OUTLINE PROFILE:

Author:  	Damien Falgoust <dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu>
School:		University of Texas
Course:		Torts
Year:		Fall 1996-Spring 1997
Professor:	Prof. David Robertson
Book:		Robertson, Powers, Anderson
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SOURCE OF THIS OUTLINE:

ILRG Law School Course Outlines Archive 	<http://outlines.ilrg.com/>
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A MESSAGE FROM THE AUTHOR:

This outline is e-mailware!  While there is no cost for using the outline, you must drop me a line at dfalgoust@mail.utexas.edu to tell me what you think, if it helped you, etc; it’d also be nice if you dropped by my web page at http://www.geocities.com/NapaValley/3578/ and signed my guest book.

Feel free to redistribute this outline unmodified to anyone who may find it useful.  This outline is provided “as is” and I make no promises as to its accuracy (it worked for me, your mileage may vary).  Good Luck on exams!

Damien Falgoust
University of Texas School of Law

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TORTS OUTLINE
Prof. David Robertson – Fall 1996/Spring 1997

I.	General Principles for Torts
A.	Three Divisions of Tort Law
1.	Intentional Torts
2.	Negligence
3.	Strict Liability (influenced by negligence)
B.	Steps in Trial – (most errors at 3, 3a, 4b, 6 and 8)
1.	Complaint Filed
a)	D. Moves to Dismiss
b)	D. Moves for Summary Judgment
c)	D. Answers
d)	Discovery 
e)	Jury Selection
2.	Opening Statements
3.	P.’s case-in-chief [evidence]
a)	D. Moves for Directed Verdict #1
4.	D.’s case-in-chief [evidence]
a)	P.’s rebuttal
b)	P./D. move for Directed Verdict #2
5.	Closing Arguments
6.	Jury Instructions
7.	Verdict
8.	Move for JNOV
C.	Elements of Tort Analysis
1.	Authority
a)	“logical fit”
2.	Economic Efficiency
a)	cost avoidance
b)	deterrance (damages deter future disputes)
3.	Fairness
4.	Administrative Ease
a)	court efficiency
b)	court credibility
c)	court comfort
II.	Negligence
A.	Generally
1.	Prima Facie Case for Negligence
a)	Defendant had a duty of care (Judge) 
b)	Defendant failed to conform (breached) his standard of care (Jury)
c)	Defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of plaintiff’s injuries (Jury)
d)	Defendant’s conduct was the legal (proximate) cause of plaintiff’s injuries (Jury) 
e)	Plaintiff suffered actual damages (Jury)
B.	Breach
1.	Generally
a)	Is there substandard care / substandard behavior?
b)	An action can be one of four things with regards to breach:
(1)	Negligence Per Se
(2)	Prima Facie evidence of Negligence
(3)	Some evidence of Negligence
(4)	Irrelevant (no evidence of Negligence)
2.	Reasonable Standard of Care
a)	Generally, a person owes a “reasonable standard of care” to avoid breaching a duty owed.
b)	The formula to determine breach: B  < P L  
(1)	B = Burden of preventing the injury
(2)	P = Probability of the injury happening
(3)	L = The severity of the loss/injury
c)	Basically, this balances the cost of preventing an injury against the benefits of so preventing.
d)	Important: the scope of B and L must be the same.  (You must assign a burden sufficient to prevent the loss you are claiming)
e)	Ex.: When a warehouse is flooded by a burst pipe, but the cost of inspecting the pipe would entail astronomical cost, the owner of the pipe did not breach his duty to keep the pipe in good repair.  Grace v. City of Los Angeles 
f)	Ex.: When a worker is electrocuted by a live power line that served no useful purpose and would have entailed minimal cost to remove, the owner of the line did breach his duty to keep his premises clear of danger.  Allien v. Louisiana Power & Light  
3.	Factors Modifying Breach
a)	General Standard – Reasonableness is measured from the viewpoint of a “person of ordinary prudence” – applied to defendant. 
b)	Adults
(1)	Insanity – not accounted for (except for a small minority of jurisdictions)
(2)	Superior knowledge or characteristics – can be accounted for
(a)	Courts will limit this though – in Elliot, they treated a student of electricity injured on a field trip to an electrical construction facility as an ordinary person because his knowledge was theoretical, not practical.  (here applied to plaintiff since they sought contributory negligence)
(3)	Inferior knowledge or characteristics – not accounted for
(a)	dumbness is no excuse
(4)	Physical Handicaps – can be accounted for
(a)	Thus, a blind man does not breach if he does not use a cane if he shows that to do so is reasonable for a blind man.  Roberts v. State of Louisiana  
c)	Children
(1)	Majority Rule
(a)	“reasonable care” is determined from the viewpoint of a minor of the same age, experience, capacity, and development would follow.
(2)	Minority Rule
(a)	Minors under age 7 cannot be negligent
(b)	Minors age 7-14 are presumed not to be negligent, but this assumption weakens as the minor nears 14.
(c)	Minors over age 14 can be negligent unless they can prove incapacity.
(3)	Retardation can be accounted for in most states for minors.
(4)	Superior characteristics are not accounted for for minors.
(5)	Exception: a minor engaging in adult activities (e.g., driving a car) is held to an adult standard of care.
d)	Industry Custom
(1)	A departure from custom is strong evidence of a breach.
(2)	Adherence to a custom (or the absence of a custom to adhere to) is weak evidence that there is no breach.
(a)	The court will still apply the B > P L standard; if the burden is small, the court will find negligence even if there is no industry custom (essentially the court says there should be a custom)
(b)	Thus, in T.J. Hooper the court held a ship was negligent for not having a radio despite the lack of industry custom.  (Hooper claimed it was adhering to custom)
e)	Violation of Statute
(1)	The violation of a statute is negligence per se.
(a)	The breach test of B > P L is replaced with “was the statute violated?”
(b)	The legal cause test is replaced with “class of person/type of harm” 
(i)	Is the plaintiff in the class of persons the statute was designed to protect?
(a)	Potts v. Fidelity Fruit – produce worker injured by bug in bananas was not in class of persons statute was designed for (consumers); no liability 
(ii)	Is the harm the type the statute was designed to prevent?
(a)	Gorris v. Scott – Statute for pens on ships were designed to prevent disease, not sheep being swept overboard; no liability for lost sheep.
(c)	If the above test is not met, then there is no liability
(2)	Other excuses for violation of statute
(a)	Unavoidable accident/Impossibility
(b)	Safer to violate statute
(i)	Tedla v. Ellman – it was safer to walk on the less-frequented side of the road even though the statute said otherwise; no liability for doing so
(c)	Reasonable under the circumstances
(i)	Statute requires cars to be in good repair; no liability for not checking every second because to require such would be unreasonable.  Freund v. Debuse 
C.	Cause-In-Fact
1.	Generally
a)	“But for…” – but for the defendant’s substandard conduct, would the plaintiff have sustained the injuries claimed?
b)	Robertson’s Four-Part Test for Cause-In-Fact
(1)	Identify the injury
(2)	Identify the wrongful conduct
(3)	“Correct” the wrongful conduct (correct conservatively)
(4)	Roll the tape!
(a)	If the injury does not occur, then the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries.
(b)	If the injury still occurs, the defendant’s conduct is likely not a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries – try the alternatives, infra 
2.	Alternatives to the “But For…” test
a)	Shifting the Burden of Proof 
(1)	Done when the evidence is unfairly prejudiced against the plaintiff
(2)	Requires defendant to prove he is not negligent
(a)	Ex.: Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel – plaintiff’s husband and child drown at hotel’s unsupervised pool.  The lack of supervision by the hotel created a lack of evidence that works to their advantage; the court shifts the burden to them.
b)	Substantial Factor
(1)	Used when there is a combined force that brings about the injury and the court cannot determine via the standard “but for…” analysis which is the cause-in-fact.
