OUTLINE PROFILE:

Author:  	Damien Falgoust <dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu>
School:		University of Texas
Course:		Criminal Law
Year:		Fall 1996
Professor:	Prof. Steven Goode
Book:		Dix & Sharlot, 3rd Ed.
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SOURCE OF THIS OUTLINE:

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A MESSAGE FROM THE AUTHOR:

This outline is e-mailware!  While there is no cost for using the outline, you must drop me a line at dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu to tell me what you think, if it helped you, etc; it’d also be nice if you dropped by my web page at http://www.geocities.com/NapaValley/3578/ and signed my guest book.

Feel free to redistribute this outline unmodified to anyone who may find it useful.  This outline is provided “as is” and I make no promises as to its accuracy (it worked for me, your mileage may vary).  Good Luck on exams!

Damien Falgoust
University of Texas School of Law

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CRIMINAL LAW OUTLINE
Prof. Steven Goode – Fall 1996

I.	General Notes on Criminal Law
A.	A crime is made up of an act (actus reus) and a mental state (mens rea)
1.	The actus reus is basically anything that is not mens rea
B.	Four Elements to an offense (only the first two must be present)
1.	The Act (actus reus)
2.	State of Mind (mens rea)
3.	Results – there must be a causal relationship between the results and 1 & 2 above)
4.	Attendant Circumstances (no causal relationship needed)
C.	Steps in Analysis:
1.	Ascertain Elements of an Offense (see above)
2.	Ascertain “Defenses” – those disproving elements of a crime
3.	Ascertain True Defenses – Those that eliminate/excuse liability even if all the elements of the crime are present
D.	Types of Argument:
1.	Policy
2.	Analogy
3.	Textual (statutory language)
4.	Consequences
5.	Historical
E.	All criminal behavior is made so by statute
F.	Theories of Punishment:
1.	Deterrance
a)	general – discourages others from committing an offense
b)	specific – criminal is incapacitated from further criminal activity; also, he may be deterred from repeat behavior on release.
2.	Retribution / Punishment
3.	Rehabilitation
4.	 Condemnation (of a given behavior)
G.	Lesser Included Offenses
1.	If a crime includes all of the elements of another offense, the other offense is a lesser included offense.  An actor cannot be convicted of both, but charging him with the greater implicitly charges him with the lesser.
a)	Ex.:  Robbery is larceny with force or threat of force; thus, larceny is a lesser included offense of robbery.  An actor charged with robbery can be convicted of either, but not both.
2.	If crimes have some of the same elements but each has unique elements as well, then an actor must be charged separately, but can be convicted of both.
H.	Rule of Lenity – if a statute is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the defendant.
II.	The Act Requirement (Actus Reus) – In General
A.	The Act must be voluntary
1.	If an act is done while unconscious or through automatism, it is not a voluntary act.
a)	State v. Mercer – Mercer shot his wife while “unconscious” & was thus not guilty because there was no voluntary act
2.	Similarly, there is no criminal liability for the following because they do not meet the voluntary requirement:
a)	reflexive/convulsive acts
b)	acts that the actor did not consciously determine 
(1)	ex. A shoves B into C; no liability to B
3.	A “crime” based on status is generally not voluntary, and thus not criminal
a)	Robinson v. California – Court overturns law making narcotic addiction (not usage) criminal behavior.
B.	Omissions of an Act
1.	A failure to act is generally not criminal
2.	The exception is a where the actor (with the requisite mens rea) breaches a known duty that exists due to:
a)	Contract
(1)	Commonwealth v. Pestinikas – Actors let old man wither and die after agreeing to care for him.  They are found liable.
b)	Statute (e.g., failure to file taxes)
c)	Common Law
d)	A relationship that creates a duty (i.e., parent-child)
e)	Assumption of Care – If you start helping someone, you create a duty to finish
f)	Creation of Peril – If you put someone in danger, you have a duty to help them.
3.	The key question is: Is there a duty owed by the actor?
a)	If an actor is unaware a duty has arisen, he is not liable
b)	Also, it must be possible for the actor to perform the duty.
III.	The Act – Specific Offenses
A.	Property Crimes
1.	Larceny (a trespassory taking & carrying away of another’s personal property with the intent to steal)
a)	Elements:
(1)	A taking
(2)	by trespass
(3)	and carrying away
(4)	of the tangible personal property of another
(5)	with the intent to steal
b)	What constitutes a “trespassory taking?”
(1)	The consent of the owner is the key factor
(a)	Treating merchandise in a manner inconsistent with how an ordinary customer would creates a trespass.
(i)	Hiding merchandise in clothes or a briefcase, or wearing unpurchased clothes despite not having yet left the store is trespassory (People v. Olivo, People v. Gasparik, People v. Spatzier)
(ii)	i.e, would the owner consent to the above activities?
