OUTLINE PROFILE:

Author:  	Damien Falgoust <dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu>
School:		University of Texas
Course:		Civil Procedure
Year:		Fall 1996-Spring 1997
Professor:	Prof. Patricia Hansen
Book:		Marcus, Redish, Sherman 2nd
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SOURCE OF THIS OUTLINE:

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A MESSAGE FROM THE AUTHOR:

This outline is e-mailware!  While there is no cost for using the outline, you must drop me a line at dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu to tell me what you think, if it helped you, etc; it’d also be nice if you dropped by my web page at http://www.geocities.com/NapaValley/3578/ and signed my guest book.

Feel free to redistribute this outline unmodified to anyone who may find it useful.  This outline is provided “as is” and I make no promises as to its accuracy (it worked for me, your mileage may vary).  Good Luck on exams!

Damien Falgoust
University of Texas School of Law

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CIVIL PROCEDURE OUTLINE
Prof. Patricia Hansen – Fall 1996/Spring 1997

I.	General Notes on Civil Procedure
A.	The Due Process Clause (14th amendment, Sec. 1)
1.	“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”
2.	There is substantially similar language in the 5th amendment; the 14th amendment extends the due process requirement to the states
B.	“Hansenisms”
1.	“The court uses a balancing test”
2.	“Rule 12 (b)(6) is a ‘gatekeeper’ to the jury”
3.	“Litigation is like a photo.  You get the whole picture through discovery, and the lawyers “block out” the parts the jury can’t see”
4.	“burden shifting”
II.	Due Process & Prejudgement Seizure
A.	Case Law Regarding Prejudgment Seizure
1.	Fuentes v. Shevin (or, hey, where’s my stove?)
a)	Firestone seizes stove when Fuentes defaults via a writ which only required a clerk’s signature and the posting of a bond.  No notice was given to Fuentes.
b)	Court holds the statute is invalid, because:
(1)	Defendant owns property despite lacking title since she made payments on it, and is thus entitled to Due Process protections.
(2)	Notice & hearing before a judge should be provided before seizure of property to prevent unjust deprivation.
(3)	The court makes an exception for extraordinary circumstances, as follows:
(a)	If there is an important government interest (or public interest) at stake, then seizure is allowed.
(b)	If there is a special need for prompt action, seizure is allowed
(c)	If there has been a determination by a government official, under a narrowly drawn statute, in a state with strict regulations regarding seizure, then seizure is allowed
2.	Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. (or, Louisiana gets it right)
a)	Similar facts to Fuentes, but creditor seizes under Louisiana statute requiring both documentary proof of claim by creditor and judicial authorization; it also gave Mitchell an immediate hearing.
b)	Court holds statute is valid, because:
(1)	Judicial authorization is required
(2)	An immediate post-seizure hearing is required
(3)	A verified affadavit is required, alleging specific facts as to why replevin is required
(4)	An allegation of extraordinary circumstances is required
(5)	Court further says there should be a bond requirement (2x value of property), and damages for wrongful seizure.
3.	North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem  (or, details shmetails)
a)	Court rules several states seizure statutes are invalid, because:
(1)	They allowed a clerk (not a judge) to issue the writ
(2)	There was no provision for a prompt postseizure hearing
(3)	There was no bond requirement
(4)	No need for an affadavit of extraordinary circumstances (lessor only had to allege the lessee might hide or transfer the property – there was no personal knowledge required to make the allegations)
b)	Note that Di-Chem and the two previous cases add to a requirement that there must be either a hearing or “another safeguard.”  See below for the current rule.
4.	Connecticut v. Doehr (or, a rule at last)
a)	Doehr gets sued and gets his house attached before commencement of the suit under a Connecticut statute.  Statute requires a plaintiff to get judicial approval and an affadavit that there is “probable cause” that the plaintiff will prevail.
b)	Court finds statute invalid because:
(1)	No prior notice
(2)	Time between seizure and hearing could be (and often was) lengthy
(3)	Affadavit isn’t worth much (most plaintiffs believe they will prevail, whether their case is strong or not)
c)	Court further argues that to be constitutional, a statute should:
(1)	Give timely notice to the defendant of impending seizure
(2)	Grant a prompt postseizure hearing
(3)	Four of nine justices argue for a bond requirement
d)	More importantly, the court uses the Eldridge test (a decision normally applied to government seizures; now the court applies it to seizures between private parties
B.	The Eldridge Test (cited in Doehr)
1.	The Eldridge test is a balancing test.  Each of the three factors must be balanced against one another.
2.	Simply stated, the Eldridge test can be expressed as a ‘mathematical’ formula: PI > DI + RE
a)	PI = Plaintiff’s Interest
b)	DI = Defendant’s Interest
c)	RE = Risk of Error (erroneous deprivation)
3.	Plaintiff’s Interest (PI)
a)	If the party seeking seizure has no reason to fear that the property may be secreted, then his interest is not all that compelling.
b)	Examples of Plantiff’s Interest:
(1)	Special Need for Prompt Action
(2)	Pre-existing Property Interest
4.	Defendant’s Interest (DI)
a)	The significance of the property seized affects the validity of seizure; i.e., taking a record player is less significant than a stove, and therefore it is easier to find the defendant’s interest not harmed by such a seizure.
b)	Examples of things reducing Defendant’s Interest
(1)	A prompt hearing operates to help the defendant’s interest
(2)	Similarly, a bond helps to insure the defendant’s interest by guranteeing recourse for wrongful deprivation
5.	Risk of Error (RI)
a)	The greater the chances of an erroneous interference with the defendant’s property rights, the harder it will be for a given statute to withstand due process scrutiny.
b)	Examples things reducing Risk of Error:
(1)	A factual affadavit that does not rely on mere assertions
(2)	Judicial authorization for seizure
(3)	A narrow issue calling for seizure
C.	Clues to an unconstitutional statute (these make it more likely that a statute will violate due process rights)
1.	Plaintiff doesn’t post a bond (increased chance of harm to DI)
2.	Deprivation before hearing (note, however, that even a preseizure hearing can fail due process scrutiny)
a)	The following make such a deprivation more likely to pass muster:
(1)	extraordinary circumstances
(2)	a verified affadavit authorized by a judge
(3)	damages for wrongful seizure (i.e., a bond)
(4)	immediate post-seizure hearing 
3.	Authorization by a clerk rather than a judge (increased RE)
4.	Affadavits based on conclusory statements (increased RE)
D.	Note there are no hard-and-fast rules about determining a statute’s validity; approach problems by first applying the Eldridge test
III.	The Complaint
A.	Specificity (Rule 8(a))
1.	Rule 8(a) – a complaint need only have:
a)	Statement of jurisdiction
b)	Short & plain statement of the claim and why the pleader is entitled to relief
c)	A demand for judgement of some kind
2.	“Notice Pleading”
a)	A complaint need not allege any specific wrong; rather it must merely notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim against it
b)	Rule 12(e) allows for a motion for a more definite statement, but it is generally used only to decipher unintelligible motions, or those that are so vague that the defense could not reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, not for more detail
B.	Consistency and Honesty in Pleadings (Rule 11)
1.	Pleading in the Alternative
a)	Alternative pleadings are permitted even if they are inconsistent with each other subject to Rule 11
b)	Why? To prevent a controversy to be settled in one action, especially if the cause of the action is unknown
(1)	Ex. McCormick v. Kopmann – McCormick sues for wrongful death of her husband, alleging negligence against both the truck driver who hit him (crossing the center line) and the bar that let her husband drive home.
(2)	Illinois at the time was a contributory negligence state.  If McCormick’s second claim is true, then her husband must be contributorily negligent, invalidating the first claim.
(3)	Court nevertheless allows the complaint, for both judicial economy (hearing the action in one proceeding) and to prevent injustice (both defendants could blame each other in a separate proceeding and both walk away scot free).  Since the key witness is dead, alternative pleadings are the only way to determine the truth.