(2)	In this case, we ask if the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
(3)	Ex.: Two fires, one set by the defendant, reach a building at about the same time and burn it to the ground.  “But for…” is inadequate since the injury might have happened from the other fire.  In this case, we ask if the defendant’s fire was a ‘substantial factor’ in the injury.  Since it is, the claim meets the cause-in-fact requirement.
c)	Unitize the Actors
(1)	Used in simultaneous actions.  Similar to burden shifting – multiple defendants are made into one; burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to prove he was not the cause-in-fact of the injury.
(2)	Ex.: Summers v. Tice – two hunters shoot simultaneously, causing injury.  It is impossible to tell which hunter’s bullet caused the injury.  Court “unitizes” both hunter’s conduct and shifts the burden to them to distinguish their conduct away.  (They’re both on the hook)  (Know this cite)
d)	Res Ipsa Loquitur
(1)	Literally, “the thing speaks for itself” – circumstantial evidence.
(2)	Requirements
(a)	Inference of Negligence – incident must give rise to an inference that there has been negligent conduct
(b)	Exclusive Control – the defendant must have exclusive control over the instrument of injury
(i)	This ‘nondelegable duty’ premise makes an independent contractor an “employee”
(c)	Plaintiff’s Action – Injury must not have happened as a result of any of the plaintiff’s voluntary actions
(3)	Res Ipsa Loquitur normally only gets a plaintiff past directed verdict and to the jury
e)	Lost Chance (Reduction in Chance)
(1)	Many courts will allow recovery for a loss of chance (typically, of survival), regardless of how the injury is defined.  Herskovits 
(2)	The best way to handle loss of a chance is to make the loss of chance into the injury
(a)	This makes the “but for…” test work out – correcting the conduct eliminates the injury (the lost chance)
(b)	If the death is the injury, in cases where the initial chance was less than half, the “but for…” test doesn’t work out – the victim still dies.
(3)	Note that the court must look to expert medical testimony in lost chance cases.
3.	Preexisting Injuries and Cause-In-Fact
a)	In a case where a preexisting injury is worsened by a defendant’s negligence, the defendant is only liable for the degree the injury was actually worsened.  LaMoureaux  
(1)	The plaintiff does not have to prove the division of damages with great certainty; rather it is left to the jury to give its ‘best guess.’
(2)	Ex: Boy falls from bridge, catches uninsulated wire.  In suit alleging negligence for keeping the wire too close to the bridge (not for failure to insulate) court reduces award to the value of a crippled boy’s life (since the fall would certainly have at least crippled him).
D.	Legal (Proximate) Cause: Are the cause and harm closely enough related to find liability?
1.	General Principles of Legal Cause
a)	Possible means of determining legal cause, from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant.
(1)	All “but for…” consequences
(2)	All direct “but for…” consequences
(3)	If (and only if) the injury was foreseeable
(4)	If (and only if) B > P L as to just this harm
b)	Distinguished from duty
(1)	Duty determines if defendant is under a duty to protect plaintiff from the specific type of harm.  It is a judge decision that can lead to summary judgment, or if details are needed directed verdict 1.
(2)	Legal Cause is a jury decision unless reasonable minds could not differ.  A duty can be owed and breached, but a directed verdict 1 could still be found for defendant if the harm is too far removed from the harm.
2.	The general rule: Foreseeability 
a)	The specific harm must be foreseeable from defendant’s breach
(1)	Thus, when a tanker spills oil, the owner of the tanker is only liable for harms that could be foreseen, and thus for damages from the oil catching fire on the water (considered unforeseeable) legal cause is not met; for damage from the oil congealing on docks are legal cause is met.  Just because the spill caused one type of foreseeable harm does not make it liable for all harms.  Overseas Tankship
(2)	The extent of the harm does not have to be foreseeable.  Thus, an “eggshell skull” can recover for massive head trauma even if an ordinary skull would only have a bump.
(3)	Means of occurrence does not have to be foreseeable.  Thus, if a foreseeable harm happens in a weird way, legal cause is met.
(a)	Thus, a defendant who speeds through a construction site, causing an electrical wire to wrap around a wheel, pulling down a worker on a utility pole still meets legal cause since injury to a person (a type of specific harm) is a foreseeable result of speeding.
b)	Possible tests for foreseeability
(1)	From trial judge perspective: Was what happened to the plaintiff among the array of foreseeable risks, or close to it?
(2)	If we had enacted a statute prohibiting the defendant’s conduct, would we have done so to prevent the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff?
3.	Alternatives to Foreseeability
a)	Directness
(1)	Asks if there is a reasonable connection between the conduct and the injury; i.e., can the defendant be directly linked?
(a)	Ask: is there a close, direct, and causal connection?
(2)	It is less likely for the judge to rule as a matter of law if the court uses directness; it is more likely to go to the jury; a judgment for the plaintiff is more likely unless there are wildly attenuated or intervening factors.
(3)	A move from foreseeability to directness liberalizes the legal cause issue in much the same way as moving from “but for…” to substantial factor liberalizes cause-in-fact – it is a “fuzzier rule.”
b)	“Collapsed” Cardozo Foreseeability
(1)	Combines breach and legal cause; asks if a person of ordinary prudence in defendant’s position would have taken steps to guard against the specific risk that occurred.
(2)	E.g., is there a duty to protect that specific plaintiff?  Are they subject to the array of risks?
(3)	Uncle Dave doesn’t like; it confuses the issues, is overly harsh and restrictive; courts generally don’t follow.
4.	Other issues for foreseeability
a)	Subsequent medical injuries – a defendant is liable for injuries sustained in the treatment of the original injury (medical personnel can also be liable)
b)	Rescuers are liable if the injuries are foreseeable
c)	A defendant is only liable for suicide if the injured person committed suicide while insane, in delirium, or unconscious
E.	Duty
1.	General Principles for Duty
a)	Duty Defined
(1)	A person is under a duty to all others to exercise reasonable care for their physical safety/property
(2)	Robertson’s view: A person engaging in affirmative conduct which has the potential to physically harm others has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing the harm. (Misfeasance)
(a)	Thus:  Affirmative Conduct  Physical Harm  DUTY
(3)	Generally, duty is negatively defined (“there is no duty…”)
2.	Failure to Act 
a)	A person does not owe a duty for a failure to act unless he meets one of the following exceptions
b)	Volunteers – attempting a rescue creates a relationship
(1)	A volunteer is under a duty to not make things worse. 
(2)	A gratuitous promise to volunteer/rescue does not create a relationship (unless the promise makes a contract).
(a)	This is starting to change
c)	Prior Innocent Conduct – if innocent conduct creates a mess, the creator is responsible for cleaning it up
(1)	Thus, if a car innocently knocks down a pole, the driver must move it or be liable for injuries caused by the pole being in the road.
(2)	However, if the innocent conduct does not create the danger, the person is not liable.  Thus, if a truck drives over an already-weakened bridge, weakening it further, he is not liable to warn other motorists.
d)	A relationship can create a duty to act; 
(1)	Thus, an airport has a duty to pilots who have paid their landing fee to take action to prevent injury on their premises and during ingress/egress; however, there is no duty to such pilots who are beyond the premises.  Traudt 
(2)	Also, masters owe duty to warn their servants about dangers they know or should know about.
(3)	This ‘relationship’ concept does not extend to family members, etc.; it must be created in some way
(4)	Sometimes a social relationship can result in liability, as when two friends get into a fight, one is hurt, and the other fails to take adequate care of him.  Farwell v. Keaton  
3.	Pure Economic Loss (no physical injury)
a)	Traditionally, no duty to prevent economic losses to prevent flood of litigation
b)	Testbank: No recovery unless there is a compensable physical injury to the person.