(b)	The owner retains constructive possession – that is, custody does not equal possession.
(c)	“Larceny by Trick” – If the actor gets consent for his possession by a misrepresentation, the consent is not valid.
(i)	This is not embezzlement – there is no trust relationship involved.
(ii)	This is not false pretenses – since possession, not title, is involved.
c)	The “carrying away” can be very slight.
2.	Embezzlement – wrongful (fraudulent) conversion of property of another placed in the actor’s care to a use not intended by the owner.
a)	The key difference between embezzlement & larceny is that for embezzlement to occur, there must be a trust relationship involved.  (Embezzlement vs. “Larceny by Trick”)
(1)	That is, for larceny, the actor can have mere custody, but not possession.  For embezzlement, the actor has actual possession.  (Recall custody v. possession under “trespassory taking,” supra.)
(2)	In “Larceny by Trick” there is fraud to induce consent to possess.  For embezzlement, the consent for possession is valid, but the consent for the conversion is invalid.
(3)	Historical note – Embezzlement was created by statute to close a loophole in common-law larceny.
b)	There is no “taking” since the actor is already in possession of the property.  The offense occurs when the actor converts the property.
(1)	i.e., did the actor have the right to possess the property when the conversion occurred?
3.	False Pretenses – the obtaining of title to another’s property with the intent to deprive the owner through false statements of material fact which induces the owner to pass title.
a)	False Statements of Material Fact
(1)	The statements must be false – if the actor believes he is lying, but turns out to be telling the truth, then there is no liabililty.
(2)	The actor must know the statements are false, and must intent to defraud.
(3)	The victim must rely on the statements
(4)	“Puffing” by salesmen does not count as a false statement for purposes of this offense.  Also, promises or predictions are not sufficient for this offense.
b)	False Pretenses Distinguished from “Larceny by Trick”
(1)	The key is title
(2)	If deception is used to get possession of an item, then it is larceny by trick.  If the deception is used to get title, then it is false pretenses.
c)	Other distinctions:  It is not ordinary larceny because there is no trespassory taking; it is not embezzlement because there is no trust relationship involved.
4.	THEFT – Texas Penal Code Consolidation of Offenses § 31.02, § 31.03
a)	Each of the above offenses (Larceny, Embezzlement, and False Pretenses) as well as shoplifting, theft by false pretext, swindling, extortion (see infra.), and several others, have been consolidated into one offense, theft.   § 31.02.
b)	Theft = an unlawful appropriation of property with intent to deprive owner.  § 31.03 (a)
(1)	appropriation is unlawful if it is “without the owner’s effective consent” § 31.03 (b) (1)     (2 & 3 list other instances)
(2)	“effective consent” – consent is not effective if:  (§ 31.01 (3))
(a)	induced by deception or coercion
(b)	given by a person known to not be legally authorized by the owner
(c)	given by someone known to be unable to make reasonable decisions (youth, mental defect, intoxication)
(3)	“deprive” means:   (§ 31.01 (2))
(a)	to withhold property from the owner permanently or for so extended a time that most of the value/enjoyment is lost to the owner.
(b)	to restore property only on payment of reward or other compensation (i.e., extortion)
(c)	to dispose of property in such a way that makes recovery of the property unlikely.
(4)	Other definitions:  “Appropriate” includes both title and possession (eliminating the distinction between “larceny by trick” and false pretenses); “Property” includes real, personal, and intangible property (eliminating the personal property requirement for larceny)
5.	Robbery – larceny with the use or threat of force.
a)	Larceny is a “lesser included offense” of robbery; see notes on lesser included offenses, supra.
b)	The key to robbery is: When is the taking complete?
(1)	If the actor uses the force after the taking is complete, then there is no robbery 
(a)	i.e., was the force used for the taking or for the escape?
(2)	Courts have held that exercising “dominion and control” over the property establishes a complete taking.
(a)	Thus, an actor who had stuffed money into his pockets but was discovered and had to push his way past the owner to escape was guilty of robbery because the owner, although she did not witness the taking, prevented the actor from exercising ‘dominion and control’ by blocking the exit.  State v. Long
(b)	Similarly, boys who stole a bottle of liquor, fled the store, and later hit the owner in an attempt to return the bottle were not guilty of robbery since the taking was complete when they successfully fled the store.  State v. Arlt
c)	How much force is required?  
(1)	For example, purse snatching is an interesting problem: obviously, there must be some force to remove the purse from the victim.  Purse snatching has been held to be robbery only if there is “wresting” involved
d)	How to measure if the victim was threatened?
