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Author:  	Mr. Shannon Bangle (sbangle@mail.utexas.edu)
School:		University of Texas School of Law
Course:		Torts
Year:		Fall 1995
Professor:	Jack Ratliff
Book:		Robertson, 2nd Edition (1989)

TORTS

INTRODUCTION TO TRIALS:

Trial  Court Procedure in Torts Cases (p.1)-

PHASE I - NEGLIGENCE CONCEPTS:

1.  Introduction-

Negligence- either the omission to do something which a reasonable person would do or the doing of something which a reasonable person would not do.
Note- Reasonable person implies one who is guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs in the given circumstances.
5 ELEMENTS necessary to constitute a prima facie case in Negligence
(1)	D had duty to conform conduct to a specific standard
(2)	D breached that duty--failed to conform to appropriate standard
(3)	Causation--D’s substandard conduct was:
(a)	Cause-in-fact--actual cause of P’s injuries
(b)	Proximate cause--there was a foreseeable risk that conduct would cause P’s 	injuries 
(4)	P must prove actual damages resulting from the injury (unlike some intentional torts)
Note- Judge decides (1).  Jury decides (2), (3a), (3b), and (4).

Substandard Care and the Standard of Care- 
What Standard of Care is Required-
a.	Must determine what D actually did- Reasonable precautions must be taken.  This 	involves a utility analysis in which the precautions taken must be economically justifiable.  If the precautions are too expensive, then they are not considered OC (Grace).  If costs to protect are cheap, then there is a duty (Allien). 
b.	 Factfinder must evaluate the reasonableness of D’s behavior under the circumstances- All surrounding circumstances must be taken into account in determining if OC was present.  Some situations may make the standard of care less than in ordinary case (eg, the Sudden Emergency Doctrine-Martin).

Grace and Co. v. City of Los Angeles- Negligence in this case was det’d by comparing the economic feasibility of inspecting the pipes or replacing the pipes.  The costs were determined to be  greater than the risk of resulting injury.  Ct ruled there was no OC expected of the D, and therefore, D c.n. be negligent for failing to inspect the pipes.
Precedent case: US v. Carrol Towing Co.- Equation to find liability must be B<P*L, where B is the cost or burden of adequate precautions, P is probability that injury will occur, and L is the 	gravity of the resulting injury.  P*L is the risk of injury.
Hypo- If the pipes were for gas instead of water, the D w.h. likely been negligent b/c the risks w.h.b. higher, justifying the high maintenance costs.	

Allien v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.- The facts showed there was no use for the pole which caused the death.  The costs to have the pole removed w.h.b. minimal ($48).  Therefore, the light company was negligent for failing to remove the pole.
Contrast to: Clinton v. Commonwealth where the ct held that the D was not negl. for failing to insulate a power line, the contact with which resulted in the death of the resident.  Ct said that the accident was unforeseeable, the costs of insulating the power line were unreasonable given the small likelihood of an accident, and shifting the transformer (to reduce the voltage) w.h. interfered with the power supply given the great distance between the main line and the house.
Martin v. City of New Orleans- Ct reasoned that the judge d.n. have to instruct the jury on the Sudden Emergency Doctrine since the jury was instructed to look at all of the surrounding circumstances.
Sudden Emergency Doctrine Rule- One who finds self in position of immediate peril w/o sufficient time to consider and weigh all the circumstances is not guilty of negl. if he fails to adopt what later w.h.b. decided the best method of action, unless his own negl. caused the emergency.	

Difference b/w Gross Negligence and Recklessness-
1.	Gross Negligence: Negligence + Intent.  High degree of risk to other's safety. Consciously disregarding risk.
2.	Recklessness:

2.	The Duty Concept.

A.	Types of Duty:
(i)	Existence of Duty Issue: Plaintiff has burden est. existence of duty of def. to use reas. care. Assumption: anyone engaging in activity has potential of causing physical harm to others owes duty to use reas. care.
(ii)	What standard of Care is Required?: Law has determined that duty should be either less demanding or more demanding than exercise of reas. care under circ.
(a)	More demanding: Common carriers/Innkeepers; owe passengers and innkeepers high degree of care.
(b)	Less demanding: Possessors and Owners of Land.
B.	Nonfeasance (Failure to Act)  v. Misfeasance (Affirmative Act):
As general rule, failure to act (including failure to rescue) will be insufficient to impose liability on def. for injury caused thereby.  No duty to rescue P even though D could with no risk. Exceptions:
(i)   Business Invitee (Traudt)
(ii)  Special Relationship (Chastain & Fuqua)
(iii) Innocent Injuror (Buchanan & Hardy)
(iv) Volunteer (Farwell & Florence)

Traudt v. Chicago: (*)Everyone has duty to avoid acting so as to hurt (mal). But w/ failure to act (non), no need w/out sp. rel. Deceased was business invitee and sp. rel. existed with D which carried duty to provide reas. safe ingress/egress, notwithstanding the airport auth. were not in control of adjacent lake. No legal duty for bystander.
Chastain v. Fuqua: Fanny ruled out; if didn't cause defect in mower, as volunteer had no K and no duty except to avoid injuring.  Grandpa in re: master/servant relationship had no knowledge of 	

duty  and therefore not responsible for failing to inform; no culpability.
Buchanan v. Rose: Driver not negligent, although created situation. Strained attempt to release. Law: (i) negligent act; (ii) bystander no duty; (iii) innocent injurer-if one by acts creates dang. sit. & appears another may be injured, must warn or be resp. for circ. Argued here, it would have been inevitable. (Hardy v. Brooks; 203; dead cow in road).
Farwell v. Keeton: Chris & Cole on Friday Night. "Undertaking"; One who undertakes act may not discontinue assistance if he has, in some way, put plaintiff in worse condition than if nothing had been done.
Florence v. Goldberg: (*)(Faux action)Police created duty to parents by placing guards on street to aid children. Voluntarily assumed responsibility and had resp. to continue. Created obligation and had responsibility to continue and give notice when w/drew.	

C.	Duty to Act to Control Others (Third Party):
In cases where obvious & immediate source of harm is judgment proof, people seek to hold others whose negl. set stage responsible for harm caused. Whether def. can be liable for blameworthy third person is often treated as problem of prox. cause. In recurrent categories (mental illness & alcohol), though, commonly conceptualized as duty issue. Generally, no duty imposed to control conduct of third party. Exceptions:
(i)    Special Relationship Attached-Duty of Psychotherapist: Patient= danger of violence to                   another, affirmative obligation to use reas. care to warn intended victim (Tarasoff &                    Thompson). 
(ii)   Special Relationship/Volunteer Rule (Otis Engineering).  No vol. to third person.