2.	Rule 11, Honesty, and Sanctions
a)	Pre-1993
(1)	Rule 11 requires general honesty in all pleadings, including:
(a)	The pleading is not for an improper purpose (e.g., delay)
(b)	The pleading is warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument to extend existing law
(c)	The pleadings’ allegations and factual contentions are well-grounded in fact  or are likely to have such support upon further discovery 
(i)	Note the well-grounded in fact requirement changed in 1993; see infra.
(d)	The pleadings’ denials are based on evidence or a reasonable lack of information or belief
(2)	Rule 11 requires the party to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual allegations before filing the pleading
(a)	Ex: Albright v. Upjohn – Albright sues 9 pharmaceutical companies for injuries from tetracycline; Court grants Rule 11 sanctions against Albright’s attorneys to Upjohn after it is found they did not manufacture the drugs.  Court holds that it would have been ‘reasonable’ for Albright’s attorneys to inquire about who manufactured the drug before suing (they specialized in this type of suit and should have known how to get the necessary data)
(3)	A 1983 amendment made sanctions mandatory (This changed in 1993; see infra)
b)	Changes to Rule 11 in 1993
(1)	The “well grounded in fact” requirement became “evidentiary support.”  Note this is a lesser burden for the pleading party to meet.
(a)	Note this might have changed the outcome of Albright, supra.
(2)	Sanctions are no longer mandatory.  A court “may” (rather than “shall”) impose sanctions.
(3)	The “Safe Harbor” Provision – an attorney has 21 days to withdraw an offending pleading after opposing counsel files a Rule 11 motion to avoid sacntions.
C.	Legal Sufficiency of Plantiff’s Claim (Rule 12(b)(6))
1.	Rule 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move for dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”
2.	This motion is evaluated on the face of the complaint, not the evidence.
a)	The court must accept the facts in the complaint; it evaluates the legal theory to see if a claim can be granted (or the frivolousness of an argument to extend the law)
3.	If the motion is granted, the plaintiff has two options:
a)	He can amend his complaint without prejudice, or
b)	He can appeal.  If he does so, he takes a serious risk: more often than not, a court will not permit an amendment after an unsuccessful appeal.
4.	General vs. Specific Complaints and Motions to Dismiss
a)	If the Complaint is GENERAL
(1)	The Rule 11 ‘reasonable inquiry’ must be broad, BUT
(2)	The chance of dismissal for failure to state a claim is lessened
b)	If the Complaint is SPECIFIC
(1)	The Rule 11 ‘reasonable inquiry’ is more narrow, BUT
(2)	The chance of dismissal for failure to state a claim is greater
D.	Heightened Requirements for Specificity (Rule 9(b))
1.	Rule 9(b) – In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
a)	Note this is an exception to the 8(a) notice pleading standard
2.	In cases of fraud, there must be enough facts in the complaint to raise a “strong inference” of fraud – that is, the specific acts or omissions upon which the claim rests.
3.	The courts had extended this rule to situations other than fraud until 1993, when in Leatherman v. Tarrant County the U.S. Supreme Court held that the rule only covers what it says it covers – fraud or mistake.
a)	Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – a saying says one thing to the exclusion of all others.  (Court uses this rationale in Leatherman)
b)	The court reserves the right to maintain the 9(b) heightened pleading standard fo cases involving public officials with qualified immunity
4.	Additional matters requiring specificity:
a)	Denial of a party’s legal capacity to sue (9(a))
b)	Denial of performance or occurrence of a condition precedent (9(c))
c)	The existence of judgements or official documents and acts upon which the pleader plans to rely (9(d) and (e))
d)	Material facts of time and place (9(f))
e)	Special damages (9(g))
f)	Certain admiralty and maritime jurisdictions (9(h))
IV.	Defendant’s Response
A.	Pre-Answer Motions (PAMs)
1.	A defendant has 20 days after service of summons to file PAMs (either before or concurrently with his answer), or the answer itself.
a)	If PAM is granted the suit is dismissed (except for 12(e) motion for a more definite statement; then an answer must be filed within 10 days of the amended complaint being filed)
b)	If PAM is denied, then the defendant has 10 additional days to file the answer
2.	Disfavored Defenses – these can only be brought in a PAM or in the answer; if they are not, then they are waived.  They are (all are Rule 12(b)):
a)	2 – Court lacks personal jurisdiction
b)	3 – Court is the improper location (improper venue) for the suit
c)	4 – Insufficient process
d)	5 – Insufficient service of process
3.	Favored Defenses – these can be brought at any time up until the end of trial.  They are (all are Rule 12(b)):
a)	6 – Failure to state a claim (note this is the only non-procedural defense in Rule 12(b))
b)	7 – Failure to join a necessary party under Rule 19
4.	Most Favored Defense – this can be brought at any time, even on appeal, whether it was an issue at trial or not. It is (Rule 12(b)):
a)	1 – Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
B.	Setting Aside a Default Judgement
1.	Rule 55(c) – a court can set aside a default judgement (i.e., one where the defendant fails to answer) for ‘good cause shown.’
2.	Three factors determine ‘good cause’
a)	Will the tardy judgement cause prejudice to the plaintiff?  (Has plaintiff’s ability to prepare been harmed?
b)	Does the defendant have a ‘meritorious defense?’
c)	Did culpable conduct on the defendant’s part lead to the default?
3.	Courts generally favor hearing a case on its merits
a)	Thus, a ‘meritorious defense’ is anything not completely insane
b)	‘Culpable conduct’ means an intent to thwart the proceedings or a reckless disregard for the proceedings (not just incompetency)
(1)	Note here the courts will try not to penalize the client for picking a lousy attorney.  Shepard Claims 
C.	Admissions and Denials in the Answer (Rule 8(b))
1.	Rule 8(b) – A party shall affirm or deny and state defenses to each of the cliams in the complaint
a)	Failure to deny constitues an admission (8(d))
b)	An answer claiming lack of knowledge to affirm or deny is a denial
(1)	Unless the defendant ‘obviously had the knowledge or information,’ in which case it consititutes an admission.  David v. Crompton & Knowles Corp
c)	Denials can also be ineffective.  A defendant must be careful to specifically deny and affirm where a portion of the complaint contains a mix of averments that are true/false.  
2.	Sometimes a denial is called a “negative defense”
3.	See also Amendments to Pleadings, infra.
D.	Affirmative Defenses in the Answer (Rule 8(c))
1.	A defendant must plead anything constituting an “affirmative defense” in his answer.
a)	Ex.: res judicata, contibutory negligence, assumption of risk, faiure of consideration, etc.
2.	A plaintiff does not have to anticipate a defendant’s defenses in his complaint.  Gomez v. Toledo 
E.	Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaims (Rule 13(a))
1.	Defined
a)	Compulsory Counterclaims are those that “arise out of the same action or occurrence” and does not require the presence of third parties over which the court has no jurisdiction
b)	Permissive Counterclaims are those that are not so related
2.	Four Tests for Compulsoriness
a)	Are there the same facts/law in the claim and counterclaim?
b)	Would res judicata prevent hearing the counterclaim as a separate suit?
c)	Is there the same evidence in the claim and counterclaim?
d)	Is there a logical relation between claim and counterclaim?
3.	A compulsory counterclaim must be brought if it is ever to be heard (Rule 13(a): a pleading shall state as a counterclaim…).  Otherwise, it is barred.
4.	A permissive counterclaim can be brought at the defendant’s option (Rule 13(a): a pleading may state as a counterclaim…)
a)	Permissive counterclaims often run afoul of subject matter jurisdiction problems when the primary claim is federal and the counterclaim is state, since there is no supplemental/ancillary/pendant jurisdicton.
5.	How much evidence do two claims need to share?  The courts are unclear.
V.	Amendments to Pleadings (Rule 15)
A.	A pleading can be amended once before a response is filed or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served
B.	After a response has been filed, a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
1.	A party cannot amend if doing so would cause prejudice to the other side.
a)	Ex: If amending a ‘did not know’ answer to a ‘denial’ when the party that should have been sued cannot be sued because of the statute of limitations, the amendment will not be allowed since it would prejudice the plaintiff.  David v. Crompton & Knowles Corp.  
b)	Prejudice is hard to show and usually only arises is statute of limitations cases.