(1)	Courts apply an objective test (would an ordinary person be threatened?) rather than a subjective one (i.e., how did the victim feel?), eliminating the very timid, etc.
e)	Note that robbery is typically a far more serious offense than even larceny and assault combined.
f)	Robbery & the Texas Penal Code   § 29.02
(1)	Offense defined
(a)	Person commits an offense if, in the course of commiting a theft, and with the intent to obtain/retain control of property, he:    (§ 29.02) (see supra. for definition of theft)
(i)	intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(ii)	intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. (note different intent standard – no ‘reckless’)
(b)	“in the course of committing a theft” means:    (§ 29.01)
(i)	in an attempt to commit theft
(ii)	during commission of theft
(iii)	in immediate flight from theft
(2)	Robbery is a 2nd degree felony (1st if it is aggravated).  Compare to theft, which is a 2nd degree felony only if the value of the stolen property is > $100,000, and a 1st degree felony only if > $200,000.  Assault is a class A misdemeanor, 2nd degree felony if aggravated.
6.	Extortion – property taken by a intimidation other than a threat of physical harm.
a)	When does an ordinary threat become extortion?
(1)	For example, a threat to report a business to the BBB clearly should not be criminal; Similarly, attorneys make acceptable threats in the ordinary course of their business every day.
(2)	Most statutes have some kind of malicious intent requirement
(3)	More importantly, though, is the reason exortion statutes exist: if the threat is to report a crime, a private settlement takes away the state’s right to set judgment for the crime.
(4)	The bottom line is the distinction is very hazy; a prosecutor has lots of discretion.
b)	Extortion and the Texas Penal Code   § 31.02, § 31.03
(1)	Extortion is consolidated with theft, supra.
(2)	The definition of “deprive” includes to restore property only on payment of reward or other compensation.  § 31.01 (2) (b)
(3)	Also, an owner’s consent is not effective if it is induced through coercion.  § 31.01 (3) (a)
B.	Crimes Against the Habitation
1.	Burglary – a breaking & entering of a residence of another at night with the intent to commit a felony or theft.
a)	Elements:
(1)	A breaking (no longer an element in most modern statutes, or the breaking can be extremely minimal – like pushing a door open)
(2)	and entering (this can be any part of the actor’s body, or an instrument under the actor’s control – a stick, a bullet, etc.)
(3)	of a residence (this has been expanded to include almost any structure…it need not even be enclosed – an open pickup bed will count for purposes of this crime.
(4)	of another
(5)	at night (no longer an element in most modern statutes)
(6)	with the intent to commit a felony or theft
b)	When can an entry constitute burglary (when is it “of another?”)
(1)	The entry must invade some possessory right
(a)	Thus, an actor cannot be guilty if he enters his own home with the intent to commit a felony (i.e., to steal from his roommates; People v. Gauze)
(b)	However, if the actor has given up a possessory right, he can be guilty (i.e., an estranged husband returns to the house which is still in his name)
(c)	If an actor has access to a building, but not certain rooms, he can be guilty of burglarizing the restricted rooms.
(d)	Some states have gone so far as to say that the right to be in a store is conditioned on an actor’s conduct; that is, if the store knew the actor’s intent, he would be forced to leave (relieving him of his possessory right), and therefore he has no possessory right and may be convicted of burglary.
(e)	Consent of the owner to the entry nullifies burglary, unless the consent was had by fraud or threats.
c)	When must the actor harbor the intent to commit a felony?
(1)	At the time of entry.  If an actor decides to commit a felony after entry, there is no burglary.
d)	Burglary and the Texas Penal Code  § 30.02
(1)	Person commits offense if without effective consent of owner, he:   § 31.02 (a)
(a)	enters a habitation or building (or portion of building) with intent to commit a felony or theft, or
(b)	remains concealed in a building with intent to commit a felony or theft, or
(c)	enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft (note how this eliminates the timing of intent issue)
(2)	“effective consent” – consent is not effective if:  (§1.07 (19))
(a)	induced by force, threat, or fraud
(b)	given by a person known to not be legally authorized by the owner to give consent.
(c)	given by someone unable to make reasonable decisions (youth, mental defect, intoxication)
(3)	“owner” is the person with title, possession (lawful or not), or a greater right of possession than the actor.  § 1.07 (35) (a)
C.	Crimes Against the Person
1.	Assault & Battery
a)	Assault – the attempt to commit battery, or the intent to create apprehension in the victim of imminent bodily harm.
(1)	Was there a reasonable apprehension in the victim?
b)	Battery – an application of force resulting in bodily injury or an offensive touching
c)	Assault and the Texas Penal Code   § 22.01
(1)	Offense is committed if the actor:
(a)	Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, or
(b)	Intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, or
(c)	Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.
(2)	Note the consolidation of assault and battery into one offense (a and c are battery; b is assault)
(3)	Note the difference in state of mind requirement: an assault cannot be done recklessly, but a battery can.
(4)	An assault is aggravated if:   § 22.02
(a)	it results in serious bodily injury (causes death, a substantial risk of death, permanent disfigurement, or loss of a bodily member or organ)
(b)	the actor uses or exhibits a deadly weapon (anything designed for or that in its use could result in death or serious bodily injury)
2.	Sexual Assault – definition depends on statute
a)	Some states define as intercourse through ‘forcible compulsion’ or the threat of such compulsion which would prevent resistance
(1)	Here the court struggles with ‘forcible compulsion’ vs. ‘mere lack of consent’
(2)	Does the lack of consent make any force ‘forcible compulsion?’  Or does there need to be bodily harm or resistance?
(3)	Some courts have held the force must be “inconsistent with consensual intercourse.”  Commonwealth v. Berkowitz 
b)	Other states require penetration through physical force or coercion, typically going on to define physical force as anything without the “affirmative or freely-given permission” of the victim (i.e., the victim’s consent).
(1)	Note this still puts some attention on the victim’s conduct: how can you show freely-given permission without doing so?
c)	More important that these is the balancing test that all sexual assault statutes involve:
(1)	The Right to Bodily Integrity (right to not be subject to sex without consent; vs.
(2)	Mental Culpability Requirement for Criminal Act.
(3)	In other words, how can we protect a woman’s right to bodily integrity without prosecuting actors who lack the requisite criminal mental state (knowledge of consent, etc.)?
d)	Sexual Assault and the Texas Penal Code   § 22.011
(1)	actor must intentionally or knowingly cause penetration without the victim’s consent. § 22.011 (a)  (there are other situations as well, including oral sex and acts with a child)
(2)	§ 22.011 (b) lists when consent is not present.  A partial listing:
(a)	victim is compelled by physical force or violence
(b)	victim is compelled by threats of such force, and the victim believes the actor is capable of carrying out those threats (threats can also be against a 3rd person)
(c)	the victim is unconscious and has not previously consented (also if no consent and victim is unaware of the assault)
(d)	actor impairs victim’s ability to appraise the situation by the administering of controlled substances
IV.	The State of Mind Requirement (Mens Rea)
A.	The Basic Distinction is between General and Specific Intent.
1.	General Intent is typically intent needed to complete the physical acts or circumstances of a crime.
a)	Thus, a crime which makes it an offense to 1) assault (an act) a 2) federal officer (a circumstance) 3) who is performing his duties (a circumstance), is a general intent crime.
2.	Specific Intent is typically intent that is a purely mental state under the statute and is not related to a physical act.
a)	Thus, if the “statute” above adds 4) with the purpose of impeding the officer from performing his duties, the crime becomes a specific intent crime, because there is now a pure state of mind to prove.
3.	Why is the distinction important?  Two reasons:
a)	Need for Proof – the doing of an act is not enough proof for a specific intent crime, since the prosecution must also prove a mental state.
b)	Applicability of Defenses – some “defenses” only apply to specific intent, such as voluntary intoxication.
4.	Some courts have said that “knowledge” is the same as general intent and “purpose” the same as specific intent, but this is not alway true.
5.	Sometimes courts will imply a purely mental state, as in Lambert v. California, where the courts held an ordinance requiring felons in Los Angeles for more than five days to register also implied the actor must be conscious of the regulation – a purely mental state.  This made the violation of the ordinance a specific intent crime.
a)	Such an implication is generally limited to “failure to register” crimes
6.	Common specific intent crimes:
a)	Solicitation (intent to have someone commit a crime)
b)	Attempt (intent to complete a crime)
c)	Conspiracy (intent to have a crime completed)
d)	1st degree murder (in most states – premeditation)
e)	Assault (intent to commit a battery or to frighten victim)
f)	Larceny/Robbery (intent to deprive owner)
g)	Forgery (intent to defraud)
h)	False Pretenses (intent to defraud)
i)	Embezzlement (intent to defraud)
B.	Most jurisdictions have eliminated the general/specific doctrine with a hierarchy of mental states:
1.	Purpose
2.	Knowledge
3.	Recklessness
4.	Negligence
C.	The Texas Penal Code Definitions of Culpable Mental States § 6.03
1.	Definitions:
a)	Intentional – With respect to conduct or result of conduct, the actor’s conscious objective or desire is to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(1)	The Bomb Hypo – the actor has ‘intentional’ intent with regard to the target’s death
b)	Knowingly – With respect to the conduct or circumstances, the actor is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist.  With respect to result, the person is aware his conduct could reasonably cause the result.
(1)	The Bomb Hypo – the actor has ‘knowing’ intent with regard to the people sitting at the target’s table.
c)	Recklessly – With respect to circumstances of conduct or result of conduct, person consciously disregards a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or result will occur.’  The risk must be such that there is a gross deviation from an ordinary person’s standard of care from the actor’s viewpoint.
(1)	The Bomb Hypo – the actor has ‘reckless’ intent with regard to people at a nearby table that the actor didn’t believe the bomb would be powerful enough to reach.
d)	Negligently – With respect to circumstances of conduct or result of conduct, person should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or the result will occur.  Risk must be such that there is a gross deviation from an ordinary person’s standard of care from the actor’s viewpoint.
(1)	The Bomb Hypo – the actor has ‘negligent’ intent with regard to pedestrians the actor didn’t think the bomb could reach.
2.	Note that the common thread among each of the four culpable mental states is result.  If the penal code makes an offense available under all four, then intent must attach to the result.
3.	If an offense does not state which mental states apply, then all but negligence apply.
D.	Specific Intent to Violate a Statute
1.	Normally, ignorance of the law is not an excuse; thus typically the actor need not have intended to do something criminal (only to intend what the statute requires, e.g., for larceny the intent to steal)
2.	However, the legislature can make an offense require knowledge of its criminal nature for liability
a)	Notably, tax offenses require such knowledge.  Some bank regulations require someone who is violating them to know not only they are breaking the regulations but also that such a breaking is criminal (Ratzlaf v. U.S.)
b)	Sometimes courts will interpret the word “willfully” as requiring knowledge of an action’s criminality (as in, “willfully violating this statute results in criminal penalties”)
E.	Borrowing and Specific Intent to Steal
1.	A borrowing is not criminal:
a)	as common-law larceny, because there is no intent to steal
b)	under Texas Penal Code theft, because there is no intent to deprive
2.	However, a “borrowing” where the actor shows indifference to how the owner gets the property back (i.e., no attempt to return) can be evidence of criminal intent
a)	note, however, that it does not automatically prove such intent
b)	if the actor took steps that the actor thought was sufficient to return the property, then there is not criminal intent.
3.	A taking by mistake where the actor later decides to keep the property is NOT common-law larceny since there was no intent at the time of the taking
4.	A taking against the will of the owner (the owner objects) where the actor intends to borrow, and later decides to keep the property IS common-law larceny.  The courts will ‘constructively’ extend the time period of the taking.
5.	Note that “borrowing” does not prevent embezzlement from being criminal since the intent is intent to defraud, not intent to steal or deprive.
F.	Strict Liability Crimes
1.	These are crimes which dispense with the intent requirement for some or all elements of a crime altogether.
a)	Note, however that none are true “strict liability” since they require the actor to know something.
2.	Courts have found these crimes to be enforceable if:
a)	There is a serious public safety issue, and the actor should know that regulation is likely.  (Public Welfare is a greater good)
(1)	Thus, statutes designed to prevent drug trafficking only require actors to know they are transporting drugs, not that the drugs are illegal
(2)	Similarly, statutes requiring labeling of acids only require the actor to know he has acids of some type in his possession, not of the labeling requirement.
(3)	Similarly, statutes requiring the registration of hand grenades do not require the actor to know of the registration requirement, only that he has something that is likely to be regulated.
(4)	Contrast with statute requiring registration of a machine gun; Courts hold that the actor must know that the firearm is fully automatic, not simply that he has a gun.  Staples v. U.S. 
(a)	Why?  Because unlike the above examples, gun ownership can be entirely innocent; if he did not know the gun was automatic, he had no reason to suspect he was subject to heightened registration requirements.
(i)	(This is kind of a specious argument, since gun owners ought to know certain types of gun should be regulated)
b)	Or, the penalties are very light.
(1)	Most traffic offenses are strict liability
(2)	Another reason Staples isn’t considered strict liability is the severe penalty attached: 10 years in prison.
G.	“Defenses” to Intent
1.	Note that none of these are true defenses since they do not excuse the act; they simply refute the intent requirement.
a)	The difference is in proof:
(1)	 A “defense” requires the prosecution to disprove the “defense” by a reasonable doubt; the defense need only raise the “defense” to force the prosecution to respond to it.
(a)	That is, disproving the “defense” becomes a part of the prosecution’s burden of proof when the defense raises it.
(2)	A true defense requires the defense to prove the true defense by a preponderance of evidence.
2.	Mistake of Fact
a)	Mistake of Fact is a “defense” to prosecution if it negates the culpability requirement of the crime.
(1)	Often this depends on statutory interpretation.  Take for instance a statute that makes it a crime to assault an elderly person.  If actor assaults an elderly person but mistakenly believes the person to be younger than the statutory “elderly” age, can he use a Mistake of Law “defense?”
(a)	If the state of mind attaches only to the act and not to the victim’s age, then no.
(b)	If the state of mind attaches to the victim’s age, then yes.
b)	The reasonableness of the mistake is only at issue if the state of mind requirement is negligence.
(1)	Recklessness is a ‘conscious disregard of a substantial risk’ that a reasonable person would avoid.  If the actor acts on a mistake of fact, he cannot be reckless because he did not ‘consciously disregard’ such a risk – he couldn’t, since he wasn’t aware he was taking the risk.
(2)	Ex.: If a “murder of a peace officer” requires the actor to know the victim is a peace officer, and he kills the victim with an unreasonable mistake of fact that the victim was not a peace officer, can he raise a valid mistake of law defense?
(a)	Yes; the state of mind requirement (knowing) is greater than negligence; the reasonableness of his mistake is not an issue
3.	Mistake of Law
a)	Generally, except as follows, ignorance of the law does not excuse criminal conduct.
(1)	i.e., it is not a defense to not know of the existence of a law.
b)	Mistake of Law as a “defense”
(1)	A mistake of law is a “defense” only if the mistake negates an element of the crime.  (i.e., it negates the specific intent requirement)
(a)	Courts have interpreted “willfulness” to mean knowledge and intentional violation of a legal duty.  Cheek v. U.S.
(b)	Thus, where an actor does not believe he has a duty, he cannot have the required willfulness (unless the prosecutor can prove the actor knew of the duty).
(c)	Note that it does not matter how silly the belief is (Cheek, for instance, thought wages were not income for tax purposes).  As with mistake of fact, the only time reasonableness comes into play is if the culpable mental state is negligence.
(2)	Note that the use of force normally negates using mistake of law as a defense.  The exception is someone seeking recovery of the exact property lost. 
c)	Mistake of Law as a true defense
(1)	A mistake of law operates as a true defense if it excuses the actor’s otherwise culpable conduct (i.e., it does not negate an element of the crime)
(a)	Typically, this can be raised when the actor relies on some authority as to what the law is.
(i)	Ex.: Ostrosky – Fisherman relies on judge’s opinion that fishing law is unconstitutional; his later conviction is overturned based on mistake of law.
(ii)	Note that Ostrosky’s defense did not negate an element of the crime – the fishing law had no specific intent requirement.  Rather, his mistaken reliance excused his conduct.
(b)	Model Penal Code permits this defense in cases where a statute has not been published, or where the actor relies on an erroneous statement in a statute’s text , judicial opinion , or official’s statement.
(c)	The reliance must have been on some authority; almost all courts won’t allow advice of counsel to establish a defense of mistake of law (some will if the actor was doing so to make a bona fide effort to learn the law)
4.	Voluntary Intoxication
a)	Generally speaking, voluntary intoxication is not a “defense” even though it could certainly disprove a culpable mental state.
(1)	The rationale is that an actor should be aware of the risk involved in getting drunk
(2)	Most states will allow intoxication to refute intentionally or  knowingly, but not recklessness.
(a)	Thus, if recklessness is an element, then intoxication does not negate recklessness unless the actor would have been unaware of the risk sober
b)	The intoxication debate rages:
(1)	Scalia: Intoxication has not historically been a defense; evidentiary rules bar other types of evidence.
(2)	O’Conner: Intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct (not a true defense) but rather negates state of mind (“defense); other evidentiary rules have purposes other than making prosecution easier
(3)	Ginsburg: States have the right to determine the elements of crimes; disallowing intoxication acts as a modification of the mental state requirement for the crime.
(4)	There is no answer – the debate continues…
5.	“Defenses” and the Texas Penal Code 
a)	§ 2.03 & § 2.04
(1)	§ 2.03 deals with “defenses” 
(a)	Note that Texas makes self-defense a “defense” rather than a true defense (as is the norm).
(b)	Other Texas “defenses:” Mistake of Fact, Entrapment
(2)	§ 2.04 deals with affirmative (true) defenses
(a)	Texas true defenses: Insanity, Mistake of Law, Duress
b)	Mistake of Fact – § 8.02 (a)
(1)	“it is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense”
(2)	In Texas, never ask for a jury instruction on mistake of fact, since the charge will include “reasonableness;” rather, argue it in closing.
c)	Mistake of Law – § 8.03 
(1)	Ignorance of the law is not an excuse
(2)	It is a true defense if an actor relies on:
(a)	a written statement of the law in an order or grant from an administrative agency, or
(b)	a written interpretation of the law in a court opinion or from an official responsible for interpreting the law
d)	Intoxication – § 8.04
(1)	Intoxication is never a “defense;” it may be used to mitigate the penalty
V.	Complicity
A.	Model Penal Code (Texas follows)
1.	Person is legally accountable for another if, with the requisite state of mind, he causes an innocent person to commit a crime, or is an accomplice (state of mind does not attach to accomplice)
2.	Accomplice
a)	Solicits a crime
b)	One who (with intent to promote or assist) aids, attempts to aid, or agrees to aid in the commission of a crime
c)	One who has a legal duty to prevent an offense and does not do so
3.	Note the Model Penal Code has an ‘intentional’ requirement – thus the accomplice must want the crime to succeed (see next)
B.	U.S. v. Ortega – requirement that, to be an accomplice, one must
1.	know what the criminal is trying to do;
2.	render assistance to the criminal; and
3.	believe that the assistance would make criminal’s success likely
a)	note that belief is not the same as wanting the crime to succceed
C.	Posner’s view: we should only hold accomplices liable if doing so would make the offense more difficult to commit.
D.	General notes on complicity:
1.	Note that even if an actor attempts to aid in the offense, he is liable for the whole offense, while if a primary actor attempts an offense his generally has less liability than if he succeeds
2.	When to hold the accomplice responsible for additional crimes?
a)	Most courts use the “natural & probable” doctrine – liability for those crimes which are natural and probable results of the original crime.
b)	State v. Marr – accomplice to burglary held liable for subsequent murder and arson.
E.	Complicity and the Texas Penal Code  § 7.02
1.	Definition of accomplice is the same as MPC, above
2.	For additional felonies, all accomplices are liable if it “should have been anticipated.”
VI.	Homicide
A.	General Principles
1.	Murder vs. Manslaughter
a)	The basic distinction is murder requires malice aforethought, while manslaughter has no such requirement.
b)	Modern Penal Codes make the following distinctions:
(1)	Murder: intentionally or knowingly causing death (some add recklessly with extreme indifference to human life)
(2)	Manslaughter: recklessly causing death
(3)	Negligent Homicide: negligently causing death
2.	Fetus rules: not murder until fetus is born, though many criminalize if the death is without the mother’s consent.
B.	Malice Aforethought
1.	Defined – the intent to kill (actual or implied) under circumstances that do not excuse, justify, or mitigate to manslaughter
a)	Intent to kill is implied if actor intends to inflict great bodily harm or if the “natural tendency” of his behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm
2.	Malice applies to four types of homicides:
a)	Intent to kill  (Note that there is no need for premeditation, just an intent to kill)
b)	Intent to cause great bodily injury
c)	Depraved heart murder (depraved mind, depraved indifference, abandoned & malignant heart)
d)	Felony murder (malice imputed)
3.	Malice is essentially a state of mind requirement
a)	It attaches to the result, not the act causing the result
(1)	In ‘intentional’ or ‘knowing’ killings, this isn’t a problem
(2)	Depraved heart murder requires a ‘reckless’ state of mind (the same as manslaughter)
(a)	The difference is the gravity of the risk created.  For depraved heart murder, there must be a ‘grave risk of death,’ contrasted with ‘substantial risk’ for manslaughter.’
(b)	Thus, for depraved heart murder, the actor must be reckless as to the result (death), and have created a grave risk of death (he need not be aware of the increase in risk from substantial to grave) 
(c)	Sometimes it is said for b, c & d above that the malice is ‘implied.’
(3)	Texas handles slightly differently; see below
C.	Premeditated Killings
1.	Many states distinguish 1st degree and 2nd degree murder by premeditation (deliberation on the idea of killing)
2.	Time requirements for premeditation
a)	There need not be a long time to deliberate
b)	However, mere presence of time to deliberate is not evidence of deliberation
(1)	State v. Bingham – Actor strangles woman while raping her in a secluded field.  The approximately 5 minutes it took to strangle is not deliberation because it merely shows an opportunity to deliberate, not deliberation itself
(a)	A pause between beating and strangulation would show deliberation
(b)	The planned presence of a weapon would show deliberation
(c)	Conduct or circumstances suggesting deliberation or a plan would also suffice
(d)	Note the court’s opinion in Bingham is not without argument: it could be argued that the transporting of the victim to the field evidenced a plan
D.	Voluntary Manslaughter
1.	Murder can be mitigated to manslaughter if there is an adequate provocation
2.	Test for provocation
a)	Provocation resulting in sudden and intense passion (not the result of a mental defect) that would cause an ordinary person to lose self-control; 
b)	Causal connection between passion and killing
c)	No cooling off period between provocation and act
3.	What characteristics of the actor do we assign to the “ordinary person?”
a)	Assign too many and it becomes impossible to convict the actor.
b)	Assign too few and the rules become too harsh.
c)	State v. Raguseo – Actor obsessed with his parking space goes nuts, stabs victim who parked there.
(1)	Majority uses purely objective point of view in evaluating the reasonableness of the actor’s conduct
(2)	Dissent says we should determine if the actor’s conduct is reasonable for a person with the actor’s emotional state
d)	The standard here is deliberately vague, and thus open for discussion
(1)	Some commentators suggest using the actor’s handicaps and attributes, but not his personal moral values.
E.	Involuntary Manslaughter (Reckless & Negligent Killings)
1.	General Requirements: Unintentional killings in the course of…
a)	Lawful acts in an unlawful manner (less than depraved indifference, but more than tort negligence)
b)	Unlawful acts
F.	Felony Murder
1.	Generally, an actor is liable for killings occurring during the course of a felony; the intent for murder is implied from the felony.
a)	This is often unjust – Ford v. State – Ex-con possesses a handgun (a felony); while cleaning it, it discharges, killing victim in apartment below.  Ford is guilty of murder via the felony murder doctrine.
2.	Many require the felony to be “inherently dangerous”
a)	Some states view the felony in the abstract to determine dangerousness
b)	Most look at the particular facts of the case
c)	Note that a “inherently dangerous” does not mean a greater than 50% chance of death – otherwise it would be depraved heart murder
3.	Some require ‘foreseeableness’ for felony murder to apply (though they often stretch this quite a bit)
a)	Generally, the felony and the killing must be part of the same “chain of events”
4.	Felony Murder and the Merger Doctrine
a)	If the felony is an “integral part” of the resulting homicide, it merges with the homicide, so the prosecution must prove the mens rea element of the homicide.
b)	Generally, it only applies to assaults; it prevents defeating the mens rea requirments for murder by pursuing assault plus felony murder.
5.	Felony Murder and Third Parties
a)	Should felony murder apply to co-felons or bystanders killed by the victim of the felony?  (Or bystanders killing other bystanders, etc., etc.?)
(1)	Some courts say any death resulting from the felony invokes felony murder, regardless of who caused it
(2)	Others limit it to only those caused by the actor
(a)	Agency theory – Felony murder only applies to killings by the actor or his co-felons (who are agents of the actor)
G.	Murder and the Texas Penal Code 
1.	§ 19.01 – Criminal Homicide – causing death with any mental state
2.	Murder §19.02 
a)	Intentionally or knowingly causing death
b)	Intends to cause serious bodily injury or commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that results in death
c)	Felony murder (see below) (also, note those that elevate to capital murder)
3.	Capital Murder § 19.03 (Murder as above, plus…)
a)	Murder of a police officer or fireman
b)	In the commission of kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, or obstruction/retaliation (More Felony Murder, see below)
c)	Murder for hire
d)	Prison murders
e)	Multiple victims in one “criminal transaction”
f)	Murder of someone under age 6
4.	Manslaughter § 19.04
a)	Recklessly causing death
5.	Negligent Homicide § 19.05
a)	Negligently causing death
6.	Voluntary Manslaughter (sort of)
a)	Texas has no voluntary manslaughter.  However, the murder provision (§ 19.02) allows an actor to raise “adequate cause” (e.g., sudden passion, etc.) at the sentencing phase to reduce the sentence to a 2nd degree felony.
7.	Intoxication Manslaughter § 49.08
a)	Basically, drunk driving.  No mental state required.
8.	Felony Murder §19.02 (b)(3) 
a)	Killing during commission or attempted commission of a felony, or during immediate flight
b)	Killing must stem from an act “clearly dangerous to human life”
VII.	True Defenses
A.	Self-Defense
1.	Generally, a person must be in danger of imminent harm to present a valid self-defense claim.
a)	What is imminent?  Most courts say immediate harm.  This presents problems in cases of (for instance) battered wife syndrome.  Norman 
b)	Mere verbal threats are not sufficient in themselves to create the harm.
2.	If a person is the initial aggressor, he cannot pursue a self-defense claim unless he first attempts to withdraw.
a)	Some states permit “imperfect” self-defense to those who do not withdraw or to initial aggressors (they just mitigate the offense)
b)	Some states will permit an actor to pre-arm himself so long as this does not create a confrontation (not Texas!)
3.	The “retreat rule”
a)	Some states require an actor to retreat if possible for a valid self-defense claim.
b)	The “castle rule” – some states do not require retreat if the actor is in his home.
(1)	Exception: retreat is still required if the attacker is a co-dweller in some jurisdictions
(2)	Guests are included in the “castle doctrine” even if attacked by their host.
4.	Self-Defense and the Texas Penal Code 
a)	§ 9.02 – a (so-called) “defense” exists if conduct is “justified”
b)	§ 9.31 – Self-Defense
(1)	must “reasonably believe” that force is immediately necessary to protect himself.
(2)	No Self-Defense if:
(a)	Verbal threats alone make up the threat
(b)	Actor is the initial aggressor (unless he attempts withdrawal)
(3)	For unlawful arrests: police must use greater force than necessary before the actor resists
c)	§ 9.32 – Deadly Force
(1)	Only permitted if:
(a)	§ 9.31 requirements are met, and
(b)	it is unreasonable to retreat (unless in your home), and
(c)	immediately necessary to protect actor from death or prevent the commission of [various serious assaultive felonies]
B.	Defense of Others
1.	Only permitted if the 3rd party would have a valid self-defense claim. (Based on actor’s perceptions)