Tarasoff v. Regents Univ. Ca.: Special rel. between def. therapists & patient which may support affirmative duties for benefit of third persons. Decedent known & spec. foreseeable & identifiable victim of patient's threats. Duty to exercise reas. care to protect foreseeable victim of danger.
Thompson v. Alameda County: (*)No affirmative duty to warn of release of inmate w/ violent history who has made nonspecific threats of harm directed at nonspecific victims.
Otis Engineering v. Clark: Affirmative act (mis) of placing in car & directing home imposed duty on Co. to exercise reas. care. When, b/c of employee's incapacity, employer exercises control, duty to take such action as reas. prudent employer under same circ. would take to prevent employee from causing unreas. risk of harm to others. Recognizable great danger of harm to third persons. 	

D.	Duties of Owners & Possessors of Land:
1.	Possessor's Liability for Injuries Off Land: Injuries to users of adj. highway or to neighbors caused by activity or artificial condition on D's land subject to ord. princ. of negl.; poss. owes duty reas. care, and is liable if negl, cause in fact, prox. cause, and damages are est. Injuries caused by natural condition traditionally excluded from responsibility, although this is changing (Sprecher).
2.	Liability for Injuries on Premises: 
(a)	Common Law Scheme in Texas (Keetch v. Kroger)
Tx. Premises Liability Bus. Invitee B/P:
(i)   Actual/constructive knowledge of some condition by owner/operator. *
(ii)  That condition posed unreasonable risk of harm.
(iii) That owner/operator didn't exercise reas. care to reduce/eliminate risk.
(iv) That owner/operator's failure to use such care prox. caused injuries.
(b)	Scheme Critique (Tx.Dept.Hwy. v. Payne)
Licensee B/P:
(i)    Actual knowledge of condition by owner.
(ii)   That condition posed unreasonable risk of harm
(iii)  That owner failed to exercise ordinary care to protect licensee from danger.
(iv)  That owner's failure was prox. cause of injury to licensee.
(v)   That licensee did not actually know of condition.
-Invitee may be business/public; person on land held open to public.
-Meter Inspectors (bus. invitees)
-Police/Firemen (licensees, b/c  on prop. when not expected).
-Social Guest (treated as licensees).
Trend towards making all invitee status, except trespasser.
(c)	Abandons Common Law Scheme (Poulin)
3.	Attractive Nuisance Doctrine; Children (Edwards)
Possessor liable for harm to tres. kids by artificial cond. if:
(i)    Owner knows/has reason to know kids will trespass.
(ii)   Condition poses unreasonable risk of death/harm.
(iii)  Kids do not discover/realize risk.
(iv)  Utility and burden of elimination<risk.
(v)   Owner fails to exercise reas. care to eliminate danger/protect.
4.	Landlord/Tenant: Injuries on Leased Premises (Sargent v. Ross)
Landlord liable for harm from dang. cond. if injury attributable to:
(i)   Hidden danger of which landlord, not tenant aware.
(ii)  Premises leased for public use.
(iii) Premises retained under ;landlord's control, like stairways.
(iv) Premises negligently repaired by landlord.

Keetch v. Kroger: Keetch implied bus. invitee. That owner created risk may support inference of knowledge. Jury must still find owner knew/should have known. Making inference as matter of law is improper unless knowledge uncontroverted. Kroger denied know., so inference can't be made as MOL. St.Dept.Hwy. v. Payne: If culvert premise defect, State owes same duty as priv. landowner to licensee; if special defect, owes duty of that to invitee. Payne claims both, State neither. DO: Modern courts have turned to imposing on owners/occupiers single duty of reas. care in all circ. Ghost of "no-duty".
Poulin v. Colby College: Guy helped lady up kill, slipped on ice on way back.Conferred economic benefit by assisting; implied invitation. No reason to deny dams. b/c invitee. Owner/occupier owes same duty reas. care in all circ. to all persons lawfully on land.
Edwards v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: Kid contacted powerlines: POW. Failed to prove (ii), (iv), (v).
Sargent v. Ross: (*)4 yr. old fell to death from outdoor stairway. Owner used to be regarded as lacking poss. & control, thus, no liability. Exception. Here, landlord negligently constructed dangerously steep stairway. Henceforth, landlords as others must exercise reas. care not to subject others to risk of harm.	

3.	Proving Negligence

A.	Idiosyncrasies of the Actor:
1.	Objective Standard Uniformly Applied; does not take idiosyncrasies into account, i.e., clumsiness, stupidity, low I.Q (Jolley).
(a)	Cts. that do take insanity into account when reality break prevents conforming to          std, still hold negl. when cond. foreseeable and places self in position to do harm.
(b)	Self-intoxication doesn't forgive conduct that negl. when committed by sober man.
(c)	Insanity can be excuse for contributory negl.
2.	Superior Knowledge;  plaintiff's conduct must be judged in light of superior knowledge (Elliot).
3.	Physical Handicaps; conduct of handicapped indiv. must be reas. in light of his knowledge of his infirmity. He must take precautions which ord. reas. man would take if blind (Roberts).
(a)	Physical deficiencies distinguish themselves; mental don't.
(b)	Mental deficiencies easier to fake.
4.	Child Negligence; 
(a)	Minority: Under 7 not capable of negligence; older than 7, but under 14 rebuttably presumed incapable (Dunn).
(b)	Majority: Children to be judged by reas. minor of same age, capacity, and development (Dunn dissent).
(i)	Unlike adults, children given break for sub mental abil. b/c rate development.
(ii)	For intentional tort, adult activity=adult standard.

Jolley v. Powell: Wrongful death (insanity(; insanity of tortfeasor does not justify exception to gen. rule which holds tortfeasor to objective "reasonable man" standard. Slips no less troublesome.
Public Service v. Elliot: (*) Student w/ training in electricity gets electrocuted in plant tour. Here. cont. negl. would bar recovery. Ct. sends to jury which finds that superior knowledge not enough to find him negl. Exercised level of care=to that of reas. person w/ same level.
Roberts v. La: Respondeat superior case; how blind man would be held liable if employer (Post Office) not sued. Held to ord. care std. of another blind person; subjective (Phys. not = to mental handicap).
Dunn v. Teti: (*) Action in trespass for injury to 6 yr. old by negl. swinging of stick by 5.7 yr old.	

B. Violation of Statute:
1.	Effect of Violation in Civil Suit;
(a)	Conclusive or Irrebuttable Presumption (Per Se Martin)
(b)	Rebuttable Presumption (Tx.); reas. person would not violate.
(c)	Inference of Negl.; jury can pass on question but not dispose of as matter of law.
2.	Safer Alternative; if compliance more dangerous than violation, violation not unreasonable and question of negl. for jury (Tedla).
3.	Excuse; Impossibility of compliance; reas. person would have violated as well; goes back to jury (Freund).
(a)	Tx. charge; judge decides whether to give grounds for excuse.
(b)	Compliance with statute is evidence of reas. care, not conclusive.
4.	Per Se Requirement; statute violated must be aimed at protecting the damages that actually results for liability (Gorris).
5.	Application of Requirements; To determine if violation is negl. per se as to person, ask:
(a)	Whether injured falls w/in class ordinance intended to protect (Potts).
(b)	Whether harm complained of was harm intended to guard against.
(c)	Whether statute intended to create tort liability at all.