2.	A party also cannot amend to undercut Rule 12 (h) by adding an unfavored defense.
C.	“Relating Back” Amendments to the time of original filing
1.	An amendment can be related back if: (Rule 15(c))
a)	It is permitted by statute
b)	It arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original pleading
c)	It changes the party’s names, meets (b) above, and the new party knew or should have known the action would have been brought against him but for the mistake in the original complaint.
2.	Ex: In Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc, P slipped and fell down a stairway. She sued Gold Dust (D). alleging negligent maintenance. Upon discovering a basis for an allegation of defective construction, P amended the complaint to add Cavanaugh (the other D), a partner in the partnership owning the building. Cavanaugh was also president of Gold Dust Casino, Inc. Cavanaugh's addition was after the statute of limitations had run. Cavanaugh moved for summary judgment. 
a)	The court held that under Rule 15(c), when a newly added defendant has been aware of the litigation, the statute of limitations may not apply to him. Here, Cavanaugh, as president of Gold Dust, certainly had notice of the suit.
3.	The court applies a “same injury” test in determining if the amendment can be related back, i.e., does the amended pleading arise from the same injury or duty?  Contrast to the “same evidence” test for compulsory counterclaims, supra.
VI.	Discovery & Trial (Rule 26)
A.	Disclosures Requried
1.	Initial Disclosures (must be given without waiting for a discovery request)
a)	Names & addresses of individuals likely to have discoverable information
b)	Copies or descriptions of relevant documents
c)	Computation of damages and basis of that computation
d)	Copies of any insurance agreements under which an insurer might be liable
2.	Disclosure of Expert Testimony
a)	Must include qualifications, opinions to be expressed, and basis for those opinions.
3.	Pretrial Disclosures
a)	At least 30 days before trial a party must disclose witnesses expected to be called or who will be called if the need arises.
B.	Discovery limited by privilege
1.	Attorney-client, priest-penitent, doctor-patient, husband-wife
2.	5th amendment right not to self-incriminate
3.	Attorney’s work product 
4.	Government secrets
C.	Mechanisms used in discovery
1.	Oral depositions (expensive; most important)
2.	Deposition upon written questions
3.	Interrogatories (inexpensive)
4.	Request for the production of documents (2nd most important)
5.	Court-ordered mental or physical exam (for “good cause”)
6.	Requests for admission
D.	Generally, the scope of discovery extends to anything not beyond the scope of the litigation that is not priveliged
E.	Rule 37 Motion to Compel Disclosure – permits sanctions against offending party
F.	The effects of broad discovery include more information at trial, and (more importantly) a more likely chance of settlement.
VII.	Summary Judgement
A.	For a successful summary judgement motion, the moving party must show the absence of any issue of material facts
1.	Contrast to motion for dismissal: SJ focuses on the facts, while motion to dismiss merely focuses on the complaint.
B.	How clearly does the moving party have to prove the lack of an issue?
1.	The Adickes Standard – the moving party must show actual evidence that there is no issue of material fact.
a)	In other words, he must foreclose the possibility of an issue
2.	The Celatex standard (modifying the Adickes standard) – moving party must merely point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.
a)	In other words, there is no foreclosure needed – the burdens reflect those at trial.
b)	Any evidence pointed out as insufficient or inadmissable must also not leave open any question of the potential for a triable issue (this is how the court adapts Celatex to Adickes)
(1)	“Any question” is pretty subjective.  
(a)	In Adickes the court felt indamissable documents alleging police conspiracy created a potential for triable fact.
(b)	In Celatex the court felt that inadmissable documents from the decedent, his former employer, and his insurance company did not show a triable issue as to wrongful death from asbestos exposure.
(c)	In Visser, the court felt that inadmissable documents from three disgruntled co-workers were not enough to show a triable issue as to another employee’s wrongful discharge for age discrimination.
3.	Three views on how summary judgement should be approached
a)	Traditional view – moving party must shift the burden to the nonmoving party be producing evidence nonmovant must respond to
b)	Prof. Louis – moving party only has to show enough evidence to demonstrate a lack of proof of an element of the nonmovant’s case (i.e., movant only needs to meet the burden of production – there is no need to shift the burden)
c)	Prof. Currie – summary judgement should be treated the same as a directed verdict – with no burden on the moving party
C.	Strategic Implications of a Summary Judgement Motion
1.	Forces the nonmoving party to do a “dress rehersal” for trial on paper.
a)	This forces the nonmoving party to either step up discovery or drop the case altogether.
b)	It may or may not increase costs of litigation – while it certainly forces more costs into a shorter time span, the discovery costs would probably happen anyway in the course of normal litigation.
2.	It also gives the moving party a “sneak preview” of at least some elements of the nonmoving party’s case
D.	Other general notes on summary judgement
1.	The judge is supposed to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and ask if a reasonable juror could find for the nonmoving party in such a light.
2.	The plaintiff may move for summary judgement any time after 20 days from start of the action or any time after the opposing party files a summary judgement motion.  The defendant can move for summary judgement at any time.
VIII.	The Right to Jury Trial & Jury Selection
A.	Juries: Pro and Con
1.	Pro
a)	A jury brings “common sense” to bear on the facts
b)	Juries do not create precedent, and thus can decide hard cases without creating bad law
c)	Juries preserve the dignity of the bench by relieving judges of the responnisbility of decision
d)	The jury itself is educated by their own exposure to the administration of justice
e)	A jury makes law intelligible by forcing a merger of law and common sense
2.	Con
a)	Jury trials cause delays to the courts
b)	Juries are often incompetent
c)	Juries are often prejudiced
B.	The Right to Jury Trial
1.	The historical test to determine if a jury trial is valid
a)	The 7th amendment preserves the right to jury trials in civil matters (the right to a jury trial in criminal matters is absolute).  Thus, if an action would create a right to a jury in 1791, it creates such a right today.
b)	Problems arise when actions are brough which did not exist in 1791.  Then the courts must try to find a similar action that existed in the past to determine if the right to a jury exists.
c)	The basic distinction is between legal issues (which preserve the right to a jury) and equitable issues (which entail no such right).
2.	Legal or Equitable?
a)	The court looks at two factors:
(1)	The type of action (analogizing to similar 1791 actions), and
(2)	The type of remedy sought according to 1791 standards (generally, money damages are legal; others are equitable) This is the more important of the two. 
b)	Ex.: In Teamsters Local #391 v. Terry – an action claiming the union had violated its duty of fair representation for members with seniority, the court looked at several analogies to actions existing in 1791:
(1)	An action to vacate an arbitration award (since the employee is seeking to set aside a result of the grievance process)
(a)	Court rejects because the grievance process never began
(2)	An action for attorney malpractice (an attorney owes a duty to his client, like the union owes to its members)
(a)	Court rejects because client has total control in attorney-client relationship, unlike in a union-member relationship
(3)	An action against a trustee by the beneficiary for failing to enforce a contract held by the trust.  (Since the union has exclusive bargaining power on behalf of its members, and members can only sue if the union fails to give fair representation)
(a)	The court accepts this analogy as valid
c)	Monetary Damages that are equitable 
(1)	Restitutionary damages (i.e., back pay)
(2)	Incidental damages or those that are a small part of equitable damages.