4.	Mental and Emotional Damages
a)	Possible methods of handling emotional distress
(1)	Recovery only if the emotional distress is accompanied (“parasitic to”) a physical injury or impact, and there are physical manifestations of the distress.  
(a)	Thus, a woman frightened into a heart attack by a charging bull was denied recovery, because there was no injury from the bull itself.  Bosley
(2)	Zone of Danger/Fear of Self – If (and only if) the negligent conduct puts the plaintiff in fear for himself, and there is a physical manifestation of emotional distress, recovery is allowed
(a)	Thus, dad who was almost hit by a car and had a heart attack because he feared for his own life can recover.  Niederman 
(3)	The Dillon Test
(a)	Elements (plus physical manifestations)
(i)	Plaintiff is near the accident
(ii)	Plaintiff had a “sensory and contemporaneous” observance of the conduct
(iii)	Plaintiff was closely related to the victim
(b)	Firm vs. Flabby
(i)	Firm – Each element must be met
(ii)	Flabby – Each element does not have to be met; they are only guidelines to determine liability.  Haught 
(4)	No rule – treat emotional harms the same as physical harms (still require physical manifestations)  Molien 
(a)	Note Robertson really dislikes Molien – he feels Dillon should operate as a checklist (firm)
b)	Most courts today apply one of the variations of Dillon (usually firm).  (The courts swing back and forth from restrictive to liberal in the cases they will allow; this progression demonstrates that)
5.	Government Entities
a)	Immunity – a government entity is exempt from liability entirely unless it expressly waives its immunity via statute or other government act.
b)	Public Duty Doctrine – a government entity that has waived its immunity is only liable for torts injuring someone with a “special relationship” to that entity (i.e., a person or class of persons)
(1)	Thus, a government is not liable for failure of police to show up in time to stop a crime since this represents its ordinary relationship with the general public
(2)	However, a government entity is liable for failing to keep a crossing guard at a school when it has done so consistently in the past, since this represents a special relationship with a class of persons (school children)  Florence v. Goldberg  
6.	Duty to Control Others
a)	There is generally no duty to control others, absent a special relationship
b)	However, an affirmative act can yield such a duty (e.g., Otis Engineering)
c)	Dram Shop Liability
(1)	Chico establishes liability for dram shops in Texas 
(2)	Later adopted by statute; lessens liability to dram shop, and no liability to private host for guests over age 21.
7.	Duty for Possessors and Owners of Land
a)	Possessor’s Liability for Off-Premises Injury
(1)	Duty owed for… (for comparison with next)
(a)	Activities – Reasonable Care
(b)	Artificial Conditions – Reasonable Care 
(c)	Natural Conditions – No Duty, except for recent “nibblings,” e.g., Sprecher (mud slide)
(2)	Note a possessor is either an owner or a lessee; one need not be physically present to be a possessor
(3)	Does rule forcing liability for off-premises liability make sense?
(a)	Coase theorem: Parties can get together and get the most economically efficient result (e.g., if it is cheaper to take steps to prevent an activity than the cost of the harm, it doesn’t matter if there’s tort liability or not – if there is liability, possessor will pay for the preventative improvement; if no liability, off-premises party will pay)
(b)	Robertson thinks the Law and Economics school overstates the effectiveness of this, though.
b)	Possessor’s Liability for On-Premises Injury
(1)	Duty owed a…  (for comparison with previous)
(a)	Trespasser
(i)	Activities – Very Limited; Duty to avoid recklessness
(ii)	Artificial Conditions – Very Limited; Duty to avoid recklessness
(iii)	Natural Conditions – Very Limited; Duty to avoid recklessness
(b)	Licensee
(i)	Activities – Reasonable Care (almost ?)
(ii)	Artificial Conditions – Limited Duty
(iii)	Natural Conditions – Limited Duty
(c)	Invitee
(i)	Activities – Reasonable Care (almost ?)
(ii)	Artificial Conditions – Reasonable Care (almost ??)
(iii)	Natural Conditions – Reasonable Care (almost ??)
(2)	Types of Persons On-Premises
(a)	Trespasser – One who enters (or stays) without permission
(i)	Duty owed: 
(a)	No duty but to refrain from willful injurious conduct
(b)	Exceptions exist for injured kids, land with frequent trespassers, and when the trespassers’ presence is discovered
(b)	Licensee – One whose only privilege derives from the possessor’s consent (e.g., social guests)
(i)	Duty owed: 
(a)	Reasonable care in activities on premises
(b)	Reasonable care to warn of dangerous conditions known to possessor an not likely to be discovered by the licensee (only in some jurisdictions, e.g., not NY)
(c)	Invitee – One who enters on either an errand of economic benefit to possessor (e.g., a business guest – generally, must yield a profit to possessor), or one present under circumstances that imply a representation by the possessor that reasonable care has been taken to make the property safe (e.g., public use)
(i)	Duty owed:
(a)	Possessor must inspect for potential dangers
(b)	All duties owed licensees
(3)	Some courts eliminate the distinction between licensee and invitee (others don’t)
(a)	Poulin v. Colby College (icy sidewalk) – court eliminates distinction (Maine)
(b)	Younce v. Ferguson (keg party) – court declines to eliminate the distinction (Washington)
(i)	Also note that in Younce, the court said a $4.00 cover for the party did not make her an invitee (no profit)
(ii)	Also note the party was not considered a ‘public use’ of the land
(c)	Also note that sometimes kids get invitee status regardless of why they are on the premises
(4)	Note the jury determines which category a person belongs in (an exception to the general duty rule)
c)	Owner’s Liability for Leased Land
(1)	Traditional Rule – no liability for a landlord unless:
(a)	There is a hidden danger
(b)	The premises are leased for public use
(c)	The injury is in a ‘common area’ under the landlord’s control
(d)	Negligent repair by the landlord
(2)	New Rule (most courts) – Landlords owe a duty of reasonable care, just like anyone else (Sargent v. Ross)
(a)	Problem: this means a trespasser (e.g., a burglar) can sue and the court cannot dismiss
(b)	Remember, B-PL to determine if they have met their duty
F.	Damages
1.	Types of Damages 
a)	Nominal – small award given if there is no compensable physical injury (does not apply to negligence since actual damage is an element)
b)	Compensatory – Designed to compensate for any injury, including medical costs, pain & suffering, etc.  For 3rd party, includes:
c)	Punitive – Designed to punish the tortfeasor and prevent similar conduct in the future.
2.	Measurement of Compensatory Damages
a)	How far into the future do damages extend?
(1)	Pain & Suffering – the victim’s life expectancy
(2)	Lost Earnings – the victim’s work life expectancy
(3)	All others – sometime after trial but before work life expectancy (includes medical expenses, etc.)
b)	Methods of measurement
(1)	Present Cash Value and Taxes
(a)	Present Cash Value
(i)	If you’re a business major, you should understand the concept of present value (if not, shame on you)
(ii)	If an award for lost earnings is increased each year to represent increased pay due to inflationary increases, it should also be discounted back to the present value to be symmetrical.  (O’Shea)
(iii)	Some (but not most) states don’t bother with either increasing the earnings or discounting back to present value because it complicates things for the jury.
(iv)	Robertson: we ought to treat differently losses before trial and losses after trial
(b)	Taxes
(i)	Since goal is to return parties to status quo, award for lost earnings should be discounted to reflect the taxes that would have been owed on those earnings (since compensatory awards are not taxed)
(ii)	Punitive awards are taxed 
(2)	Prejudgment interest (interest from date of injury to trial date)
(3)	Unit of Time (“Per Diem”)
(a)	Used frequently as a measure of pain & suffering damages.