Martin v. Herzog: Husband, with no lights, hit by oncoming car and killed. Omission of stat. signals=negl. per se. Error to give jury dispensing power with regard to negl. Still must prove causal connection.
Tedla v. Ellman: (*) Tedla and Bachek (killed) not contributorily negl. as matter of law for failing to follow stat. regarding walking on highway. Observance subjects to more imminent danger.	

Freund v. Debuse: Plaintiff contends negligence per se since brakes not maintained adequately. Ct: Negl. as matter of law unless jury could find party acted as reas. prudent person in circ.
Gorris v. Scott: Sheep washed overboard b/c not constrained according to Contagious Dis. Act. When damage not of nature contemplated by stat., no action founded on neglect.
Potts v. Fidelity Fruit & Produce Co.: Consumer protection act not intended for banana worker.	

C.	Industry Custom
1.	Departure from Industry Custom Evidence of Violation of Negligence; not conclusive, question for jury.
2.	Compliance Merely Evidence of Due Care.
3.	Entire Industry Can Fall Below Minimum Standard of Care (T.J. Hooper).

T.J. Hooper: Barge accident in storm; no custom as to receiving sets; universal disregard will not excuse omission.	

D.	Circumstantial Evidence and Res Ipsa Loquitur
1.	Circumstantial Evidence Proves More Likely Than Not Absent Eye Witness.
2.	Circumstantial Evidence Enough to Create Fact Question for Jury to Find Negl (Yates).
3.	Res Ipsa Loquitur; circ. evid. formula; creates inference of negligence for jury (Colmenares). Requirements:
(a)	Accident one which does not occur in absence of negligence.
(b)	Must be agent or instrument within exclusive control of defendant.
(c)	It must not be due to any voluntary action on part of plaintiff.

Yates v. Chappell: Yates collided with abutment killing himself and Chappell. What occurred immed. prior to and at the moment of impact may be est. by circ. evid, either alone or in combination with direct evidence. Cannot be w/drawn from jury unless only reas. inference from evid. is no negl.
Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co: Mr. Colmenares fell when handrail stopped on escalator. Would not stop w/out negl., Port authority had nondelegable duty to maintain safely, and no evid. plaintiff's caused accident.	

4.	Causation

A.	Cause-in-Fact
Cause in fact satisfied if defendant's conduct shown more probably than not to have been among the causes (Actual cause).
1.	But-for Test; defendant not charged with responsibility for injuries unless plaintiff can est. that injuries probably would not have occurred in absence of defendant's negl. conduct.
(a)	If no reason to believe action by D will stop injury, shouldn't go to jury (East Texas Theatres, Inc.).
(b)	If reas. actions could have been taken to deter conduct, goes to jury (Marek).
(c)	Evidence need not be certain to allow cause in fact question to go to jury; P must only prove probability (Havner).
2.	51% Probability;
(a)	Majority: Causation of death must be shown more probably than not (51%).
(i)	If patient has 51% chance survival, and doctor's negl. reduces to 49%, plaintiff recovers 100% damages.
(ii)	If 40% reduced to 20%, no causation/recovery; didn't change probability of death.
(iii)  If 90% reduced to 70% due to unnecessary removal of kidney, no recovery.
(iv)  Probability of survival not=life expectancy.
(b)	Minority: any evidence of negl. enough for jury question (Herskovits).
3.	Alternative Liability Theory "Proof"; unusual burden shifting to def. due to lack evid.
(a)	If negl. causing injury caused lack of evid., burden on D to show no cause (Haft).
(b)	Shift when  multiple defendants cause single injury (Summers).
(c)	Shift to multiple defendants w/ superior knowledge (Ybarra).
4.	Aggravation; D only responsible for injuries he caused, not preexisting (LaMoreaux).
5.	Substantial Factor Approach; when 2 contemporaneous causes exist, either of which would have cause injury individually, use subst. factor instead of "but-for".

East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge: Bottle hit plaintiff on head at theatre. Claims negligence for failing to remove "rowdy" patrons. No evidence that bottle thrower was rowdy person; no actual cause; doesn't go to jury.
Marek v. Southern Enterprises, Inc.: Firecracker in theater led to loss of hearing. Owed duty ord. care to patrons. Had defendant intervened, throwing would stop; goes to jury.
Havner v. E-Z Mart: Indication of abduction in course of robbery. In deciding if enough evid. for jury, have to deal hypothetically and ask what happens if all alarms work. Don't know if police would make it in 1.5 min. . Policy choice: Verdict to insure future safety for employees.
Herskovits v. Group Health Co-Op: Claim that delay in diagnosis of lung cancer may have reduced chance of 5-yr. survival by 14 % (from 39 to 25). Rejects def. argument that plaintiffs must show that Herskovits "probably" would have had 51% chance of survival absent negligence. 
Haft v. Lone Palm: Whether negl. of no lifeguard was prox. cause shifted to def. so as not to give them advantage of lack of evid. due to lack of guard. (Summers: 2 hunters fired, hit third; Ybarra: injury during operation, burden on defs. to show no involvement).
LaMoreaux: Personal injuries in collision; aggravated pre-existing ones. Desire to place burden on party with greatest access to relevant evidence; plaintiff here. (See Dillon:Kid falling grabs wire).	

B.	"Proximate" or Legal Cause; Inquiry: whether negl. conduct too remote from harm.
1.	Directness Approach; If result direct consequence of act, damages recoverable. Cause in fact (actual cause) indicates proximate cause (Pfeifer).
2.	Foreseeability Approach; When we say def. guilty of negl. conduct, def. has failed to guard against foreseeable risks generated by his or her conduct.
(a)	In order to be liable, injuries must be foreseeable (Wagon Mound I).
(b)	Enough to foresee type of injury even if mechanics of accident not foreseeable (Mechanism Rule).
(c)	Defendant will be liable if some injury of general type plaintiff sustained was foreseeable consequence of def. negl. conduct, although extent of injuries may be quite unexpected (Extent Rule).
(d)	Subsequent Medical Injuries: Negl. def. held liable.
(e)	Rescuers: Foreseeable.
(f)	Suicide: When person takes own life as result of injuries, plaintiff negl. only if injured person took life while insane, unconscious or in delirium.
(g)	Zone of Danger: If P out of zone, then no liability (Palsgraf).
3.	Defensive Theories;
(a)	New and intervening cause.
(b)	Sole proximate cause; P's negl. so strong that it's the only cause of accident.

Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theatre: (*) Spitball hit kid's eye in theatre.  For negligence to be considered cause, must be close direct causal connection between negl. and injury; Polemis: Fire direct consequence of falling plank despite no foreseeability.
See Foreseeability Case Examples pp. 174-179.
Wagon Mound I: Wharf destroyed by oil leak from Wagon Mound. Trial found fire direct consequence of oil release. Polemis overruled; foresight of reas. man alone determines responsibility.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.: Foreseeability case; not normal zone of danger approach. But, looks to foreseeability on indiv. basis. Asks if Mrs. Palsgraf was foreseeable/within zone. Dissent suggests directness.	

5.	Limitations on Negligence Recoveries ("No Duty", "No Causation"). 

A.	Threshold Question; No duty/Prox. cause, draws line for recovery (Strakos). No-duty rule for judge to decide at outset. Once case progresses. becomes No-cause issue. Inquiries:
(i)		Was there a duty owed?
(ii)		Was there a breach of that duty?
(iii)	Was there an injury?
(iv)	What does connection with injury have to be?
(a)	Was it "but-for" cause?
(b)	Was it proximate cause?

Strakos v. Gehring: As a matter of law, contractors not responsible from injuries in defects of their work once it has been accepted by authority.	

B.	No Duty, No Negligence; no duty really means no proximate cause as matter of law. Court may not recognize duty out of public policy considerations.

C.	Losses Unaccompanied by Physical Injury (to persons or property);
1.	Injury to Property; No recovery for economic loss absent physical injury to proprietary interest (Testbank, Robins).
(a)	Econ. loss recoverable in intentional tort, and legal and accounting malpractice.
(b)	Alternative would account for prox. cause, foreseeability, and particularity of damage; attempt to overcome arbitrariness.
2.	Physical Injury to Persons; No recovery for pure emotional distress w/out phys. injury (Bosley)-Impact rule. Physical injury caused by stress doesn't qualify.
(a)	For recovery, bodily injury must accompany fright or mental suff. tied to peril (Potere).
(b)	Movement away from no-duty rule, although courts still recognize need for special restrictions for non-physical injuries.
(i)	Texas does not allow, follows impact rule,get it, got it, good!
(ii)	May allow for intentional emotional distress.
3.	Proximity Exception; when plaintiff in personal danger and actually did fear impact near occurring tort, recovery allowed (Niederman).
4.	Tx. Uninjured Bystander Case by Case Exceptions; primary test for foreseeability (Dillon)
(a)	Whether plaintiff near scene as opposed from distance.
(b)	Whether shock resulted from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted from learning from others after occurrence.
(i)	Mismanaged birth reas. causes contemporaneous shock (Haught).
(c)	Whether plaintiff and victim were closely related, as contrast to absence of relation or distant.
5.	Itemization of successful Emotional Injury Cases;
(a)	Emotional harm parasitic to physical injury.
(b)	Plaintiff showed impact or physical injury in Bosley sense(and in most places phys. manifestations of emot. harm).
(c)	Plaintiff met zone of danger/fear for self req. (and in most places showed phys. manifestation).
(d)	Plaintiff met Dillon v. Legg criteria for uninjured bystander recovery(and phys. manifestation).
(e)	Plaintiff complained of negl. transmission of telegram announcing death or negl. handling of corpse.

Testbank: Toxic spill in channel; unintentional tort. Retains bright line rule of damage to prop. interest due to virtue of predictability, vice of unjust/unfair results. Majority retains/reinforces no-duty rule, whereas dissent argues prox. cause treatment of econ. loss. Robins Dry Dock v. Flint: Denied plaintiff recovery for economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which he had no proprietary interest. Limitation on open ended repercussions of negl.
Bosley v. Andrews: Plaintiff had heart attack due to bull charge. Broad no-duty rule.
Niederman v. Brodsky: Appellant suffered coronary failure when appellee's vehicle hit son standing next to him. Originally dismissed for failing to meet impact rule. Abandons phys. impact req. for plaintiffs who were in personal danger of phys. impact b/c of direction of negl. force against him and where plaintiff actually did fear phys. impact.
Haught v. Maceluch: Dr. caused daughter to suffer brain damage. Mother claims mental suffering. Bystander exception to impact rule. Dillon v. Legg: Mother had experiential perception.
 Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: (*) Incorrect diagnosis of Gonorrhea; spouse foreseeable plaintiff of negligent diagnosis.	

6.	Affirmative Defenses to Negligence

A.	Introduction
1.	Affirmative Defenses; If pleaded and proved by defendant, defeat or significantly reduce liability that plaintiff has otherwise established. Defenses focus on some aspect of victim's conduct.
(a)	Contributory (and comparative) negligence, failure to avoid consequences, and assumption of risk focus with conduct of victim prior to injury.
(b)	Failure to mitigate damages and statute of limitations focus on behavior after injury.

B.	Contributory and Comparative Negligence
1.	Contributory v. Comparative; (See Tx. Comparative Statutes)
(a)	Contributory: Under common law, negl. on part of plaintiff, no matter how slight, would bar recovery. Courts would ameliorate in two ways:
(i)	Rules of negl. law applied so as to make it diff. for def. to prove case.
(ii)	Courts developed doctrines that operated as exceptions to cont. negl.
-"Last clear chance"
-Defendant's "willful & wanton behavior, and "imminent peril" rule.
(b)	Comparative: Plaintiffs and defendants share losses produced by combined negl.
(i)	Pure Comparative Negligence: Cont. negl. and AOR shall not bar recovery. Damages otherwise recoverable diminished in proportion which culpable conduct attributable to claimant or decedent bears to culpable conduct which caused damages (Hoffman).
(ii)	Modified (51%): Cont. negl. shall not bar recovery if such negl. was not greater than the negl. of the person or combined negl. of all persons against whom recovery is sought. Damages allowed diminished by negl. attributable to person recovering.
(iii) Modified (50%): If fault of plaintiff is of less degree than fault of defendant, then          P entitled to recover amount of damages after diminished in proportion of own            fault. If P's fault is equal or greater than D's, then P not entitled to recover.
(c)	Gross Negligence: No negligence credited to P for D's gross negl. (Derenberger).

Hoffman v. Jones: Husband killed in accident from his negl. and that of other driver. Cont. negl. charge, verdict for def. Appeal: Juries disregard charge to avoid injustice; cont. no longer bar.
Derenberger v. Lutey: Derenberger's drunk driving gave teenage friend drain bamage. Willful/wanton misconduct prevents plaintiff's own cont. negl. from reducing recovery. Ratliff: Doesn't make sense, if D that negl., jury wouldn't credit negl. to P anyway.	