3.	Cases with both legal and equitable claims
a)	In a case with both legal and equitable claims involving common facts (and the case is not split into two proceedings), the legal claims are heard first and the right to jury trial is preserved.
b)	Note this has the effect of eliminating the bench trial’s ability to be a finder of fact since the jury’s findings are binding on the court for the equitable claim. (res judicata)
4.	Jury Trials in other types of Proceedings
a)	There is no right to jury trial in statutorily-created agencies enforcing their own rules
b)	When public rights are at issue (i.e., government-brought civil actions based on statutory violations), there is no jury trial right
(1)	Only private actions are guaranteed the right to jury trial
C.	Jury Selection Issues
1.	Voir Dire – “to speak the truth” – preliminary examination of prospective jurors.
2.	Typically, an attorney can strike “for cause” (where he can show juoro bias) and also has 3 preemptory challenges that can be used for any reason, with limits
3.	A preemptory challenge cannot be used to strike a juror based on the juror’s race.  (This is an extension of the 14th amendment’s equal protection clause to the 5th amendment due process clause) Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
a)	The opposing party may bring a challenge of a racial preemptory strike, event though technically the aggrieved party is the juror. Why? Test for 3rd party standing:
(1)	He suffers an injury
(2)	He has a close relationship to the 3rd party (the juror)
(3)	The 3rd party is hindered from protecting his own interests
4.	In 1994 the court also invalidated preemptory strikes based on gender.  J.E.B. v. Alabama 
D.	A judge can use JNOV (judgment as a matter of law) after the verdict to “correct” a clearly erroneous jury decision.
IX.	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A.	Remember, this is the most favored defense and can be brought up at any time, even appeal, and even if it has not been mentioned before.
1.	Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  State courts are courts of general jurisdiction (since the 10th amendment grants them ‘all powers not reserved for the federal government’)
2.	The burden rests on the plaintiff to prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
3.	A court can dismiss on lack of subject matter jurisdiction even if one of the parties does not challenge it
4.	Remember, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction on any claim that is appealed to it as the “court of last resort,” regardless of if a federal court could have heard the case at the trial level.
B.	Levels of analysis for federal claims
1.	Constitutional – What claims does the constitution say can be heard in federal court?  (Article III, Sec. 1)
a)	Congress can establish federal courts (except, of course, the Supreme Court)
b)	Federal judges have tenure for life
2.	Statutory – What claims does congress say can be heard in federal court?
a)	Citizens of different states (diversity suits) § 1332
b)	Federal Questions (after 1875) § 1331 
3.	Judicial – What claims does the judiciary say can be heard in federal court?
a)	Interpretations of constitutional & statutory rules (see infra)
b)	A federal court will not hear domestic relation or probate cases
C.	Diversity Jurisdiction
1.	Two requirements:
a)	The parties must be from different states, or one party is from the U.S. and another is from a foreign country 
(1)	Citizenship is determined by domicile (not mere residence) Mas v. Perry 
(2)	A change of domicile requires:
(a)	Taking up residence in the new domicile, and
(b)	Intending to remain there (note how subjective this rule is!)
(3)	For corporations, a “dual” citizenship exists:
(a)	The state of incorporation, and
(b)	Their principal place of business (headquarters)
(4)	For partnerships, sometimes courts look at each partner, sometimes courts only look at those partners in management positions
(5)	A recent amendment makes a resident alien a ‘citizen’ of his state of domicile
b)	The amount in question must exceed $50,000 (soon to be $75,000)
(1)	The amount in question is determined by the damages sought in the complaint (not the actual award – Mas v. Perry)
2.	There must be complete diversity between the parties 
a)	All the plaintiffs must be from a different state than all the defendants.
D.	Federal Question Jurisdiction
1.	Generally, a federal claim exists if the plaintiff alleges a right or interest that is substantially founded on federal law (be it federal statutes, federal common law, federal constitutional law, treaties, or federal administrative regulations.
a)	Jurisdiction is determined from the complaint – a federal defense is inadequate to create federal subject matter jurisdiction
b)	The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule – a federal claim must be part of a “well pleaded complaint”
(1)	If the federal issue is simply “tacked on” to get into federal court, the court will not hear the issue.
(2)	A court examines the complaint to see if the federal issue must be present for the claim to be complete.  (Could the cause of action succeed without finding a violation of federal law?)
2.	When is there a federal cause of action?
a)	If a federal law creates a private cause of action 
(1)	Congress does not create a private cause of action for every federal regulation because to do so would overrun the courts.  However, sometimes courts will imply a federal cause of action even though it does not exist by the statute.
b)	If a state law claim includes a federal claim that could be brought under and existing private federal cause of action
(1)	Note the doctrine of preemption.  If a federal law “so occupies” a given field, a federal court should hear the issue (e.g., labor relations suits)
c)	If there is a very important constitutional question at issue
E.	Supplemental, Pendant, and Ancillary Jurisdiction
1.	If a claim has both federal and state issues, the federal claim is “substantial,” and both claims would ordinarily be expected to be tried in one proceeding, the federal court may hear all of the issues.  UMW v. Gibbs; § 1367(a)
a)	This changes the old rule, which held:
(1)	If 2 distinct grounds in one cause of action, then supplemental jurisdiction exists
(2)	If 2 completely distinct causes of action, then no supplemental jurisdiction exists
b)	Elements of new test (note it is the same as Wigglesworth – see “defendant’s response: compulsory counterclaims,” supra)
(1)	Substantial federal claim
(a)	The claim must be non-frivolous (i.e., subject to Rule 11 – it does not matter if it is dismissed by a 12 (b)(6) motion, etc.)
(2)	Common Nucleus of Operative Fact
(a)	The claims must stem from the same transaction or occurrence, the same series of incidents, or have a logical relationship
c)	A court has discretion to hear supplemental jurisdiction claims.  It balances the following in deciding:
(1)	Reasons to decline hearing (§ 1367(c))
(a)	A novel state law issue (federal judiciary avoids making state law)
(b)	Federal claims are dismissed before trial
(c)	State issue predominates
(d)	Other “exceptional circumstances” with “compelling reasons” for declining
(2)	Reasons to grant hearing
(a)	Claim is closely tied to federal policy
2.	Heightened Requirements for Supplemental Jurisdiction (including claims against 3rd parties)
a)	In addition to the Gibbs test, one must look at the claims in light of the intent of the statute granting federal jurisdicition to determine the validity of supplemental jurisdiction.
b)	Therefore, in a claim based on diversity, a claim against a 3rd party against who there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction against the 3rd party does not have supplemental jurisdiction.
c)	The bottom line: If diversity citizenship is destroyed, there can be no supplemental jurisdiction, regardless of if the claim meets the Gibbs test.
3.	Other Issues
a)	Pendant and Ancillary Jurisdiction (before they were merged into supplemental jurisdiction)
(1)	Pendant Jurisdiction = state claims by plaintiff against defendant
(2)	Ancillary Jurisdiction = state claims by either plaintiff or defendant against a 3rd party
b)	“Piggybacking”
(1)	If a state law claim meets the Gibbs test for another state law claim, and the second state law claim meets the Gibbs test for a federal claim, the original state law claim meets the test for supplemental jurisdiction by “piggybacking” on the second state law claim.  Palmer v. Hospital Authority
(2)	Presumably, this can be continued ad infinitum as long as the final state claim is anchored to a federal claim.
F.	Removal
1.	If a plaintiff could have sued in federal court, but instead chose state court, a defendant can remove the proceedings to federal court by filing within 30 days of the filing of the complaint.  At this time, the state action ‘freezes.’
a)	The exception is a diversity of citizenship suit where the defendant is a citizen of the state where the claim is brought.
2.	A plaintiff can file a motion to remand to get the claim back into state court.
G.	State v. Federal Court: Strategic Considerations
1.	Why choose federal court?
a)	Federal Procedures may be faster
b)	Jury is drawn from a larger area
c)	Intimidation
d)	Judges appointed for life are not beholden to political issues
2.	Why choose state court?
a)	Cozier proceedings
b)	Narrower jury pool
c)	You may just prefer a state judge
X.	State vs. Federal Law (The Erie Problem)
A.	Overview
1.	The Rules of Decision Act of 1789 (28 U.S.C.A. § 1652) requires the federal courts hearing state claims to use the “laws of the states” in deciding the claim.  The question was, what exactly was meant by “laws?”