(i)	e.g., “one dollar per waking hour” to compensate for pain
(ii)	Per diem usually results in inflated awards, at least in comparison with what the award would have been had it just been decided as a lump sum
(b)	There are three ways for courts to handle per diem instructions:
(i)	They are permitted (Texas)
(ii)	They are only permitted with cautionary instructions (Federal court; Westbrook)
(iii)	They are not permitted at all
(4)	Remititur (judge threatens re-trial unless a given figure is accepted)
(5)	Structured Settlements and Compromise Verdicts
c)	Distinction between Wrongful Death and Survival Damages
(1)	Wrongful Death – designated family members get damages representing what they have lost.  Includes:
(a)	Loss of support – earnings less personal expenditures
(b)	Loss of services – e.g., gardening, car maintenance (sometimes nurturing of kids of the jurisdiction doesn’t permit loss of society)
(c)	Loss of society – loss of companionship, e.g., nurturing kids, etc.
(2)	Survival – Damages to the decedent’s estate (lost earnings, etc.)
3.	Collateral Benefits (i.e., ‘freebies’)
a)	Collateral means not from the defendant’s pocket.  Includes:
(1)	Plaintiff’s thrift (e.g., he carries insurance)
(2)	Gifts (e.g., a relative who is a doctor provides plaintiff care free of charge)
b)	Two approaches to holding the defendant liable for damages the plaintiff can cover via collateral benefits
(1)	Majority Rule – Payments from collateral sources do not reduce the amount recoverable
(a)	Why the majority rule?:
(i)	Right of subrogation – insurance company or giftgiver can ask for reimbursement
(ii)	All tortfeasors should pay for their torts
(2)	New York Rule – There is no recovery for losses not actually incurred (Coyne)
(a)	Why the New York rule?
(i)	We don’t want to unjustly enrich the plaintiff, even if it is a windfall to the defendant
(ii)	States following this rule typically make an exception for insurance, since the plaintiff has paid for the benefit of coverage through premiums (and is thus not a pure collateral benefit)
4.	Punitive Damages
a)	Hierarchy of Blameworthy Conduct (worst to best)
(1)	Intentional Harm
(2)	Recklessness (e.g., disregard for safety)  Punitives usually start here
(3)	Gross Negligence  Sometimes here, though
(4)	Negligence
(5)	Strict Liability
b)	Synonyms for Punitives – exemplary (Texas); vindictive; smart money (to address the “smart” of the injury or insult)
c)	Pro and Con on Punitive Damages
(1)	Pro-Punitives
(a)	To discourage similar conduct for others
(b)	To specifically discourage the defendant from such conduct
(c)	Punishment for punishment’s sake
(2)	Anti-Punitives
(a)	Do we really want civil courts to punish, especially when the requirements for punishment exceed criminal standards?
(b)	Lack of protection for defendant in civil court that exist in criminal court
(c)	14th amendment considerations (substantive due process on actual amounts; procedural due process should limit how punitives are determined)
(i)	Robertson thinks that’s an awful lot to read into the 14th amendment!
(d)	Early awards can prevent later compensatory awards to other plaintiffs
d)	Tort Reform and Punitives:
(1)	Higher evidentiary standard for punitives (clear and convincing)
(2)	Many states (including Texas) require a separate ‘mini-trial’ to determine punitives
(3)	Ceilings set on punitives (in Texas, § 41.008, greater of $200k or twice economic and noneconomic damages not to exceed $750k)
e)	Who to tie the intent level (e.g., reckless, etc.) to in a company?
(1)	A corporate policy maker, e.g., the executive suite (Roginsky)
(2)	Any agent acting in a managerial capacity (Restatement; Grimshaw [the Pinto case])
(3)	Any employee
G.	Affirmative Defenses to Negligence (Contributory and Comparative Negligence)
1.	Contributory and Comparative Negligence
a)	General notes
(1)	The defendant’s case (as relates to the negligence of the plaintiff) only has to prove breach, cause-in-fact, and legal cause; duty is assumed and damages are just not an issue
(2)	For wrongful death suits, the victim’s negligence is imputed to the plaintiffs
b)	Contributory Negligence (DC, VA, AL (?), a few others)
(1)	Old common law rule is mostly gone; it bars recovery if the plaintiff was negligent in any way in causing his injury
(2)	The harshness of this rule led to many doctrines to get around it, including last clear chance (gone); reckless/willful & wanton requirement; double standard in favor of plaintiff; assumption of risk (see infra)
(3)	Most states have abandoned because of its harshness; also because of scholarly criticism, maritime never using it, and England (where it started) having abandoned it
c)	Comparative Negligence
(1)	In the late 1960’s, most states moved to a comparative negligence system, which rather than completely barring recovery simply reduced the plaintiff’s recovery by his amount of negligence
(2)	What gets compared?  Robertson says blameworthiness (as opposed to responsibility or causation)
(3)	Types of Comparative Negligence Systems (see statutes, p.363): 
(a)	Pure System 
(i)	Without Setoff – Plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by his own negligence. (NY)
(a)	Total Damages - P’s fault = P’s award
(ii)	With Setoff – Plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by his own negligence; if the defendant has counter-sued and wins, the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by the defendant’s award as well. (FL)
(a)	Total Damages - P’s fault = P’s award, reduced by D’s award
(b)	Robertson says setoff leads to windfalls to insurance companies, since one doesn’t have to pay at all and the other pay less than he ought to (rationale for setoff is that it is the way contract litigation is handled)
(b)	51% Bar System – Plaintiff is barred if his fault is more than defendant’s fault; otherwise, like pure without setoff (MT)
(c)	50% Bar System – Plaintiff is barred if his fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s fault; otherwise, like pure without setoff (AR)
(d)	Note Texas is 51% sometimes, 60% sometimes; no setoff
(4)	Examples of Comparative Negligence
(a)	P is 70% at fault, D 30%; $100k in damages. P gets…
(i)	c/n – 0 
(ii)	FL – 30k
(iii)	NY – 30k 
(iv)	MT – 0
(v)	AR – 0 
(b)	P is 50% at fault, D 50%; $100k in damages. P gets…
(i)	c/n – 0 
(ii)	FL – 50k
(iii)	NY – 50k 
(iv)	MT – 50k
(v)	AR – 0 
(c)	P is 70% at fault, D 30%; $100k in damages. D countersues and gets 100k in damages.  P gets…
(i)	c/n – 0 
(ii)	FL – 0; D gets 40k because of setoff [D’s 70k award - P’s 30k award = 40k for D]
(iii)	NY – 30k; D gets 70k 
(iv)	MT – 0; D gets 70k
(v)	AR – 0; D gets 70k
(d)	P is 50% at fault, D 50%; $100k in damages. D countersues and gets 100k in damages.  P gets…
(i)	c/n – 0 
(ii)	FL – 0; D gets 0 [setoff nets to zero – 50k - 50k = 0]
(iii)	NY – 50k; D gets 50k
(iv)	MT – 50k; D gets 50k
(v)	AR – 0; D gets 0 
(5)	Exceptions to Diminution of Comparative Damages
(a)	Reckless (“Willful and Wanton”) Conduct
(i)	If a defendant’s conduct is either intentional or reckless, the court may not reduce the compensatory damages by the plaintiff’s negligence (Defendant bears full award)
(a)	Derenberger (drunk car wreck) – court says comparative negligence says “negligence” and that willful and wanton means something different from mere negligence; it says D must bear the full award
(b)	Derenberger dissent – The reason for the differing definitions is a throwback to an ameliorative doctrine from contributory negligence days.  We ought to make P’s pay for their share of negligence because we want to discourage them from being negligent, too.
