
rule, which deals with taint.  Under 1.10(a), one L in a firm cannot represent someone that has a conflict of interest with another L’s C in that firm (this applies to past or present Cs).  1.10(b) holds that once an L leaves a firm, that firm can still represent Cs who have
interests that are materially adverse to the leaving L’s Cs, so long as these interests are
not the same or substantially related to the leaving L’s Cs’ interests.  For example,
let’s say the leaving L represents Microsoft in an antitrust suit.  The firm can represent MS’s competitor, WordPerfect, as long as it is not in an antitrust suit against MS.  The
exception to 1.10 is 1.11, which deals with government employees who go into private
legal practice.  If these employees worked on a case in the government and the firm
deals with that case, then the government-become-private atty is “screened” from the case
and cannot get profits that the firm earns from the case.  

VI. 	Lawyer as Intermediary

A. 	An L is an intermediary if he represents two or more clients who are creating a transaction or
resolving a dispute.  MR 2.2 applies here, and often time in cases with multiple Cs, it is not clear
if 2.2 or 1.7 (conflict of interest among current clients) actually applies.  Most states hold that 1.7 applies.  Dzien says that under 2.2,  L adjusts his rights and responsibilities, and that the only thing that distinguishes 2.2 from 1.7 is the phrase “best interest,” which is not very helpful.  Dzien says that real estate deals, start up companies, and negotiations between husband and wife, are the most common scenarios where 2.2 applies.

B. 	Model Rules

1. 	MR 2.2:  Intermediary.  For 2.2 to apply, L must:

a. 	Tell C of the risks and benefits of multiple Cs and get their consent.

b. 	L has to determine that the matter can be resolved in Cs’ best interest
(this language of “best interest” is what distinguishes 2.2 from 1.7).
			Then, Cs must be capable of making an informed decision (this is true of
			both 2.2 and 1.7).  There must be little risk of prejudicing (or adversely
			effecting) Cs by representing them.  Finally, L has to be able to carry out
			his duty as intermediary impartially and without any improper effect on Cs.
	
c. 	L must withdraw if Cs so request or object to him.

		Dzien says 2.2 differs from 1.7 only in that 2.2(a)(2) has language of “best interest.”
		Dzien also says that any agreements made under 2.2 should be memorialized.

		Hypo:  There is a real estate transaction.  The buyer is disappointed with the deal, so
		he cancels his $1,000 check to the seller.  Can L represent both under 2.2?  Dzien
		says it is very risky, and L should not represent them.  Anything L takes from the buyer
		(i.e., the $1,000) would go to the seller, and any advantage L gave to the buyer would hurt
		the seller.  Thus, both parties would get the short end of the stick.  Thus, L should not
		be an intermediary under 2.2 since it would not be in Cs’ “best interests” and it would be
		hard for him to be impartial.   

		Hypo:  H & W come to L to and ask him to do mirror image wills for them.  If they have
		separate property (i.e., bank accounts), then Dzien says it is careless to do mirror image
		for them.  Dzien says only do mirror image wills under 2.2 if the parties are equally
		sophisticated and have equal bargaining power.  The same goes for prenuptial a			agreements.

		Hypo:  W agrees to H’s request to pay less child support.  L can meet with W & H
under 2.2, so long as he fully explains the agreement.  He should also memorialize the a	agreement.

Hypo:  W & H go to see their L.  While H goes to the bathroom, W asks L to take her
husband out of her will.  Can L do this?  Of course not!  He must withdraw under 1.16.
But should L disclose to H why he is withdrawing?  Some states say no.  Dzien says
that the modern approach is to have L tell Cs ahead of time that he will share anything
with the other spouse that one spouse tells him.  

Hypo:  Coke and Pepsi open a business together in USSR and want L to represent them.  Both have to disclose their secret recipes.  Is there a conflict here?  No, they are sophisticated entities, and can decide whether or not L will represent them.  L can
represent them as an intermediary under 2.2.