C.	Mitigation and Avoidable Consequences; Law of negl. traditionally precluded recovery of any dams. that P could have avoided by taking prudent measures to prevent or reduce severity of injuries. Mostly affirmative defense; defendant must introduce evid. and persuade jury that reas. care by plaintiff after accident would have avoided some dams.
1.	Failure to Mitigate Damages; Post-accident conduct by victim that was proximate cause of some of the injuries or damages.
(a)	Most states handle mitigation issue via jury instruction (Moulton).
(b)	Tx. charge asks to not include dams. from failure of P to treat injury as person of ordinary prudence.
2.	Failure to Avoid Consequences; Pre-accident conduct by victim that did not cause accident but was prox. cause of some of the injuries or damages.
(a)	Failure to wear protective helmet inadmissible to show negl. on part of plaintiff or mitigate dams (Dare).
(i)	Sounds like "egg shell" but not since P could control with helmet.
(b)	If reas. person would have used seat belt, then jury should be able to consider in assessing dams (Hutchins).
(i)	In cont. or modified negl. scheme, goes to determine dams.
(ii)	In pure comparative scheme, goes to P's degree or % of negligence.
(iii) Few states allow such evid.; Texas doesn't.

Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.: After Moulton hurt knee, told to stay off of it but continued to perform duties and lost job due to pain. Trial verdict against D. Review to allow D to plead P's failure to mitigate. Defect in charge.
Dare v. Sobule: Dare (decedent) hit truck on motorcycle while not wearing helmet. Petitioners contend that trial's refusal to instruct jury that failure to wear helmet did not constitute cont. negl. was reversible error; agreed.
Hutchins v. Schwartz: (*) Hutchins appeals from verdict awarding him dams. in auto wreck and finding him 40% comparatively negl.; claims error in admitting evid. of his failure to wear seat belt.
Froom v. Butcher: Plaintiff's failure to wear belt would reduce dams. by 20%. Appeal agrees. Question not what caused accident, but cause of damage; if no belt, damage is part of the result of his own fault.	

D.	Assumption of the Risk; has gone away except for strict liab. cases; now asked in terms of P's comparative negl.
1.	Express; agreement valid & denies action in negl. if passes four factors (Boehm):
(a)	Whether duty to public exists.
(b)	Nature of service performed.
(c)	Whether contract fairly entered into.
(d)	Whether intention of the parties expressed in clear unambiguous language.
-Party may still pursue action for dams. caused by willful/wanton misconduct.
-Cts. usually uphold exculpatory clauses in suits between commercial entities.
-In personal injury cases, cts. suspicious of exc. contracts; refuse to enforce if P            signing as condition of: gaining admission to charity hospital, participating in              secondary school athletics, driving tanker truck into chemical plant.
2.	Implied; P knew of risk and voluntarily chose to encounter.
(a)	In Tx. requisite met if P undertook risk knowingly and voluntarily; not necessary to show that taking of risk unreasonable on P's part.
(b)	Not voluntary if no free choice of viable alternatives (Marshall).
(i)	Contributory fault doesn't count in strict liability, but AOR does as a matter of apportionment.
(c)	AOR now element to consider after D's fault established and is governed by comparative fault principles (Murray).

Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce: Boehm sustained injuries during mock gunfight; appeals from grant of summary judgment in dist.ct. Held: Didn't involve service demanding public duty creating disparity of bargaining power. Entered into knowingly and fairly. Clear language; can eliminate negl. w/out expressly using word"negligence"-not in Tx. yet.
Marshall v. Ranne: Jury found he assumed risk when vicious hog attacked and injured hand. Vicious animals should be governed by principles of strict liability (immed. liab.-should know & contain; domesticated-after 1st bite, contain). Cont. negl. is no defense to strict liab; full resp. for preventing harm on D. Thus where P fails to ex. reas. care to discover animal or take precautions, not bar to recovery on basis of strict liab. No vol. choice. dilemma of facing danger or surrendering rts.
Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.: (*) Murray died from shallow diving in motel pool. AOR no longer bar. P should be entitled to recover full dams. minus percentage assessed as comparable fault.	

E.	Statutes of Limitations Lecture (415)
1.	Discovery Rule; SOL doesn't run until you notice injury or have reason/cause to notice. Applies only where it would have been impossible to know of injury (medical malpractice). Burden on plaintiff.

PHASE II - DAMAGES:

I. Damages:
A. Introduction:
(i)	Nominal Damages: Intentional torts complete w/out actual dams. may award nominal.
(ii)	Compensatory Damages: Restores P to pre-injury condition. a.k.a. Actual damages; proved in terms of injury, bills, lost work, suffering.
(iii) Punitive Damages: a.k.a. exemplary; Designed to punish & deter, and provide example for        outrageous conduct.
B. Compensatory (Actual) Property Damages:
(i)	Invasion of Land: Diminution in value (or restoration) + P's loss of use (rental value).
(ii)	Chattels: Diminution in value. May recover for discomfort, annoyance, inconvenience, but nothing remote, uncertain, conjectural or speculative.
C. Compensatory Personal Injury Damages:
(i)	Medical (and related) expenses (past and future);
(ii)	Earnings losses (past and future);
(iii) Physical and mental pain and suffering (past and future).
1.	Lump Sum Damages (Westbrook): 
(a)	Punitives don't allow for appeal to community prejudice (Us v. Them)
(b)	Unit of time argument; requires calc. of future dams. that may be wholly inaccurate; can't predict future pain; chance of overcompensation.
(c)	TX: O.K. argument in Tx.
(d)	TX: New trial for damages prohibited; can take parts to the jury when the rest has been decided as a matter of law, but where jury decides liability & dams. cannot bifurcate, have to send whole for retrial.
(i)	Plaintiffs want to show damage when arguing liability.
(ii)	Scope of risk determined by first jury which forces 2nd to guess scope of risk for liability or effectively retry liability issue.
(e)	Loss of consortium: companionship & physical support.
(f)	Compromise Verdict: Jury impermissibly mingled liability and damages considerations (i.e. small award to grievously injured person.)
(g)	Structured Settlements: Allows some freedom in measuring payments over time.

2.	Taxes, Inflation, Present Value, Interest:
(a) Norfolk (taxes)
(i)	Taxes should be taken into account & jury should hear; no more variables than figuring future income.
(ii)	TX & most others do not take taxes into account or instruct jury that award may be tax exempt.
(b) O'Shea (present value, interest)
(i)	Rewards for future occurrences sill be reduced to present value.
(a)	Exception: Awards for pain and suffering are not reduced to present value.
(ii)	Damages Question: What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would compensate the P for future damages?
(iii) Future Earnings (increases): Merit raises (experience & promotion) + Inflation
(iv) Discount Rate (rate at which one could safely invest money today and reap 	                           benefits later): Cost of use of money (1%-3%) + Inflation.
(v)	Usually, the inflation factor is dropped and the net difference is used as either the discount rate or future earnings, whichever is left.
(vi) Three kinds of verdicts:
- General Verdict: P wins or loses & money damages
- Special Verdict: Asks jury questions with no general answers. e.g. Texas Pattern Jury Charge
- General Verdict followed by Interrogatories: Jury explains its answers; rarely used.
(c) McCrann (prejudgment interest)
(i)	 Sometimes it is best to drop inflation figure and deal with the difference between future earnings and discount rate.
(ii)	Prejudgment interest- Interest accrues for past damages incurred up to the trial including pain and suffering.
(iii) Discount rates do not apply to prejudgment damages.