2.	The Old Rule: Swift v. Tyson only permitted federal courts to interpret state statutes, not common law.
a)	This led to forum shopping, such as plaintiffs reincorporating in different states just to get diversity jurisdiction in cases where they felt being in federal court was the more advantageous forum.  Black & White Taxi v. Brown & Yellow Taxi 
3.	This was overturned by Erie v. Long Island R.R..  Under Erie, the federal courts were allowed to apply state common law in state claims.  Why?
a)	Law Review Article 
b)	Social Policy (Uniformity)
(1)	The “end run” around state policy allowed by Swift – It prevented the application of policies the state felt were beneficial
c)	Philosophy – shift from “natural law” (law exists independently) to “Positivism” (law is created by man based on policy decisions)
d)	Constitution – court says in Erie that there is no “general” federal common law (i.e., common law that does not relate to a federal issue) because the Constitution does not give them the power to decide “general” issues, and thus the federal courts must apply state law.
(1)	The court does not specify a Constitutional provision, but it is most likely relying on the 10th amendment – powers not reserved for the federal government are given to the states.
B.	The Erie Problem 
1.	The Rules of Decision Act requires the federal courts to apply state substantive law
2.	The Rules Enabling Act for the FRCP require the federal courts to apply federal procedural law
3.	Thus, the problem is when is a rule substantive and when is it procedural?
C.	Unscrambling Erie 
1.	The York rule: If a rule is outcome determinative, then it is substantive (that is, if it substantially affects the ultimate outcome of the trial).
a)	The problem: everything is outcome determinative – e.g., if filing on the wrong size paper results in a key motion being dismissed, it substantially affects the outcome of the trial
D.	A final answer: The Hannah v. Plumer test.
1.	Does the state rule conflict with FRCP?
a)	If yes, it is presumed to be procedural, and federal rule applies.
b)	If no, continue to the next step.
2.	Is the state rule required for the “twin aims of Erie”?
a)	The twin aims are:
(1)	The prevention of forum shopping, and
(2)	Preventing the unfair administration of law (e.g., undermining state policies – does the rule affect life outside of court?)
b)	If yes, the state rule applies
c)	If no, the federal rule applies.
XI.	Personal Jurisdiction
A.	Types of personal jurisdiction
1.	In Personam – means the defendant is personally liable for the court’s judgment, i.e., the court has power over the defendant himself.
2.	In Rem – the court has power over a particular piece of property.  Limited to property within the state’s physical borders and is necessary for the state to be able to bind all persons regarding the property’s ownership and use.  Typical for eminent domain, drug forfeitures, and estate settlements.
3.	Quasi In Rem – the court has the power over a particular piece of property regarding a particular person.  The court cannot decide the rights of all persons regarding the property.  The court’s judgment only extends to the property and does not bind the defendant personally.
B.	Methods of exercising personal jurisdiction
1.	Personal Service In-State
a)	This is the traditional rule, established in Pennoyer v. Neff.  Basically, a state can exercise jurisdiction over anyone within its borders.
(1)	In Pennoyer, the court refused to permit an Oregon resident to sue a California resident via publication in Oregon newspapers.
(2)	Note this power also typically applies to people domiciled in a state regardless of if they are present in the state at the time of service.
b)	Theories as to why, absent another doctrine, service must be in-state
(1)	State Sovereignty – to serve a party in another state would usurp sovereignty of the state the party is currently in.
(a)	i.e., the states have no direct jurisdiction over those outside their borders.
(b)	Note that full faith & credit only applies if a court has proper personal jurisdiction.
(2)	To do otherwise is a violation of 14th amendment due process – the right to be heard.  If you can serve via publication in a state where the party does not reside, it is unlikely he will know of the suit and therefore unlikely he can defend his interests.
c)	Personal jurisdiction via in-state personal service was most recently upheld in Burnham v. Superior Court (1990) by a plurality (but unanimous) opinion.
(1)	Key reason seems to be tradition – Scalia says that it is part of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
(2)	Scalia also says that judges shouldn’t change the law here – it should be done legislatively.
(3)	Brennan thinks waiting for the legislature is too long – judges ought to uphold fair play/sub. justice today by making new law.
(a)	However, he still thinks in-state service is good, because the defendant by being in a state avails himself of that state’s services, and thus should also the state’s authority.
(4)	White puts a lot of faith in that the defendant has consented to service by intentionally putting himself within the state’s borders.
2.	In-State Service to an Implied Agent
a)	If a state heavily regulates an activity for the protection of its citizens, it can appoint an agent for service for an out-of-state defendant.
(1)	The key is exclusion: can the forum state exclude people from doing this activity?
b)	Ex.: States regulate automobiles to protect the safety of its citizens; the state can name an in-state official as an implied agent of out-of-state drivers for service of process should someone wish to sue them for an auto accident.  (Hess v. Pawlosky)
3.	Consent to Service
a)	A person can consent to a state’s personal jurisdiction.
b)	The biggest problems in this area arise when the consent is via a small clause in a contract, for instance on the back of a cruise ticket (as in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute).  These clauses are prima facie valid, but subject to scrutiny for fundamental fairness.  Why?:
(1)	Likelihood that without clauses cruise line would be subject to suit anywhere
(2)	Less confusion as to forum due to clauses (judicial economy)
(3)	Consumer benefit of lower fares.
c)	Requirements for consent:
(1)	Notice – even if it’s teeny-weeny writing on the back of a ticket (not notice of suit, infra, but rather notice that this forum is the proper one)
(2)	“Fundamental Fairness” – i.e., no bad faith; no requirement for a remote, alien jurisdiction; disputes that are “essentially local” should be kept in the locality.
4.	Minimum Contacts
a)	A state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has “minimum contacts” within that state.
(1)	Note this analysis only applies for cases where the court must have specific jurisdiction.
(2)	The alternative is general jurisdiction.  A court has jurisdiction over a defendant for:
(a)	individuals – defendant is domiciled in-state
(b)	corporations – primary state of business and state of incorporation.
b)	Steps In Minimum Contact Analysis
(1)	Has the defendant purposefully availed himself of the court’s jurisdiction?
(a)	Does he have ‘systematic and continuous’ activity in the state?
(i)	As in Int’l Shoe, where the defendant had employees operating regularly in the state.
(b)	Does the cause arise from a contact with the state?  (Does the defendant gain the benefits of the forum state’s services?)
(i)	Soliciting a contract (as in McGee) with a ‘substantial connection’ to the state.
(ii)	As in Burger King, where the defendant was deemed to have contact with the state because he had to remit fees to the main office there as part of the contract which was at issue in the suit.
(iii)	A retail sale outside the state that happens to end up in-state is not purposeful availment (as in Volkswagen)
(c)	Could the defendant have reasonably anticipated his activities could give rise to the cause of action in the state?
(i)	A magazine publisher is subject to libel anywhere the magazine is sold since it could reasonably anticipate suits there.
(a)	Hansen instead thinks this type of situation should be read narrowly, focusing on the targeted nature of the publication (Was the story directed at the forum state?  Will its effects be primarily felt there?)  Calder 
(ii)	Injecting goods into the stream of commerce may meet this requirement (e.g., selling or advertising in the forum state; possibly if defendant has reason to believe goods will end up in a specific state)
(a)	Brennan says this is enough
(b)	O’Conner adds that the activity must be directed at the state
(c)	Stevens looks at the volume and hazardous nature of the activity.
(d)	Hansen suggests distinguishing cases which involve contracts and cases involving retail sales.  Note the test is easy for contracts and more difficult for retail sales.