		NOTE:  Under 4.3, L should make it very clear, in situations where is not an 
		intermediary, who exactly he represents.  Otherwise, he can be sued for giving
		the impression to someone that he was representing them.  

VII. 	Former Client Conflicts and Confidentiality

A. 	MR 1.9 applies here.  A L who has formerly represented a C in a matter shall not later
represent another C in the “same or substantially relater” if the latter C’s interests are
materially adverse to the former C’s, without the former C’s consent. Cts have held that paralegals, secretaries, and law clerks switching jobs do not constitute a conflict of interest.
Also, if a L switches firms and there could be a conf. of int., screening that L is not sufficient
to prevent the conf. of int (unless that L was a gov. atty, in which case 1.11 would apply).

B. 	Model Rules

1.  MR 1.9 (very important):  Conflict of Interest: Former Client.  1.9(a) holds that an L who has formerly represented a C in a matter shall not later represent another C in the “same or substantially relater” if the latter C’s interests are materially adverse to the former C’s, without the former C’s consent.  Dzien says he will only really test us 1.9(a).  1.9(b) deals with L and a C in a former firm (unlike 1.10, which deals with firms representing one their L’s clients).  Notice that under 1.9(b)(2), L must have acquired info. that creates a conflict of interest under 1.6 (confidentiality) or 1.9(c).  Under 1.9(c),
if the info. that L learned becomes generally known, then it is no longer confidential
and does not create a conflict of int.  1.9(c) could be an interesting defense to a motion
to disqualify under, say, 1.9(a).  There are two approaches to conflict of interests under 1.9:

a. 	Posner (fed. ct.) approach (obj. inquiry):  Ct. should conduct an objective 
inquiry.  Could L have learned confidential info. in Situation I that could give him an advantage in Situation II?  Posner’s inquiry goes no further than this.  Dzien is critical of Posner, saying it is a broad disqualification rule.

Hypo:  In situation I, a firm represented Texaco in 1963.  Can that firm represent
a C against Texaco today?  Posner would say that there is a conflict of interest.

			b.  State ct. approach (obj. and sub. inquiry): State cts. go beyond Posner and
			allow for both an objective and subjective approach.  This subjective 
			approach gives L a chance to rebut, and the results from it often differ from
the Posnerian obj. test.  In re Conduct

			Hypo:  Same as Texaco hypo above.  The obj. test alone created a conflict of
			interest.  But what about the subj. test?  The firm can say that it never learned
			of any confidential info that could give it an advantage in representing C today.
			Dzien likes this approach better since it gives the firm an opportunity a chance
			to indeed show whether or not it had conf. info. that could creat a conf. of int.
			
			Hypo:  L represents husband and wife.  H&W get a divorce.  Can L represent
			either if he or she comes to him?  No, not unless he gets the other’s consent
			(which actually is not difficult to get).

Hypo:  In Petroleum Wholesale, A-Firm has represented P and B-Firm now represents D.  L moves from A-Firm to B-Firm, and A-Firm then moves to disqualify B-Firm under
		1.9(b).  The Ct. found a conflict of interest, since that L received conf. info.  Even if
		the firm tries to screen L, there still is a conf. of int.

		Hypo:  Can sophisticated Cs waive a conflict of interest in advance?  Dzien says yes,
		but only if Cs know exactly what conflict exists. 

		NOTE:  Cts have held that paralegals, secretaries, and law clerks switching jobs do not
		constitute a conflict of interest.  

2. 	MR 1.11:  Successive Gov. and Private Employment.  Deals with screening—
preventing a former gov. atty from having any access whatsoever to a case in the firmwith
which that atty has a conflict of int.  A former gov. atty is only disqualified from a case in that firm if he personally and substantially worked on the matter in the gov.  If atty
had drafted legislation, tules, etc., then these are not considered a substantial matter.  In the event that the former gov. atty is disqualified, the firm must screen him and prevent him from receiving any profits from that case..