3.	Collateral Benefits ("Collateral Source Rule"):
(a) Coyne
(i)	General Rule: Payments from collateral sources to P do not reduce the amount recoverable from D.
(ii)	This case is an exception: Holding- P cannot collect for medical expenses because he didn't pay for them and the damages are supposed to be compensatory.
(iii) TX: D gets the benefit of no collateral source payments to the P. 

Westbrook v. General Tire. Tire blow out. Verdict excessive; new trial for damages.
Norfolk v. Liepelt Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) for wrongful death. Issue: what to do with income taxes re: damages.
O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Tugboat cook injured and question was over future earnings.
McCrann v. U.S. Lines, Inc. Slip and fall on deck. Issue was over prejudgment interest and discount rate.
Coyne v. Campbell Dr.'s friend covered expenses but he still wants money from D. Exception to the Collateral Source Rule.	

D. Wrongful Death, Survival, Loss of Consortium:
1. Moragne v. States Marine Lines (wrongful death--statutory claim)
Facts: Only discussed notes
(a)	No common law right of recovery for wrongful death; the right of recovery for wrongful death comes from state statutes.
(b)	 Two kinds of wrongful death statutes:
(i)	Wrongful Death Actions - right of the dependent to sue only for their loss (financial support, cost of education and clothing, loss of guidance and companionship).
(ii)	Survivorship Action - refers to the survival of the cause of action that the decedent would have had at the time he died.
2. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet  PI--wrongful death overlap)
Facts: P sued for wrongful death even though decedent had already recovered for his injuries.
(a)	Decedent can recover for his own damages and then later after decedent's death others can recover for wrongful death.
(b)	May be a concern of recovery overlap for loss of future wages or loss of expectancy of inheritance.

E. Punitive Damages:
1. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
Facts: P seeks compensatory and punitive damages because the drug company gave him cataracts.
(a)	Not sufficient evidence to submit punitive damages issue to the jury.
(b)	Four functions of punitive damages (historically):
(i)	Redressing affronts to personal feelings.
(ii)	Financing the cost of deserving litigation.
(iii) Diverting P's revenge into peaceful channels.
(iv) Punishment for and deterrence from socially disapproved conduct.
(c)	Punitive damages traditionally for intentional torts which extends to willful and reckless disregard.
2. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company
Facts: Pinto case with manufacture of defective gas tank.  Punitive damages were $125 M but were reduced to $3.5 M.  D appealed.
(a)	Punitive damages can be awarded because it was not an innocent defect but a conscious design choice.
(b)	There must be an element of subjective blameworthiness to award punitive damages.
(c)	Punitive damages must have a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages.  Common law was 3 or 4 to 1.
3. Moriel v. Transp. Indem. Co. (new TX standard for punitive damages)
Facts: Bad faith refusal by D to pay insurance claim by P.
(a)	Ct. set new rule that trial bifurcation would take place on a motion but failed to say who should make the motion. (The Ct. assumed it would benefit the D but it actually helps the P who have started to request it.)
(b)	Punitive damages are taxable.
(c)	Since Moriel it takes more bad conduct to get punitive damages.
(d)	Moriel requires change to clear and convincing evidence of "malice".
(e)	Consciousness of a high probability of a minor injury or low probability of a major injury does not qualify for punitive damages.
II. Multiple Tortfeasors and Damages:
A. Joint & Several Liability:
1. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.
Facts: Both East Texas and Sun had pipelines that broke and damaged P's pond.  The damage was indivisible.
(a)	When there is an indivisible injury caused by independently acting tortfeasors then the D's are jointly and severally liable (one may have to pay 100% of the damages).
(b)	Concert of Action - If D's acted in concert then each D is the agent of the other, thus liable for indivisible damages and damages caused only by the other.
B. Enterprise and Market Share Liability:
1.Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly and Co.
Facts: P claims injury from taking DES in 1949. P can't identify which company made the drug.
(a)	P was not allowed to recover under Market Share, Alternative or Enterprise Liability.
(b)	Market Share Liability: Your overall market share = your liability
(c)	Enterprise Liability: Liability for each D is based on the group conduct of the industry. (Should only apply if there is a small # of producers, unless it is strictly a concert of action case.)
(d)	Market Share and Enterprise Liability are not commonly used.
(e)	Alternative Liability: Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the P by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
2. Gaulding v. Celotex Corp.
Facts: P's brought suit as survivors of decedent who died of cancer caused by asbestos exposure. P's sued 5 manufacturers of asbestos containing board but can't identify the manufacturer of the board.
(a)	No recovery under theories of collective liability.
(b)	J&S and res ipsa loquitur- No b/c P can't prove that any D actually caused the harm.
(c)	Alternative liability- No b/c P did not sue all possible wrongdoers.
(d)	Concert of Action- No b/c no evidence that D's conspired together to intentionally misrepresent and suppress relevant info. about health hazards of asbestos.
(e)	Enterprise Liability- No b/c no proof that one of the D's probably caused the injury and no proof that risks of asbestos were jointly controlled by D's.
(f)	Market Share Liability- No b/c can't prove where board was initially marketed.
3. Hypos and review in notes of 2/6

C. Contributions and Indemnity:
1.Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials Inc.
Facts: P recovered against D for violations of the Sherman Act by conspiring w/other companies to fix prices and damages were trebled under the Clayton Act.
(a)	Common law provided no right to contribution among joint tortfeasors.
(b)	Indemnity: One D collects 100% of what was paid in damages from another D.
(c)	Contribution: Ds share equally (usually statutory).
(d)	Three types existing indemnity:
(i) Vicarious liability; i.e. employer sues employee.
(ii) Quasi-vicarious; i.e. retailer sues manufacturer for product defect.
(iii) Contractual; i.e. terms provide indemnity.
(e)	TX Punitive damages are assigned to each D based on financial capacity to pay; no right to contribution.
(f)	Hld: Courts don't have power to formulate contribution, must be statutory.

D. Comparative Fault and Multiple Tortfeasors:
1. Brochner v. Western Ins. Co.
Facts: Brochner injured P by performing unnecessary surgery. P sued Brochner and hospital. Cases separated, independently settled. Later, hospital and ins. agent filed suit against Brochner for indemnity.
(a)	Old rule: Single tortfeasor may ultimately pay expenses of all injuries to 3rd party as a result of negligence by two or more actors.
(b)	New: Joint tortfeasors are now subject to contribution among themselves based upon their relative degrees of fault.
(c)	Hld: Hospital has no rt. of indemnity from Brochner; remedy in contribution.
(d)	Indemnity provided by common law, contribution provided by statute.