(2)	Would the exercise of jurisdiction comport with fair play and substantial justice? (also known as “reasonableness”)
(a)	This is a balancing test.  The court weighs PI & SI vs. DB:
(i)	The plaintiff’s interest 
(a)	sophistication of plaintiff
(b)	burden of finding & litigating in an alternative forum (physical location)
(ii)	The state’s interest
(a)	public safety
(b)	no interest for suit between foreign corporations for indemnification (Asahi)
(c)	efficiency (where’s the evidence?) (this could be a fourth element)
(iii)	The defendant’s interest
(a)	sophistication of defendant
(b)	burden of litigating in forum state (distance and foreign legal system considerations – Asahi)
XII.	 Other Considerations in Choosing the Forum
A.	Notice
1.	When can must a court give personal notice and when can it do so by publication, appointing someone to handle unknown parties’ interest?
a)	Personal service – sufficient in any context
b)	Service by mail – sufficient for known parties (i.e., names and addresses are known) Federal Rules only – see below
c)	Service by publication – sufficient for unknown parties (i.e., names and addresses cannot be reasonably ascertained)
2.	Federal Rule 4 – permitted methods of service
a)	Personal service
(1)	For a corporation, serve a officer or managing agent.
b)	Leave service at place of abode or with a person of reasonable ability
c)	Via mail with a request to waive personal service
(1)	Note incentive for defendant to waive personal service – doing so buys him time to answer (60 days instead of 20)
3.	Note the balancing test for notice by publication – You must use the method of service which is most reasonable.  The court balances efficiency against fairness.
B.	Venue
1.	Venue deals with insuring that the forum has some logical bearing on either the claims or the parties.  
a)	Note that venue in all cases deals in which federal district to bring suit in, and is thus more narrow than the previous issues which only had which state as its limiting factor.
2.	28 USC § 1391: Venue – a case must be brought in (s. a & b are essentially the same except the third part, and are thus presented together):
a)	The judicial district where any defendant resides, if they all reside in the same state.
(1)	Note an alien can be sued in any district (s. d)
b)	The judicial district where a substantial part of the events/omissions giving rise to the claim (or a substantial part of the property which is the subject of the action is situated)
(1)	Note for this to apply, the incident must occur in this country (there are no federal districts abroad!)
c)	Judicial district in which:
(1)	Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction (solely diversity cases) (s. a)
(2)	Any defendant may be found if there is no other district available. (cases that are not based on diversity alone) (s. b)
C.	Form Non Conveniens
1.	Refers to the discretionary power of a court to decline jurisdiction if a more convenient (or just) forum is available elsewhere.
2.	The trial court is given broad discretion to decide whether to hear or dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.  (FNC is not considered a constitutional issue).
3.	Testing for FNC: the short version.  Court should dismiss based on if the forum:
a)	Is unfair to the defendant out of proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or
b)	causes significant legal or adminsitrative problems.
4.	Testing for FNC: the big balancing test.  Court considers:
a)	The location of witnesses and evidence
b)	The amount of prejudice to the defendant
(1)	Counterbalanced by plaintiff’s convenience
(a)	Plaintiff’s right to choose forum is given great weight.
(b)	However, if the plaintiff is foreign, it is not given great weight.
c)	What law would apply
(1)	If the alternative is a foreign country that offers no remedy, then the court will probably not dismiss; 
(2)	However, if the foreign country offers any remedy, regardless of how small, the court is more likely to dismiss.  Piper Aircraft v. Reyno
d)	Local (or state, or federal [for foreigners]) interest, if any
e)	Burden on the court (i.e., having to apply foreign law)
XIII.	 The Size of the Litigation 
A.	Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
1.	Res Judicata (a.k.a “claim preclusion”) – A final judgment on the merits precludes relitigation of the same claim between the parties.
a)	Final judgment 
(1)	Not a motion to dismiss (12 (b)(6)) – however, if no amendment is allowed, such a motion can become final
(2)	Summary judgment is a final judgment on the merits
(3)	Note Rule 60 permits relief from a final judgment for up to a year for various possibilities (new evidence, mistake, fraud, clerical error, etc.)
b)	On the merits
(1)	This means the case cannot be dismissed for a procedural reason (e.g., for lack of jurisdiction) for res judicata to apply
c)	Same claim
(1)	This means the claim must arise from the same “transaction or occurrence”
d)	Between the parties
(1)	Third parties to the transaction or occurrence are not barred
(2)	Remember compulsory counterclaims – these cannot be brought in a new action
e)	Other notes on res judicata
(1)	Res judicata combines the doctrines of merger and bar.
(a)	Merger means a victory in court causes the claim to merge into the judgment so it cannot be brought again
(b)	Bar means a loss in court bars relitigating the claim.
(2)	Some states have a “primary right” rule which may permit personal injury claims to be relitigated in some instances.
(3)	Res judicata bars relitigating in every state (full faith & credit) 
2.	Collateral Estoppel (a.k.a. “issue preclusion”) – a party cannot relitigate issues previously actually litigated and decided.
a)	Actually litigated 
(1)	Default judgment does not count – there must have been acual litigation
b)	Decided
(1)	The specific issue must have been actually decided (a problem if the judgment does not include a decision on each issue)
c)	Who is barred? – Only parties to the prior suit
(1)	Collateral Estoppel can only be used against an original party.  (that is the “victim” must be an original party)
(a)	For an old party to use it against a new party would deny the new party the chance to be heard on the issue (i.e., due process considerations)
(b)	This is not a problem for a new party using it against an old party, as the old party has already had a chance to be heard on the issue.
d)	Mutuality – Same parties as in the prior suit (thus, nonmutuality means a new party is involved)
e)	Defensive vs. Offensive Use of Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel
(1)	Defensive Use (usually favored)
(a)	This means a new defendant is using collateral estoppel as a shield from a new claim
(i)	In other words, the plaintiff is trying to relitigate an issue decided against him in a previous case against a new defendant
(2)	Offensive Use (sometimes favored, sometimes not)
(a)	This means a new plaintiff is using collateral estoppel as a ‘sword’ to prevent the defendant from litigating an issue decided against him.
(i)	In other words, the old plaintiff won and the new plaintiff seeks to use that victory to insure victory on that issue for himself
(ii)	Disfavored because it fosters a “wait and see” approach to litigation
(3)	The Parklane test determines if either use is permitted.  It says use of nonmutual collateral estoppel is permitted unless: 
(a)	A new plaintiff could have easily joined the original action
(i)	Note this applies to offensive use only
(ii)	What if the plaintiff was out of state, or the original action sought diversity?
(b)	There are different stakes involved
(i)	In other words, the original action was small and the current action is huge – the ‘victim’ may not vigorously litigate the small claim because it is small; it is unfair to preclude him from litigating a bigger claim.
(ii)	Note however that if the increase in stakes are foreseeable, use of estoppel is permissible
(c)	Prior inconsistent rulings
(d)	Different procedures
(4)	Note that the trial court is given broad discretion on when to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel
(5)	Note that in Parklane the majority was not bothered that the prior claim was heard in a bench trial (an SEC action), and that the application of estoppel prevented them from litigating the claim to a jury.
3.	Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel compared
a)	Res judicata applies to the entire claim while collateral estoppel only applies to a given issue
b)	Res judicata applies whether or not there has been litigation, while collateral estoppel only applies to issues actually litigated
c)	Res judicata applies only to the original parties, while collateral estoppel may apply to new parties
B.	Permissive Joinder 
1.	Permissive Joinder of Claims (Rule 18(a))
a)	A party can join as many claims has he has against another party
b)	Note, however, that this is only a pleading rule – the judge may sever unrelated claims for separate trials if needed at a later time (Rule 42(b))
2.	Permissive Joinder of Parties (Rule 20)
a)	To join a party (who is not required), you must establish that your claim against the party to be joined
(1)	arises from the same transaction or occurrence of the initial claim, and
(2)	involves a common question of law or fact.
b)	Examples
(1)	Kedra – Court permits joinder of police officers by family suing for harassment.  The harassment took place over a period of time, so court says joinder is justified; reserves the right to sever at a later time.
(2)	Cohen – Court denies joinder of banks by plaintiff suing for usury violations; says the different lending policies from bank to bank do not create a common issue of fact
(3)	Mosely – Court permits joinder of GM employees suing for racial discrimination.  Court says claims are logically related.
c)	The Balancing Test for Permissive Joinder: The court balances:
(1)	The efficiency of hearing the case in one action and the similarities involved vs.