(i)	Robertson likes the dissent
(c)	Wassal (motel rape case) – Posner says intentional or reckless acts to force D to bear full award; “willful and wanton” a bad term since it creates confusion between recklessness and gross negligence.  (D was only grossly negligent)
(i)	Of course, Posner does his usual tortured math to show the economics are in favor of D
(b)	The Caraballo Heresy
(i)	Caraballo – Caraballo dives off of pier, sues government for failing to post signs.  Court eliminates all award (of a 70% P - 30% D split) to Caraballo, saying he is the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
(a)	Court basically says P is too unforeseeable, which in essence says he is more blameworthy
(ii)	It is a ‘heresy’ because it does not acknowledge mutual proximate cause reasoning – the two causes of his injuries are not mutually exclusive
(a)	Ex.: if a schoolteacher allowed one of her students to dive, both she and the government would be liable.  (If P’s liability is transferred to a 3rd person, there is clearly liability)
(iii)	As you might guess, Robertson does not like this opinion!  He thinks it would be more intellectually honest to throw it out on cause-in-fact (e.g., Caraballo would have ignored signs if they were present)
(c)	Note punitives are never reduced by comparative fault.
2.	Other Affirmative Defenses
a)	Failure to Mitigate Damages (FMD)
(1)	This deals with the post-accident conduct of the victim, where he aggravates the damages from the incident
(2)	Three ways to handle a victim’s aggravation of his injury:
(a)	Forgive the victim (no penalty)
(b)	Give the jury an instruction that they shouldn’t give the plaintiff what he could have avoided (traditional view – most courts)
(c)	Give the defendant a special verdict on the issue (i.e., jury fills out a number for amount of damages plaintiff could have avoided, which offsets award)
(3)	Main question is how much pressure do we need to put on victims to make them act properly? 
(a)	Robertson says not much – enlightened self-interest says so.  Also prevents confusion with FAC.
(4)	Moulton – plaintiff doesn’t follow doctor’s advice after injury, aggravates his injuries.  Different results at different levels:
(a)	Trial: court denies instruction and special verdict
(b)	Appellate: court grants both instruction and special verdict
(c)	Supreme: court grants instruction only (doesn’t want to clog the jury with more s.v.’s than there already are)
b)	Failure to Avoid Consequences (FAC) (motorcycle helmets and seat belts)
(1)	This deals with conduct of the victim before the incident that are not causes of the incident (e.g., aren’t legal cause or CIF), but make the accident worse (usually failure to wear helmets or seat belts)
(2)	FAC Pro and Con (from Hutchins)
(a)	Reasons not to admit evidence of FAC 
(i)	P shouldn’t have to anticipate D’s negligence
(ii)	It acts as a windfall to tortfeasors 
(iii)	Most motorists don’t buckle up
(iv)	It leads to a battle of experts (complexity)
(v)	P’s duty to mitigate doesn’t arise until after the accident
(vi)	Slippery slope (what if you drive a small car?)
(b)	Reasons to admit evidence of FAC
(i)	Causal relationship between injury and use of seatbelts/helmets
(ii)	Public knowledge that use prevents injury is widespread
(iii)	Auto collisions are foreseeable and the minimal effort it takes to buckle should be a factor in negligence
(iv)	Just because most don’t does not make failure to use reasonable
(v)	Battle of experts isn’t a big deal – juries are there to evaluate them
(3)	Four ways to handle FAC:
(a)	Forgive the plaintiff’s conduct (Dare)
(i)	No evidence of plaintiff’s FAC goes to the jury
(ii)	Note this is the approach in Texas (Transit Code § 545.413(g))
(b)	Admonitory instruction (treat same as FMD) (as in Moulton)
(i)	Admit evidence and give jury instruction, but no special verdict on percent of damage due to FMD
(c)	Tailored percent reduction (Hutchins)
(i)	Steps:
(a)	Break down damages into FAC and non-FAC parts
(i)	(Of course, if no FAC just use regular contributory fault ratios)
(b)	For non-FAC portion, use a “universe” where non‑FAC percentage fault for both P and D mean 100%
(i)	e.g., if P’s non-FAC fault is 30%, and D’s fault is 60%, then 100% “equals” 90%
(c)	For FAC portion, use P’s total fault (including FAC) to reduce the damages
(d)	Add FAC and non-FAC portions to get total award
(ii)	Remember, you’re measuring blameworthiness, not causation.
(d)	Bar that part (102 Harv. L. Rev. 923)
(i)	Denies an portion of damages that result from FAC
(ii)	This really sends a message to victims to take reasonable cautions
(4)	Sample Problem: Page 392
(a)	Facts: Motorcycle accident.  Cyclist (P) was not wearing a helmet; he sustains head and bodily injuries.  State is a 51% bar state.  Following facts were returned by the jury:
(i)	P’s fault: 40%; D’s fault: 60%
(ii)	$100,000 total award; $76,000 of this is caused by failure to wear a helmet (e.g., head injuries; thus the damages are $24,000 for bodily injuries)
(iii)	Part of cyclist’s fault resulting from failure to wear a helmet: 25% [25% of 40%, or 10%, stipulated by Robertson]
(a)	Thus, P is 10% at fault for not wearing helmet, and 30% at fault for other reasons.
(b)	How to handle under various schemes:
(i)	Forgive P’s FAC
(a)	This means eliminating the 10% portion of D’s fault
(b)	The total injuries equal $100k.  You must use a “90% universe” to eliminate the FAC fault.
(c)	Thus, head injuries equal 30/90, or 1/3 of the $100k, which means D is 2/3 at fault.  Thus, P’s recovery for head injuries is $100k x 2/3, or 66k
(d)	Note you use the total recovery here because it’s faster – the 10% never applies to the bodily injuries, and since we’re forgiving the FAC, it doesn’t apply to the head injuries, either.
(ii)	Bar That Part
(a)	This means you don’t give the plaintiff anything for the head injuries.
(b)	That only leaves the 24k for bodily harm; since the 10% fault for FAC doesn’t apply to the bodily harm, we have to use a “90% universe” to determine comparative fault
(c)	Thus, P is 30/90, or 1/3 at fault, meaning D is 2/3 at fault.  P’s recovery is therefore $24 x 2/3, or $16k
(iii)	Tailored Percentage Reduction (most courts will use this)
(a)	This means you reduce the plaintiff’s recovery for damages resulting from his FAC, but not for damages that are independent of that (e.g., not for the bodily harm)
(b)	That means that for head injuries, P is 40% responsible and D is 60% responsible; the total damages for the head injury is $76k; therefore, P’s damages are 60% x $76k, or $45.6k
(c)	Add to this D’s liability for the bodily injuries ($16k, as computed above in “Bar That Part”)
(d)	Thus, P’s total recovery is $45.6 + $16, for a total recovery of $61,600
c)	Assumption of Risk (AR)
(1)	Express (Boehm)
(a)	These are typically waiver of liability forms
(b)	Keys to validity (all from Bohem):
(i)	Is signer an employee?  Many courts say an employee cannot waive his employer’s liability (key is control)
(ii)	Is D’s conduct intentional or reckless?  Such contracts are not valid for conduct of that level of culpability
(iii)	Public policy analysis of contract:
(a)	Is it an adhesion (e.g., ‘take it or leave it’) contract?
(i)	If yes, it probably isn’t going to provide D a defense
(b)	Is the action the signer is waiving liability for a necessity?  (if so, it’s probably an adhesion contract)
(c)	Some court will also look into inequality of bargaining power between the parties
(c)	Robertson: express AR is alive and kickin’
(2)	Implied Primary
(a)	This is really more like limited duty/no breach – a low standard of reasonable protection is implied
(b)	Typical case is a baseball park – fence to shield folks from foul balls is enough; don’t have to fence whole park (those in the bleachers assume the risk)
(3)	Implied Secondary
(a)	Unlike primary, here the defendant has breached a duty, but the plaintiff has recognized the breach and continued to act in an unreasonable fashion towards the risk
(i)	In other words did he know of a risk and voluntarily undertake it?