2. Kaeo v. Davis
Facts: D Davis was 99% negligent and city 1%, city wanted instruction informing jury that if found responsible they would have to pay entire damages if Davis couldn't (under Hawaiian joint & severable law).
(a)	The court, if asked, should inform the jury of the possible legal consequences of the verdict apportioning negligence among joint tortfeasors.
(b)	TX Can't tell jury the effect of their decision.
(c)	TX Can't hold jointly and severally liable unless over 50% liable.
3. Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court
Facts: P crashed and was paralyzed in AMA sanctioned race and sued AMA for negligence that was proximate cause of injuries. AMA attempted to cross-claim that parents were negligent and asked for indemnity and declaratory relief assigning proportionate liability to P's parents. Hld: AMA should be allowed to file.
(a)	Court supports joint & severable liability.
(b)	Label contribution as partial indemnity in order to escape statutory control of contrib.
(c)	TX (Shoemaker v. Fogle) D's cannot make x-claim against parents for negligent supervision.
(d)	Two grounds for retaining J&S:
(i)	P's injury is "indivisible". Counter: If can apportion % negligence, then is practically divisible.
(ii)	J&S must be retained so that P does not bear risk of being unable to collect judgment. Counter: Risk of being insolvent should not be shifted to co-D from P b/c can't be done when only one D.
4. Brown v. Keill
Facts: P's son crashed into D while borrowing car and was 90% responsible. P was awarded 10% damages. P appealed and sued D under J&S and tried to get 100%.
(a)	J&S has not been retained under new comparative negligence statute.
(b)	"Phantom tortfeasor": Causal negligence of all parties giving rise to P's claim in comparative negligence statute case is to be considered even though one of the parties is not joined in the action.
5. Variola v. American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Inc.
Facts: P worked for Hydrocarbon and was injured while working on a site owned by Petrofina. P took settlement for worker's comp carried by Hydrocarbon and sued Petrofina. Ct. ordered judgment paid reduced by employee's negligence and negligence of Hydro. P appealed.
(a)	Employer's negligence cannot be considered in 3rd party negligence action brought by an employee arising out of an accidental injury covered by worker's comp insurance.
(b)	TX (Dresser v. Lee) A 3rd party can claim that the employer was the sole proximate cause of the accident. If the jury agrees, the plaintiff will lose.  

E. Partial Settlements:
1. Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc.
Facts: P sued 3 joint tortfeasors. Two settled out of court. Dresser chose to stay in ct. and was found 45% responsible. Dresser wanted settlement $ to apply to total damages instead of the percentages the other tortfeasors would have owed had they stayed in court. This would have left only small portion to pay after the two settling defendants and P's negligence was figured in. Hld: Dresser must pay 44%.
(a)	P took risk of settling beforehand and D could have as well, thus take what you get.
(b)	TX P must give D credit for $ received in settlement(s).
(c)	In most cases D's choose $ for $ credit; D's must unanimously choose $ for $ or don't get it.
2. Schick v. Rodenburg
(a)	Precedent: Degan v. Bayman: Amount received in settlement should be deducted even though a party is not judicially determined as a joint tortfeasor.
(b)	Deducted amounts should be $ or percentage of fault, whichever is greater.
(c)	TX Mary Carters are void in Texas.
(d)	Problem w/ M.C. is that it makes it appear as if testimony is being bought.
(e)	Sliding scale can be made by any D and binds all D's.

F. Review and Texas Update: Look to notes 2/14 & 2/19, in-class review, handouts.

III. Intentional Harms:
A. Intro:

B. Battery:
1. Garratt v. Dailey & Ghassemieh v. Schafer
Facts: Child pulled chair, woman fell, $11,000 dams.  Trial found no intent to injure.
(a)	Battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon another.
(i)	D must intend touch will occur that causes harm, OR
(ii)	D knows with substantial certainty the touch will occur. 
(b)	Transferred intent: same as between victims and between torts.
(c)	Idiosyncratic reactions: Must know idiosyncrasies to be battery, if not court will apply something similar to negligence/foreseeability.
2. Fischer v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc.
Facts: Black man has plate snatched away.
(a)	Actual physical contact is not necessary for battery as long as there's contact with clothing or something closely associated with body.
(b)	Objective test: Determined by what a reasonable person would find offensive. Hld: Offensive conduct was battery.  Today would not be battery but possibly assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress.

C. Assault:
1. Vietnamese Fishermen's Association v. Knights of KKK
Facts: KKK was harassing vietnamese fishermen.
(a)	Assault: Intentional and unjustified (unprivileged) threat of action sufficient to cause a well founded fear of immediate bodily harm to the plaintiff.  
(b)	D must not only threaten force but there must also be ability and opportunity to use it to be an assault.
(c)	Assault may also include intention to cause confinement.
(d)	Battery can be learned of after the fact and still be a battery, an assault cannot later be an assault if you are not aware of it at the time of occurrence.
(e)	Questions for assault:
(i)	Did D intend for P to be in apprehension of immediate bodily harm to himself or did D know with substantial certainty that the apprehension would be caused?
(ii)	Was P apprehensive about bodily harm to himself?
(iii)  Was the apprehension reasonable?
(iv)  Was there actual causation and damages?
(f)	If you have the right to use force then the threat to use it is not an assault.

D. False Imprisonment:
1. Herbst v. Wuennenberg
Facts: P's claim false imprisonment because D stood in the doorway. No threat was made and there was no contact. P didn't ask to leave.
(a)	Must be threat to apply force and have the apparent intention and ability to apply the force. (Use objective reasonable man standard.)
(b)	The essence of FI is the intentional, unlawful, and unconsented restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.
(c)	A reasonable and reasonably discoverable means of escape negates confinement. (Jury question)
(d)	Must be aware of imprisonment or that the confinement caused actual harm.
(e)	Person liable for FI for wrongfully directing police to arrest another person or if knowingly provide police with wrong info causing arrest.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
1. Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co.
Facts: D refused to pay $5,000 life ins. policy. P sued for dams. for severe emotional injury. Hld: Can recover for severe emotional distress.
(a)	Prima facie case for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress:
(i)	Outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(ii)	D's intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress;
(iii) P suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(iv) Actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the D's outrageous             conduct.
2. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club
Facts: P sued Eagles because team doctor gave false diagnosis to a sports writer. Writer wrote article stating P had fatal disease which P read thereby becoming extremely upset. Hld: P can recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Met elements for prima facie case
3. Boyles v. Kerr
Facts: P sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Taped sex and showed to friends.
(a)	P cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
(b)	Mental anguish damages can only be recovered in connection with D's breach of some other duty imposed by law.
(c)	TX Rejects cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress but retains Dillon v. Legg exception; also need not show physical symptoms.
(d)	TX Intentional infliction is recognized in Texas.