(2)	The differences involved and any possible prejudice.
d)	Note that again this rule is for pleadings and the court can sever at a later time pursuant to Rule 42.
C.	Compulsory Joinder (Rule 19)
1.	When must a party be brought in?  Analysis takes place in two parts:
a)	Is the absent party necessary?  (If so, they must be joined if feasible; if they are necessary and either personal [i.e., subject to service of process] or subject matter [i.e., diversity] jurisdiction is not destroyed, then they are automatically required to be joined) – This is not a balancing test (if any of these elements exist, the party is necessary)
(1)	Plaintiff’s interest – Is complete relief available without this party?
(a)	Joining joint tortfeasors generally doesn’t count; neither does any suit for money damages – there we let the plaintiff assume the risk of incomplete recovery
(b)	However, suits for injunctive relief where failure to join would render the relief without meaning usually require joinder.
(2)	Absent party’s interest – “As a practical matter,” is the absent party’s interests protected?
(a)	Is there privity sufficient that collatarel estoppel might apply?
(b)	Is there a ‘cloud’ on title or other ‘practical’ impairment on the absent party’s interest?
(3)	Defendant’s interest – would a judgment without the absent party possibly subject the defendant to multiple or inconsistent obligations?
(a)	For instance, an insurance policy on a person’s wife who has been divorced and remarried would require potentially that the policy be paid twice if both spouses are not present for an initial action  against the insurance company.
b)	Is the absent party indispensable?  (If either personal or subject matter jurisdiction would be destroyed by adding the party, the court balances the following factors in deciding to proceed or dismiss)
(1)	Extent to which proceeding would prejudice either parties already present or the absent party
(a)	Remember, collateral estoppel does not apply to a new party unless there is privity.
(2)	The degree to which any prejudice can be lessened or avoided (short of dismissal)
(a)	For example, in a limited funds case (i.e., ordering an insurance company to pay on a policy), a stay can be placed on payment until all parties have litigated their claims
(3)	If a judgment without the absent party will be adequate
(4)	If the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed (i.e., an alternative forum with a remedy)
2.	Court reads this rule narrowly because it doesn’t want to second-guess the plaintiff’s choices unless it has to
D.	Devices for Adding Parties
1.	Impleader (Rule 14) (a.k.a. 3rd party practice)
a)	This rule permits an “end run” around a plaintiffs’ choice of parties – it allows a defendant to “sue” a third party in the same action he is involved in
b)	Anyone who is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him may be brought in via impleader
(1)	This is typically done for cases where the defendant is seeking indemnity from an insurer or indemnity/contribution from a joint tortfeasor
(a)	Note this depends on the substantive indemnity laws of the state
(2)	Note the liability must be to the defendant – the defendant cannot implead saying the 3rd party is liable to the plaintiff.  If A is battered and sues B, but it was actually C (B’s twin brother), B cannot implead C – that is, he cannot suggest a new target for A
(3)	Therefore, the 3rd party’s actual liability is in large part based on the success of the plaintiffs action – if plaintiff loses, the 3rd party is obviously not liable to the defendant for damages that were not assessed
(4)	There must be a causal connection between the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and the defendant’s claim against the 3rd party
(a)	Thus, in Cappellini v. Unification Church, the defendant’s move to implead the Church was not valid as his claim (for getting the plaintiff to file and other alleged harassment) against them was not causally related to the original clam (a church member sued the defendant for trying to “deprogram” him)
c)	Citizenship for diversity of an impleaded 3rd party is irrelevant, as supplemental jurisdiction takes care of it; venue is also ignored
d)	Court has discretion to deny the impleader or to sever the suits into two proceedings (anyone can challenge impleader); factors weighed include:
(1)	Pro-Impleader
(a)	Efficiency of hearing all related claims in one proceeding
(b)	Avoiding repeated suits and inconsistent judgments
(2)	Anti-Impleader
(a)	Undue delay
(b)	Unnecessary complexity for the lawsuit
(c)	Potential prejudice to plaintiff (judgment-proof or sympathetic 3rd party)
e)	The plaintiff can assert any claims against an impleaded 3rd party arising from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of plaintiff’s suit against the defendant
f)	If a counterclaim is brought against a plaintiff, he may implead according to the same rules (since in such a case, the plaintiff becomes a “defendant”
2.	Counterclaims and Cross-Claims (Rule 13)
a)	Compulsory Counterclaims (13(a))
(1)	A defendant must state any counterclaims arising from the same transaction or occurrence
(2)	This is “rule-mandated res judicata” – if a person does not assert a compulsory counterclaim, he is forever barred from bringing it in a later action
b)	Permissive Counterclaims (13(b))
(1)	A defendant may bring any counterclaims he wishes that do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence (he is not barred from later action if he does not)
(2)	Like the 18(a) joinder rule, the court may sever these claims at a later time for a separate trial
c)	Cross-Claims (13(g)
(1)	A cross-claim is a claim asserted between co-parties, e.g., plaintiff #1 cross-claims against plaintiff #2
(2)	Cross-claims are limited to the same transaction or occurrence of the original claim or a counterclaim, or property which is the subject matter of the original litigation
d)	Both counterclaims and cross-claims may be used to add parties subject to Rules 19 and 20 (If a party can assert a counterclaim or cross-claim, he can add parties to that claim, subject to joinder rules) (13(h))
3.	Interpleader (Rule 22; § 1335)
a)	Interpleader allows a stakeholder to bring in other parties to litigate to determine which has the valid claim; it is designed to prevent the stakeholder from being subject to double liability
(1)	Stakeholder – a person interest is a limited fund (the “stake”); typically, an insurance policy (only pays to the policy limit) or a specific piece of property (e.g., land or a certain painting)
b)	Types of Interpleader
(1)	Rule (22)
(a)	Diversity – Complete diversity – stakeholder and all claimants must be of diverse citizenship
(b)	Venue and Service – Venue at residence of all defendants or location of events/property; Service as under rule 4
(2)	Statutory (§ 1335) 
(a)	Diversity – Minimal Diversity – Two or more claimants must be diverse
(b)	Venue and Service – Venue at residence of one or more claimant; Service is nationwide
c)	Why use Rule Interpleader when Statutory is so much easier?  For one thing, it’s a rule, which makes it a little easier to plead; more importantly, statutory interpleader in many cases requires posting of a bond, while rule interpleader does not
d)	Court will limit an interpleader to just those having an interest in the stake – i.e., it won’t let the interpleader tail wag the litigation dog  
(1)	State Farm v. Tashire, where an insurance policy only affecting one set of claims from a bus crash led to an interpleader by the insurance company; the court limited the interpleader to just those having an interest in the policy
4.	Intervention (Rule 24)
a)	Intervention allows a party to enter a lawsuit of his own accord, e.g., without either the plaintiff or defendant bringing him in
b)	Types of Intervention
(1)	Of Right (24(a))
(a)	A party has the right to join a suit if he meets the following criteria:
(i)	Interest – The party must have an interest related to the subject of the litigation (see infra)
(ii)	Impaired – That interest must be impaired as a practical matter (This rule is interpreted more flexibly than Rule 19; even if res judicata doesn’t apply, impairment based on persuasive authority will be adequate)
(a)	Thus, in NRDC v. US Regulatory Com’n – a dispute over license, intervenor Kerr‑McGee had its interest impaired because a judgment would impair its ability to get a license later on
(iii)	No Adequate Representation – This is a minimal burden – you only have to show you may be inadequately represented, e.g., a minimal conflict of interest exists
(2)	Permissive (24(b))
(a)	The court will let a party intervene if there is a common question of law or fact at issue; permission is purely discretionary, however
(i)	The court is supposed to take into consideration any undue delay or prejudice to the original parties
c)	What Is An Interest?
(1)	Typically an interest is significant if the current litigation will have a strong stare decisis effect 
(2)	It is far easier to establish this is public suits than in private suits
(a)	Public suits 
(i)	The plaintiff has less of a direct interest, so it is permissible to lessen his control over the litigation
(ii)	The court looks favorably toward the “marketplace of ideas” that more parties will bring to such suits
(iii)	However, merely being a public suit is not enough – there must be some kind of interest
(b)	Private suits 
(i)	Since the original parties have a direct interest, the court is usually less willing to say an intervening party has an interest
(ii)	Be Careful!  Sometimes what appears to be public on its face is really private if you think about it
(a)	Ex.: NOPSI v. United Gas – Suit over contract price for gas purchases.  Mayor tries to intervene on behalf of the utility company’s customers.  He cannot because the interest is private (a private contract between two companies) – 
(iii)	Generally, a purely economic interest is not enough – it must be a legally protectable interest 
(a)	For example, in NOPSI above, customers do not have a legally protectable interest in the dispute
5.	Class Actions (Rule 23)
a)	Generally
(1)	Class actions largely undo the rules applied above; it makes a party that was never before the court subject to res judicata and collateral estoppel – it means a member of the class can sue or be sued with binding effects on the whole class 
(a)	Note both plaintiffs and defendants can be certified as a class (though plaintiffs are more common)
(2)	Why a class action?
(a)	Efficiency – it’s a lot easier to take care of issues that affect many people in one suit
(b)	The Collective Action Problem (the “prisoner’s dilemma”) – It’s not always easy to get people to cooperate, even if it’s in their best interests (as in the run on the building and loan in “It’s a Wonderful Life”)
(c)	Broad Remedies – for instance, a desegregation order would be largely pointless if it was confined to the plaintiff (e.g., they have to admit him but no one else)
(d)	Insufficient Value of Damages – Company can screw people for very small amounts, make millions, and get away with it because it would be uneconomical for the customers to sue individually – Class Actions eliminate this problem
(e)	Disparity of Resources – People who wouldn’t have the resources to sue can do so as a class
(3)	How does a class action happen?
(a)	The putative class representative (who must be a member of the class) makes a motion for certification of the class
(b)	He does not need to get the permission of the other class members (although sometimes they are permitted to opt out)
(c)	A class must meet all of the 23(a) requirements and be a suit of any of the types mentioned in 23(b)
(4)	When can class certification be challenged?
(a)	At the time the judge is considering certification
(b)	After certification if the challenge is based on adequate representation
b)	Requirements for Class Certification (23(a))
(1)	Numerosity – class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is impractical
(a)	There is no fixed minimum below which numerosity will fail; in some cases 40 is plenty, while in others 350 is too few.  The court looks at several factors, including:
(i)	Effectiveness of alternatives (e.g., joinder, etc.)
(ii)	The size of each individual claim (smaller is better)
(iii)	Practical likelihood of individual suits being brought
(iv)	Public importance of the right asserted
(v)	Geographical spread of party members
(vi)	Tangibility of parties
(a)	Ex.: a suit on behalf of inmates has many intangible parties since it is impossible to tell who will be incarcerated in the future (Holland)
(2)	Common Question – there must be questions of law or fact common to all the members of the class
(a)	They don’t have to be identical.  Similar types of questions will do, and if the court later finds them to be inadequate it can either decertify or create subclasses  (Holland)
(3)	Typicality – the claim of the class representative must be typical of the class as a whole (note this goes hand-in-hand with adequate representation)
(a)	Typicality is usually met if:
(i)	The representative is part of the class, and 
(ii)	Possesses the same interest and suffers the same injury as the rest of the class
(b)	Example: An employee suing for racial discrimination for being denied a promotion is not typical of a class of people denied a job due to racial discrimination (even though they all allege racial discrimination – the injury isn’t the same)
(c)	Distinguished from “common question” requirement – common question focuses on the class as a whole, while typicality focuses on the class representative
(4)	Adequate Representation – the class members must have their interests fairly and adequately protected
(a)	There can be no conflict of interest
(i)	Hansberry v. Lee – original class of neighborhood homeowners was certified to keep blacks out; Hansberry, a black, buys a house seeking to be let in.  Although otherwise he would be a class member, is interests were not adequately represented (now go read “A Raisin in the Sun” by his daughter )
(ii)	Note, however, that if the restriction was not on blacks but on commercial development, and Hansberry bought his land to build a McDonald’s, there would be no real reason to treat him differently (after all, he should know about the restriction when he buys the land)
(iii)	Why a different result?  The substance of the issue.  The court is more likely to find a conflict over something like race than it is something like commercial development, even though logically they are the same as far as representation goes
(b)	Sometimes the lack of competent legal counsel will be considered enough to find inadequate representation
(c)	Hansen’s Four Key Points to Adequate Representation:
(i)	Class members are enititled to adequate representation as a matter of due process (remember, due process means at a minimum both notice and the right to be heard)
(ii)	If they are adequately represented, absent class members may be bound even if they didn’t participate
(iii)	If there is no adequate representation, a party may challenge the result, but must first attack the adequacy of the representation 
(iv)	When a conflict of interest between class members goes to the core of the litigation, there is no adequate representation (Hansen: don’t over-interpret this!)
c)	Types of Classes Permitted (23(b))
(1)	Anti-Prejudice –if separate actions would create a risk of inconsistent results that would subject the other party to incompatible standards, or would as a practical matter cause prejudice to class members (typically, a limited fund)
(2)	Injunctive or Declarative Relief – if injunctive relief is required, this class permits it (typically used in civil rights cases; also possible on questions related to sale of land, as in Hansberry)
(3)	Damages 
(a)	Requirements:
(i)	Same issues predominate (common questions of law or fact), and
(ii)	The class action is the superior method of adjudication, taking into consideration:
(a)	The interests of the individual members in personally controlling their cases
(b)	The nature and extent of any litigation in progress concerning the same controversy
(c)	The desirability of consolidating all claims in a single action before a single court
(d)	Any probable difficulties in managing a class action
(b)	Controversy and the Damages Class
(i)	Brief History – prior to 1966, each member had to opt into a damages class; then the rule was amended so that a class member is bound unless he opts out.  Led to an explosion of class action lawsuits
(ii)	Distinction between ordinary damage class and mass tort:
(a)	Ordinary Class Action – easy to compute damages (ex.: shareholder suit – just take damage amount and multiply by number of shares held)
(b)	Mass Tort – very difficult to compute damages per plaintiff and to prove causation per plaintiff (everyone is hurt to a different extent, and there could be different intervening factors for each plaintiff)
(iii)	Order for mandamus (order to review tell a court to do something) – sometimes can force a court to decertify, as in In Re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer (blood solids contaminated with AIDS before it was a well-known disease)  Two requirements:
(a)	The lower court’s decision causes irreparable harm
(i)	Posner said the irreparable harm in Rhone-Poulenc was the intense pressure to settle a mass tort class action creates  (criticism: don’t all class actions create that kind of pressure?)
(b)	The lower court vastly exceeded the bounds of judicial discretion
(i)	Posner says the district court judge in Rhone-Poulenc did so because he essentially asks the company to gamble their future on one trial, state law varies too much, and later juries could potentially re-try certain issues
(c)	Also note that this case is awaiting a decision from the Supreme Court
d)	Types of Notice Required
(1)	Anti-Prejudice and Injunctive classes – some notice (exact amount required is discretionary with the court)
(2)	Damages classes – good notice (every member of the class must be contacted so they may opt out if they so wish)
e)	Also note that only the named class representative(s) have to meet the diversity requirement if that is the basis for subject matter jurisdiction; similarly, the amount in question may be aggregated only if the claims of the parties are “joint” or “common” (a rare situation) – otherwise, the claim of each class member must meet the jurisdictional minimum
E.	Steps In Analysis For All Rules That Add Parties
1.	Does the party have permission to join/implead?
2.	Address jurisdictional issues (does the court have the power to hear this claim?)
a)	Example: Rule 18 permissive joinder  if not from the same transaction or occurrence, no supplemental jurisdiction (see supra)
XIV.	 Incentives for Settlement: Attorneys & Clients