(b)	The plaintiff’s actions must be voluntary for the defendant to use it as an affirmative defense (Marshall v. Ranne, where a bad hog bit a man – not voluntary because his only alternative was to become a prisoner in his own home)
(c)	This is really just contributory negligence through the back door; many (including Robertson) think it’s pretty stupid in a comparative negligence era.
(i)	To that end, implied secondary is mostly gone as a rule in most jurisdictions (replaced by comparative fault)
(ii)	Additionally, note it would be erroneous to define duty according to the plaintiff’s knowledge – that would create “The Caraballo Heresy”
III.	Intentional Torts
A.	General Notes on Intentional Torts
1.	Intent
a)	Intent means either…
(1)	Purpose or desire, or
(2)	Knowledge of a substantial certainty (Garratt)
b)	Transferred Intent
(1)	Intent transfers from tort to tort (Battery, Assault, and FI but not IIED) and from victim to victim 
(a)	Therefore, if you intend to commit an assault, but inadvertently commit a battery, the intent from the assault “transfers” to the battery
(b)	Also, if you intend to batter A, but accidentally batter B, your intent transfers from A to B.
(c)	Bennight – (bat bite case) – court finds assault when supervisor sends worker into warehouse  this transfers to a battery when she gets bitten.
2.	“Person” can be broadly defined beyond the body to things in a person’s immediate surroundings.
a)	Therefore, in Fisher, grabbing a plate from a person’s hand was considered a touching of his “person”
b)	How far can this be extended?  Roberto Alomar throws baseball at umpire’s car as he drives away (doesn’t create apprehension in ump, just damages car).  Is there a battery?  Only if you extend the ump’s “person” to include his car.
3.	“Offensive” means the action would offend a reasonable person’s sense of dignity – it is an objective standard
a)	Note, however, that it is flexible – what a 5-year old does may not be offensive, but a 35 year old doing the same act may be offensive
B.	Types of Intentional Torts
1.	Elements
a)	Battery
(a)	Defendant caused a touch to person
(b)	The touch was harmful or offensive
(i)	Remember definition of “offensive,” supra
(c)	Defendant intended to touch  (Ghassemieh, Garratt)
(i)	Note this means intent to touch which turns out to be harmful or offensive, not intent to harmfully or offensively touch
b)	Assault
(1)	Defendant caused apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive touching to person  (Vietnamese Fishermen – imminent)
(a)	Note apprehension does not mean fear – it means the plaintiff did not want the touching to occur.
(2)	Apprehension is reasonable
(3)	Defendant intended to cause apprehension 
c)	False Imprisonment (FI)
(1)	Defendant caused confinement of person  
(a)	(Herbst – must be by threat of force and apparent intention to use force)
(b)	Confinement must be in an enclosed area (excluding a person is not FI)
(c)	Reasonable (or reasonably discoverable) escape route negates FI
(2)	Confinement was harmful or knowing (P had to be hurt or be aware he was confined!)
(3)	Defendant intended to confine  
d)	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
(1)	Defendant caused severe emotional distress in person
(2)	Defendant’s conduct was outrageous  
(3)	Defendant is intended to cause the emotional distress
2.	Punitive Damages for Intentional Torts
a)	Mostly, this involves tinkering with intent, changing it from intent to do X, and making it intent to cause harm, plus outrageous conduct
(1)	Battery: intent to touch; punitives = intent to harm/insult + outrageous conduct
(2)	Assault: intent to cause apprehension; punitives = intent to harm/insult + outrageous conduct
(3)	False Imprisonment: intent to confine; punitives = intent to cause some kind of suffering + outrageous conduct
(4)	IIED is different – since intent to harm and outrageousness are already elements of the tort, there are three ways to handle:
(a)	All IIED’s can yield punitive damages
(b)	Other courts use this reason as a reason not to recognize IIED
(c)	Still others “tweak” the definition of outrageousness for punitives – i.e., regular IIED must be outrageous, but for punitives the conduct must be really, really outrageous (two definitions for the same word)
b)	Remember, intent includes knowledge of a substantial certainty  
c)	FYI: a few other places where intent is different:
(1)	Liability insurance exclusions
(2)	Criminal Law
(3)	Workers Comp loophole
C.	Defenses to Intentional Torts
1.	Note that for defenses, the defendant must plead the defense and bear the burden of proving the defense at trial
2.	Types of Defenses
a)	Consent
(1)	Express or Implied-In-Fact Consent
(a)	Appearance is everything – it doesn’t matter if the plaintiff actually wanted to be touched, etc., but rather if she lead the defendant to believe she was consenting (O’Brien – ship vaccination)
(b)	Sports – You consent to contact sanctioned by the rules and a degree of contact “within the culture of the game.” – that is, the range of expectations from the sport.  (Overall, denying consent for post-game hockey fight – no one expects a fight after the game)
(c)	Range of expectations applies in many situations – you consent to a certain amount of touching by walking through crowded law school hallway between classes.
(d)	Consent to fight – A narrow majority of states say there is no consent to fight
(2)	Implied-In-Law or Imposed Consent (e.g., medical consent)
(a)	The basic problem is how to handle medical treatment done without the patient’s consent (e.g., additional procedures than the one agreed to).  Three ways to handle (most courts have ‘evolved’ to the third):
(i)	No consent unless agreed on prior to operation (dangerous, since doctor can’t do anything that may be necessary in a timely fashion)
(ii)	Contact outside the scope of agreement is permitted in an emergency
(iii)	Contact outside the scope of agreement is permitted if it is needed in the doctor’s opinion (Kennedy – unauthorized punctured cyst)
(b)	Court in Kennedy says patient impliedly consents to any sound surgical procedure which is necessary in the doctor’s opinion – that’s a misnomer, as the consent is really imposed 
(c)	If parents aren’t available, courts will imply consent for children as a matter of law.
b)	Self Defense/Defense of Others
(1)	A defendant can use self-defense as a defense if (mostly objective test) (Tatman v. Cordingly):
(a)	Defendant actually believed there was danger (i.e., defendant really thought he was in trouble), and
(b)	Defendant’s belief was reasonable (i.e., an objective third person would have believed the same)
(i)	Must be reasonable in both nature and extent (fear is reasonable, and amount of force is reasonable)
(2)	The self-defense privilege also transfers intent.  That is, A batters B, but B repels him into C.  C has a battery claim against both A and B; B has a self-defense claim against A and C
(3)	There is an east-west split on whether you have to try to flee, if possible, before using deadly force (East says flee, West says don’t flee)
(4)	Note you can use self-defense to ward off any harmful touchings (including negligent touchings) 
c)	Defense of Property
(1)	General rule is you can use any reasonably, apparently necessary force in defense of property (note this is also another way of stating self-defense rule)
(2)	Defense of Property includes the right to exclusive possession (e.g., throwing a Jehovah’s Witness off you land)
(a)	Note you cannot use force to resist privileged force (e.g., the Jehovah’s Witness can’t use self-defense to repel your defense of property)
(3)	Deadly force is never allowed in defense of property (nor great bodily injury)
(a)	Note this may be different from criminal law
(b)	Can you threaten deadly force?
(i)	Probably not – usually, if force is privileged, any tort resulting from it is also privileged; the court’s don’t want you to shoot to frighten and accidentally hit, and then have defense of property as a defense.
(ii)	But maybe so – threatening to “release the hounds” is probably OK (Robertson: maybe the rule in (a) above only applies to guns)
(4)	Spring guns are not reasonable! (if aimed at person, “great bodily injury” is close enough to deadly force)  (Katko)
(5)	Can only use FI until property is returned, and maybe a reasonable time after that.  (Teel – girls shoplift and are caught; detaining them was OK until they returned the goods, and may be reasonable to detain them until cops arrive; not reasonable to detain them until they sign a confession)
(6)	Note that, like self-defense, defense of property can be invoked when preventing negligent acts as well
d)	Necessity
(1)	Necessity is an “incomplete” privilege
(a)	You can impinge on a person’s property right by necessity if there is no reasonable alternative
(i)	Thus, for a dock owner to push off a ship that was moored there (a trespass) in a storm was not privileged defense of property since the boat was there by necessity (Ploof)
(b)	However, a person who uses necessity as a defense must pay for any damage done to the person’s property caused by his use of it (Vincent – similar to Ploof, but had to pay damage done to dock)
(2)	Note that necessity can only be used as a defense to torts against property; it cannot be used as a defense for torts against a person
(3)	Necessity distinguished from self-defense – self-defense threat comes from another party, while threat prompting necessity comes from another source (like God)
(4)	Necessity vs. negligence (using Vincent facts)
(a)	As stated, necessity requires a person to pay for damage caused
(b)	On the other hand, breach (B-PL) analysis would probably reveal the cost (B) of leaving the dock was more than the PL of staying put, and so damages would be nothing.  Why?
(c)	Two reasons:
(i)	Because P’s conduct here is intentional (D stayed intentionally, sacrificing the dock to save his ship
(ii)	Negligence doctrine is built on the idea that we want people to take reasonable (B>PL) risks.
(d)	Thus the basic distinction is between inadvertence and intentional conduct (e.g., basic fairness)
(i)	“Even a dog knows the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked” – Holmes 
(5)	A few examples of necessity as a defense from Ploof:
(a)	Driving sheep with a dog, and dog runs onto neighbor’s land (“can’t recall dogs in an instant”) (no trespass due to necessity)
(b)	Traveler on highway is blocked goes around the road, trespassing on the adjacent land (no trespass due to necessity)
(c)	Unauthorized entry on land to save goods from fire or flood (no trespass due to necessity)
(d)	Ferryman who throws overboard a casket during a storm to lighten the boat and save the ship (no tort due to necessity)
IV.	Liability for the Actions of Another
A.	Vicarious Liability
1.	Employer-Employee (“Respondeat Superior”)
a)	An employer is vicariously liable for a worker if:
(1)	The worker committed a tort
(2)	The worker was an employee
(a)	When is a person an employee and when are they an independent contractor?
(i)	The basic test is control – how much control does the employer exercise over the details of how the person does his job?
(3)	The worker was acting within the scope of his employment 
(a)	Traditional rule: “acting with a purpose to serve the master”
(b)	New rule develops toward one of reasonable foreseeability (Bushey)
(i)	In other words, is the action totally unforeseeable from the viewpoint of typical job activity and workday stresses?
(a)	Factors include geographical nearness and temporal proximity (closeness in time) to workplace
(ii)	Thus, in Bushey, it is foreseeable that a drunken sailor might mess with some knobs at the drydock where the ship he is stationed on is located 
b)	Punitive Damages & Vicarious (Employer-Employee) Liability – three ways to handle:
(1)	Full-Scale – employer automatically liable for punitives if he is liable for compensatory (Fisher)
(2)	Managerial Agent – employer liable for punitives if tortfeasor acted under managerial direction (Grimshaw)
(3)	Corporate Suite – employer liable for punitives if tortfeasor acted under direction of high-ranking executives (Roginsky) 
c)	A note on worker’s compensation – worker’s comp is supposed to pay for any harms to employees without suing.  Damages are minimal; if employer has worker’s comp, the employee is generally limited to that as a remedy.
d)	Why vicarious liability?
(1)	We want to encourage employers to take steps to remedy situations where injuries are likely to occur
2.	Employer-Independent Contractor
a)	Normally, an employer is not liable for the torts committed by an independent contractor (see test for employee/contractor, supra)
b)	An independent contractor may, however, be held liable if it meets any of these three conditions (Becker):
(1)	The employer retains control over the subcontractor’s activities
(2)	The subcontractor employed is incompetent (Becker)
(a)	This can be extended to a financially irresponsible subcontractor, as in Becker, where the sub did not carry insurance proportionate to industry custom.
(i)	Note the facts of Becker leads to an unusual result, since the damage from not carrying enough insurance is a pure economic loss, which is normally not actionable (but is permitted at the time under NJ law)
(b)	Note Robertson loves Becker – he thinks you can teach the whole course from it (it brings in lots of different things, like industry custom and pure economic loss)
(3)	The subcontractor is involved in an inherently dangerous activity
c)	Considerations in extending liability to employers of independent contractors
(1)	Who can best bear the loss? (loss spreading) – a fairness issue
(2)	Who can best control the factors leading to an accident?  (e.g., employer can require proof of insurance)
(3)	Cost of accidents should be borne by those who get the benefit of the accident-causing activity
B.	Imputed Contributory Fault (ICF)
1.	Basic question: When will the injured party’s negligence will be imputed to a third party seeking recovery for a related injury?
2.	Two classes of ICF:
a)	Vicarious liability – based on a relationship, such as husband-wife 
(1)	For example, wife suing for compensation for medical expenses due to her husband’s injuries gets husband’s negligence imputed to her
b)	“Derivative” Action – no relationship is involved – suit is for an injury flowing from a 3rd party’s injury (e.g., the wife above is suing for her own injuries stemming from her husband’s injury)
(1)	Common-Law derivative actions
(a)	Survival
(b)	Wrongful Death
(c)	Loss of Spousal Consortium
(2)	Statutory derivative actions (availability depends on state)
(a)	Parent-Child Loss of Society
(b)	(others not mentioned)
3.	Campbell – court refuses to impute driver liability to rental car company suing to get value of the car it lost from the other driver.  Court says it looks at how much control the company had over the car.  Court reaches it’s result by:
a)	Ignoring the relevant statute (NY statute makes owner responsible for other users of the vehicle
(1)	Statute uses term “liable and responsible” – shouldn’t “responsible” mean ICF?  (rule of construction says give every term meaning)
(2)	See note on statutory interpretation, infra
b)	Applying precedent cases 
(1)	Mills, which said no imputed liability for owner not present in the car
(2)	Gochee which imputed liability when the owner of car was in the back seat)
c)	Public Policy Analysis (contributory negligence applies at the time; court says widening availability to suit is a good thing)
(1)	Not as big a deal now, since comparative negligence is the rule almost everywhere
4.	Statutory Interpretation and ICF
a)	Note the statutes on page 363 (comparative negligence statutes)
b)	Robertson says language such as “attributable to” or “chargeable to” (as in, “negligence attributable to…,” as opposed to “negligence” by itself) ought to means ICF.  Therefore:
(1)	NY – ICF applies for diminution (no bar in NY)
(2)	MT and – No ICF for bar provision; ICF for diminution 
(3)	AR – (ass-backwards) – ICF for bar; no ICF for diminution 
c)	Sample ICF Problems (assume 50% bar state) 
(1)	Husband: 35%; Wife 25%; Defendant 40%
(a)	Husband recovers: 40%
(b)	Wife recovers: 40/65
(2)	Husband: 45%; Wife 15%; Defendant 40%
(a)	Husband recovers: BAR (45 is more than 50% of 85 [45+40])
(b)	Wife recovers: 40/55
(3)	Husband: 35%; Wife 25%; Defendant 40%
(a)	Husband recovers: 40%
(b)	Wife recovers: BAR (45 is more than 50% of 85 [45+40])
(c)	Note under White v. Lunder dicta, husband may be barred (dicta bars if injured party would be barred – wrong interpretation of statute)
V.	Specialized Immunities
1.	Governmental Immunities –  The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
a)	History of the FTCA
(1)	Prior to WWII, all government entities (except for specific instances of local government) had total immunity from tort
(2)	In certain cases, legislature would pass “private bills” waiving immunity for specific individuals so they could sue for a given harm
(3)	In 1946, the FTCA was passed; broadly speaking, the rest of the states soon followed suit
b)	Provisions of the FTCA
(1)	General rule: if the US was a private person and that private person could be sued, the US can be sued 
(2)	State law where incident happened controls
(3)	Bench trial is required (no jury)
(4)	First have to make your claim to the agency responsible before going to court (agency has 6 months to respond)
(5)	Two year statute of limitations
(6)	Liability – US is liable to the same extent an individual would be, except no punitives or prejudgment interest
(7)	Exceptions to Liability 
(a)	Claims against an employee acting with due care in performance of a discretionary function (this is the biggest exemption)
(b)	Intentional torts
(c)	Combatants in times of war
(d)	Claims arising in foreign countries
(e)	Others (assessment of tax, loss of mail, fiscal operations, etc.)
c)	Military Personnel
(1)	Strictly by the statute, active-duty military personnel ought to be able to sue just as private individual
(a)	Statute specifically exempts wartime combatants and foreign claims (which implies that domestic peacetime injuries ought to be allowed)  However…
(2)	The Feres Doctrine 
(a)	This says that an active duty serviceman cannot sue for torts committed by his fellow personnel.
(i)	Court misapplies statute’s phrase “like situation” (they read it as “all the circumstances”
(ii)	Thus, they say, active-duty personnel are not in all the circumstances a private person would be – there is nothing like the military in private life
(b)	Reasons it’s OK to exclude active-duty servicemen:
(i)	Workman’s Comp scheme already in place, so no need for tort suits
(ii)	Not fair since local state law controls, because the personnel have no choice over where they are stationed
(iii)	Robertson: better reason might be that we want to avoid second-guessing military decisions (but that’s not one of the reasons the court gives)
(c)	The Feres doctrine is widely viewed as disreputable, but it is still with us (courts bash it and then continue to apply it)
d)	The Discretionary Function Exception
(1)	Dalehite (fertilizer explodes, wiping out Texas City) established that the carrying out of a government program is not within the FTCA as it is within the government’s discretion
(2)	The problem with that is it can defeat the whole purpose of the FTCA: every government employee is acting within some degree of discretion
(3)	Many courts thus try to draw distinctions, as in Lindgren 
(a)	Lindgren makes the distinction on planning and operational level activities
(i)	Planning, i.e., the broad plan, is not actionable
(ii)	Operational, i.e., the nuts and bolts, is actionable
(b)	Lindgren involved a water skier who was injured due to the lowering of a lake by a federal dam; suit alleges failure to warn; court remands to determine if not posting sign is an operational or planning decision
(4)	Robertson, however, says there’s no real way to get a good rule of thumb on the distinctions – the courts are all over the map on when a claim is actionable and when it isn’t.  (Courts tend to read the discretion exemption narrowly, though)
e)	Other notes on the FTCA
(1)	The government does not take liability for intentional torts; in cases where it is unclear if something is intentional or negligent (e.g., Ghassemeiah), the government gets the benefit (the government wins all ties)
(2)	The government is immune from all strict liability cases 
B.	Family Immunities 
1.	Generally, immunity between family members has been abolished
2.	Robertson’s Three Policy Arguments for Retaining Immunity
a)	Flood – flood of litigation (e.g., to we really want this to pop up in every divorce case?)
b)	Fracas – avoids family strife
c)	Fraud – easy to concoct a story to collect insurance money
d)	Also, note that immunity also applies to suits for contribution; this is to avoid discouraging a parent from filing suit for their injured children because of a fear that a judgment may come back to them
3.	Negligent Supervision (exception to abolishment)
a)	Holodook – court says you cannot sue for negligent supervision; no parent can watch their kid every second; parenting is like studying – you can always do a little more
(1)	Exception to the exception – parents have a duty to not entrust their children with dangerous instruments around 3rd parties (Nolechek)
(a)	Robertson: this is a mistake – it violates the principle that a right to contribution is dependent on the plaintiff’s ability to sue the 3rd party defendant (e.g., a son can’t sue his dad, so the defendant should not be able to sue for contribution from dad)
b)	Approaches to Parental Immunity
(1)	Full Immunity (Robertson says this is the best choice)
(2)	Full Liability (no immunity)
(3)	Limited Immunity for parental discretion/authority
(a)	This tries to distinguish between what is purely parenting and what is a decision anyone can make
(b)	Also note this is not supervision
VI.	Multiple Tortfeasor Problems
A.	Joint and Several Liability
1.	Generally, if the injury sustained cannot be divided, any defendant may be held liable for it jointly and severally (i.e., liable for the whole amount)
a)	Thus, in Landers, where two pipes sent waste into a pond and as a result ruining it, the plaintiff could sue either party for the full amount of damages since the injury could not be divided properly among them
b)	The injuries (if multiple) must be reasonably related in time (Loui, where guy got into three auto accidents in three years – can’t tell what injuries were from which wreck, but court does not hold the first driver jointly & severally liable [court instead gives him pro-rata damages; most courts wouldn’t even do that]
2.	History
a)	Sue each individually (e.g., no joinder)
b)	Concert – Joint & Several if they acted in concert (e.g., if they are vicariously liable – utilizes “unitize” approach, as in the two hunters example)
c)	Common Duty – If they are the same “legal unit” (if they use the same pipeline, for instance)
d)	Indivisible Result – (Baylor bus crash) – injury is indivisible, but no cause in fact work is done
e)	Cluster – Same as above, but cause in fact work is done
(1)	The distinction is the first is a mixed source with one result, while the second is a mixed source with mixed results.
(2)	Ex.: death = indivisible injury (result); other physical harm = divisible injury (result)
3.	Why Joint and Several Liability?
a)	It’s unfair to deny plaintiff  recovery just because the damages are indivisible (better for some defendants to pay more than for plaintiff to get nothing; it’s not the plaintiff’s fault he can’t divide the injury)
B.	Contribution and Indemnity
1.	Defined (generally)
a)	Contribution – defendant sues joint tortfeasors for their share of the injury
b)	Indemnity – defendant sues joint torfeasor for all of the damages owed
2.	Contribution
a)	Pros and Cons of Contribution
(1)	Pro
(a)	Fairness – Everyone shares the blame (Robertson: this has carried the day)
(b)	Deterrence – Shares the blame and ferrets out all the tortfeasors 
(2)	Con
(a)	Fairness – Court shouldn’t aid those with dirty hands
(b)	Deterrence – Russian Roulette (who wants to risk the bullet?)
(c)	Efficiency – No contribution encourages settlement
b)	Note that percent causation has nothing to do with the percent blameworthiness used for comparative negligence
c)	Also note that settlement eliminates any contribution owed to other tortfeasors (to encourage settlements)
3.	Indemnity
a)	Types of Indemnity Categories (structured as indemnitee-indemnitor, e.g., he who seeks indemnity - he who owes indemnity)
(1)	Passive-Active (abolished)
(a)	This stems from contributory, “all-or-nothing” rules that aren’t around anymore; instead of indemnity, passive tortfeasors should pay their share (Lochner, where hospital sues doctor for indemnity for negligent surgeries)
(2)	Vicarious-Direct
(3)	Strict Liability Retailer - Strict Liability Manufacturer
b)	Thus, according to the above, in Otis Engineering, the company:
(1)	Could get indemnity against supervisor who sent drunk worker home (vicarious-direct – employer is vicariously responsible, and supervisor is directly responsible for the negligent act – here, sending him home)
(2)	Could not get indemnity against the drunk employee (not vicarious-direct as he wasn’t acting within scope of employment; maybe passive-active, but that has been abolished)