F. Trespass to Land:
(a)	Physical invasion of another's property requires no showing of intent or damages.
(b)	Indirect Trespass:  If you intend the act which places you on another's land it is a trespass whether you know it is their property or not.

G. Trespass to Chattels and Conversion:
(a)	If short of conversion it is trespass the chattels.
(b)	The intentional exercise of dominion over chattels which so seriously interferes with the owner's rights that the actor may be required to pay the full value of the chattel.
(i)	Recovery: get damages to property and some recovery for loss of use. 

H. Defenses:

1. Consent:
O'Brien Cunard SS Co. (implied consent)
Facts: P sued D for battery and negligence for vaccinating her on a ship. Hld: No assault because actions expressed consent.
(a)	Consent is judged by objective bystander test. would a reasonable viewer think there was consent?
(b)	Consent is part of the prima facie case for battery. If there was consent then there is no battery.
Overall v. Kadella (scope of consent-Hockey)
Facts: P sued D for injuries from hitting him during a hockey fight. P supposedly didn't provoke the fight and was on the bench. Hld: P recovered even though he voluntarily participated in the game.
(a)	You consent to a reasonable customary contact within the sport.
(b)	Every player has a duty to other players to refrain from conduct proscribed by safety rules.
Katherine K. v. Robert B. (scope of consent-sex)
Facts: D lied to P and said he was VD free. P had sex with D and got Herpe. Hld: P can recover due to nature of confidential relationship.
(a)	Court says she can recover because its about physical injury. Relied on Barbara A.
(b)	She consented to a disease free touch and got a contaminated touch.
(c)	General rule: No one has a duty to speak but when you begin to speak you must speak truthfully.
(d)	Exception: Confidential relationship: Within such D is required to tell P about his herpes even if he doesn't ask; arises from specific facts.
(e)	Exception: Fiduciary duty: i.e. attorney to client; arises from status of participants.
Kennedy v. Parrott (medical consent)
Facts: P consented to have appendix removed and in the course the doctor punctured an enlarged cyst on purpose. Hld: No cause of action because no physical harm.
(a)	Old rule: Consent only extends to operation consented to.
(b)	Intermediate rule: Doctor can do anything necessary so long as within the original incision.
(c)	Newest rule: Dr. limited to original consent except in an emergency where neither the patient nor a representative can consent.
(d)	Review consent notes p. 59.

2. Self-Defense:
Tatman v. Cordingly
Facts: Old man ran over 22 yr. old's motorcycle, hit him, and went to get his gun. D finally subdued old man.
(a)	Defense:
(i)	Must be a reasonable belief that force is necessary.
(ii)	Can use no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend one's self.
(b)	When a threat ceases the privilege ends and D may be liable for excessive force.
(c)	Deadly force can only be used to resist deadly force except in your home. You are not required to flee your home or business.

3. Defense of Property:
Katko v. Briney (spring gun)
(a)	No rt. to use deadly force to protect property.
(b)	If place device in position to protect, can use no more force than you would be entitled to.
(c)	Only time deadly force is justified is when trespasser is using violence, committing capitol felony, or where actor is endangering human life.
(d)	One should post warning signs for guard dogs, some statutes allow deadly force to protect property, cannot use deadly force to recapture property.

4. Necessity:
Teel v. May Dept. Stores
(a)	Stores have a limited privilege to detain shoppers for a reasonable time to investigate shoplifters.
(b)	Owner has a right to use reasonable force for confinement to investigate the suspect.
(c)	Private necessity: Common law doctrine of necessity is conduct that would otherwise be tortious is okay if necessary. i.e. use someone's cabin in a blizzard.
(i)	No privilege to eject someone from using property under doctrine of necessity.
(ii)	Privilege of necessity does not extend to harm to persons.
(iii) Must later pay the reasonable value of what you have taken, unless it is to protect           life.
(d)	Public necessity: No compensation required at common law.
(i)	Wartime govt. can conscript your property.
(ii)	Public catastrophe prevention allows govt. to destroy property.
(iii) To abate public nuisance.
(iv) Most such privileges are repaid under statute.

IV. Vicarious Liability and Imputed Contributory Negligence:
A. Employees, Independent Contractors and Children:
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S.
Facts: D was sailor who came back to ship drunk. He opened water valves which flooded dry dock and ship. Hld: U.S. should pay compensation.
(a)	U.S. is defendant under respondeat superior.
(b)	General rule: (Restatement S. 228(1)) Employee must be within the scope of employment.
(c)	Analysis:
(i)	Inquire as to employee's liability.
(ii)	Was it within the scope of his employment? (Usually if it is for employee's own interest it is not within the scope of employment, but if it is a clumsy devotion to employer's interest, it is within the scope of employment.)
(d)	Employer is entitled to indemnity from employee.
(e)	Bushey was more expansive than traditional respondeat superior and is not followed today.
Becker v. Interstate Properties
Facts: Appellant was severely hurt on job site. IP was owner and general contractor on the job. Appellant worked for Wood Pine who was hired to pave the job. Wood Pine hired Windsor contracting corp. who's employee ran over appellant. Windsor had little money and driver had only $10,000 liability insurance. Hld: The case should have gone to a jury to decide whether the employer was responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor.
(a)	General rule: Employer is not liable for the torts of the subcontractor. 
(b)	Exceptions from Majestic:
(i)	Where the employer retains control over the aspect of the activity in which the negligence occurs; 
(ii)	Where the contractor employed is incompetent; OR
(iii) Where the performance of the contract involves an inherently dangerous activity.
(c)	Court said IP violated exception (ii) because they hired an underinsured subcontractor.
(d)	This case is more than vicarious liability because employer conduct matched one of the three exceptions to the general subcontractor rule whereas as strict vicarious liab. there need be no wrongdoing on the part of the employer.
Owens v. Ivey
Facts: D attacked P and caused over $1,000 damage. Ps mother seeks money damages from Ds mother under the NY parental liability act. Hld: P cannot recover under the statute.
(a)	This case is an exception to the rule because most strict liability statutes for the torts of minors have been upheld.
(b)	The court says this statute is really a bill of attainder which is prohibited by the constitution.

B. Imputed Contributory Fault:
Continental Auto Lease Corp. v. Campbell
Facts: P owned the car that 3rd party was driving when it had a collision with the defendant. Both parties were negligent. Hld: 3rd party negligence is not imputable to the plaintiff so that it is barred by contributory negligence from recovery against the D.
(a)	The owner of the vehicle must have inferred or actual control of the car for imputed contributory fault. i.e. Owner was in the back seat (Gochee v. Warner).
White v. Lunder
Facts:

V. Defamation:
A. Prima Facie Case:

B. Privileges:

C. Constitutional Limitations: